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Abstract 
Immigration is a contentious issue for the governments of developed countries 
like the UK. Despite limited evidence demonstrating any substantial 
detrimental impact of immigration, it is often opposed. This thesis contains 
three empirical works that investigate a) how immigrants view immigration 
and how these views compare to natives b) the role of the labour market in 
establishing views towards further immigration and c) the impact of 
immigrants on primary schools in England. Data come from the UK 
Citizenship Survey; the censuses, providing longitudinal data on immigration 
in local areas, and the Department for Education, providing panel data for 
primary schools. A variety of econometric techniques are employed for the data 
analysis: OLS, Probit, Ordered Probit, fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design 
(RDD), fixed effect regressions, and Instrumental Variable (IV) are all 
implemented. 
Results suggest that earlier immigrants are similar to natives in being 
opposed to further immigration, while recent immigrants are more in favour 
of further immigration. Financial and economic shocks are associated with 
stronger anti-immigration responses. However, labour market concerns do not 
play a large role for either group of the respondents. 
The role of labour market is investigated more rigorously by studying 
the change in views of native males on exit from the labour market. After 
controlling for the potential selection and endogeneity biases using a fuzzy 
RDD, views of native males, essentially, remain unchanged with some 
evidence of reduced opposition after exit from the labour market.  
Finally, this thesis investigates the impact of immigrants on educational 
outcomes and schools. Using past location choice of immigrants to account 
for the non-random selection of immigrants into areas, results suggest that 
increased immigration has improved educational outcomes, both in English 
and maths, but also placed resource pressures on primary schools, as class 
sizes have increased and schools had to hire additional teachers. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This chapter sheds light on the economic, political and societal importance of 
immigration as a research topic. It explains the research background in light 
of the previous immigration literature in general and in the context of 
immigration in the UK in particular. It provides information on the history of 
immigration into the UK. It explains the aims and objectives of this thesis, 
highlights important immigration issues and finally outlines the structure of 
the thesis.  
1.1 Research Background 
Immigration has always been an important topic of research due to its 
controversial nature. Irrespective of the fact that the literature often 
demonstrates the benefits of immigration, it is often opposed. Why is 
immigration opposed? An answer to this question can be very helpful in policy 
formation and in understanding the social fabric. This question becomes even 
more important if the society is ethnically, culturally and religiously diversified 
like the one in the UK. Issues like discrimination, racism and xenophobia can 
be better understood once this question is answered. 
People with different ethnic, cultural or religious backgrounds perceive 
things differently. Every individual has his own reasons and motivations for 
possessing the views/attitudes that he possesses. Much of the previous 
economics literature, that this thesis draws upon, has referred to “attitudes” 
rather than views. In wider social sciences, “attitudes” are often taken to 
represent a deeper psychological consideration that cannot be identified from 
the questions normally used in the research in economics on attitudes. For 
purpose of this thesis the terms “attitudes/views” are used interchangeably 
assuming that even if they are not identical they are highly correlated. 
People living in a diverse society need to interact with each other.  The 
way one behaves towards the other is due to some certain reason or is backed 
up by a motive. That motive can be economic, social or based upon personal 
experience. This research thesis is focused on the attitudes/views towards 
further immigration and its consequences. 
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Over time, immigration has increased in developed countries and as a 
result different types of social and economic issues have arisen, such as: the 
economic impact of immigration on the host country, wage differentials, 
discrimination, unemployment, racism, societal integration, assimilation, 
xenophobia (fear of foreigners), attitudes towards immigrants and cultural 
aspects of immigration. All of these have remained highly debated issues 
during recent decades and are explained below in the light of previous 
literature. 
1.1.1 Immigration Issues 
Research has investigated the impact of immigration on the economy in 
the host countries. A large body of empirical literature is available that 
addresses the question of immigration and its impacts upon local labour 
markets.1 Economic theory suggests that the decisive element of economic 
impact of immigration resides on the skill differences of immigrants and 
natives. Source country will gain more if there are greater differences in 
immigrant native skills. Natives having complimentary skills with immigrants 
gain and those having similar skills lose. Facchini and Mayda (2006) studied 
the redistributive welfare state effect on natives’ attitudes towards 
immigration. They found that high earners suffer more from unskilled 
immigration when taxes are raised to keep the per capita share unaffected but 
low earners suffer more from unskilled immigration if tax rates remain same 
and per capita share is reduced. Its exact opposite is true in case of skilled 
immigration. Borjas (1992) found that skill differences exist in the second and 
third generation of the immigrants and part of these differences are 
attributable to the “ethnic externalities”. These ethnic externalities affect the 
labour market outcomes or productivity of the children. He suggests that 
increasing the skill level of one generation increases the economic welfare of 
next generations.  
Most of the research findings state that immigration does not have any 
considerable adverse effect on local labour markets in the US (Altonji and 
                                       
 
1 For comprehensive review of the literature on the economic impact of immigration see, 
Borjas, G.J. (1994), Borjas, G.J. (1999), Friedberg, R.M. and Hunt, J. (1995), LaLonde, Robert, 
J. and Topel, R.H. (1996). 
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Card, 1991; Card, 1990; Card, 2001; Kuhn and Wooton, 1991; LaLonde and 
Topel, 1991), the UK (Dustmann et al., 2003; Dustmann et al., 2005), 
Germany (Haisken-De New and Zimmermann, 1994; Haisken-De New and 
Zimmermann, 1999; Pischke and Velling, 1997), France (Hunt, 1992), 
Portugal (Carrington and Lima, 1996), Austria (Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller, 
1996; Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller, 1999) and in Western Europe as whole 
(Angrist and Kugler, 2003). All of these studies (except for Borjas (2003)) 
indicate that immigration has almost no negative effect on the wages, 
employability or displacement of natives in local labour markets. By contrast, 
Borjas (2003) detected reductions in average native wages by 3%, whereas 9% 
for those having minimum education on a 10% increase in immigration in the 
US.  
Increases in net immigration mean an increase in labour supply, and 
theoretically, in a simple model, an increase in the labour supply decreases 
wages and increases unemployment in the host country. Mostly, immigration 
reduces the wages and increases the unemployment in immigrants (see, for 
example, Manacorda et al., 2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). Manacorda et al. 
(2012) for Britain using the UK’s Labour Force Survey (after 1983) and the 
General Household Survey (mid 1970s to mid-2000s), and similarly for the 
US, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) using the US Decennial Censuses 1960 – 2000 
and 2006 American Community Survey. They find that wage difference 
between natives and immigrants is an outcome of their skill differences and 
that an increase in immigration decreases immigrant wages, if there is any 
effect of immigration on native wages, it is positive suggesting that natives and 
immigrants are not competitors in the labour market. These recent additions 
to the literature strengthen the idea of Borjas (1992) that natives and 
immigrants are imperfect substitutes as they possess different skills and 
hence are not competitors in the labour market.  
A large body of literature finds a positive correlation between the 
earnings of immigrants and their years of stay in the host countries. As the 
time spent in the host country widens, the wage differentials between natives 
and immigrants narrow because immigrants acquire natives’ skills that result 
in reducing the wage gap between the two groups, for instance (Bloom and 
Gunderson, 1991; Baker and Benjamin, 1994) for Canada, (Dustmann, 1993) 
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for Germany, (Beggs and Chapman, 1991) for Australia, and (Chiswick, 1978; 
Carliner, 1980) for the US with an exception of Hammarstedt (2003) for 
Sweden. Hammarstedt (2003) find that even after 15 years of stay in Sweden, 
immigrants do not reach to natives’ wage level. Bratsberg (1995) found that 
immigrant students after completing their education they earn more in U.S. if 
their home country offers them a low return to skills and earns less if home 
country is paying high return to skills. 
Some studies attribute wage and employability differences to 
discrimination:2 For instance Arai and Thoursie (2009) for Sweden use data 
from Patent och Registreringsverket3 (Swedish Patent and Registration Office 
(PRV)) to find the foreign forfeited names from 1991 – 2000. This data is then 
matched with the LOUISE database (Data of entire population in Sweden) and 
is used to investigate the wage differences between individuals with foreign 
sounding names and the individuals who surrendered their foreign sounding 
names and adopted neutral or Swedish sounding names. Using Difference-in-
Differences, they find that the change of foreign names to neutral or Swedish 
sounding names rewarded name changers in terms of 26% higher wages than 
the name keepers. Similarly, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for the US 
find that white names receive 50% more call backs for job interviews as 
compared to the African American names, in their field experiment of sending 
fabricated CVs that differ only by name. For Sweden Hammarstedt (2003) 
finds wage difference in the favour of immigrants coming from Nordic 
countries as compared to immigrants from non-Nordic countries depicting 
wage differentials based on where the immigrants come from. 
Apart from the labour market competition, Card et al., (2012) give 
another reason why people may oppose further immigration, which they term 
“compositional concerns”. “Compositional concerns” refer to the utility derived 
from the non-economic social determinants like interpersonal trust, 
neighbourhood safety, workplace and schools. They conclude that these 
concerns are five to six times more crucial in the attitude formation of natives 
towards immigration as compared to the economic concerns like wages and 
                                       
 
2 For detailed theory on discrimination read the seminal work of Becker, G.S. (1971). 
3 Name change authority in Sweden. http://www.prv.se 
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taxes. Additionally, a body of literature throws light on prejudices, suggesting 
views towards immigrants vary depending upon where those immigrants come 
from. Dustmann and Preston (2004) find that in the UK immigrants from 
European countries experience better attitudes compared to the immigrants 
from Asia or West Indies. 
In opposition towards further immigration perceptions may be more 
important than the facts. Those perceptions can be caused due to various 
reasons and can influence the voting behavior of public and prioritization of 
issues (Ipsos MORI, 2014; Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Glaeser, 2005). 
According to the Ipsos MORI’s political barometer from October 2014, 45% of 
the respondents consider the subject of “race relations/ immigration / 
immigrants” as the first most important issue, followed by 34% respondents 
considering “NHS / hospitals / health care” as the second most important 
issue and 30% respondents choose “economy / economic situation” as the 
third most important issue facing Britain today, (Ipsos MORI, 2014). In a 
recent survey conducted by the Ipsos MORI, in 14 countries including the UK, 
they found that mostly people are unaware of the real facts and figures behind 
the news in print and electronic media. In the survey, they found that people 
living in the UK overstate the number of immigrant population in the UK two 
times more as compared to the actual number of immigrant population. 
Additionally, people living in the UK also tend to overstate the unemployment 
rate by up to three times more than the actual unemployment rate. Nardelli 
and Arnett (2014), in their article of 29th October, 2014, report the managing 
director of the Ipsos MORI, Bobby Duffy, as saying that public priorities may 
be different if the public has correct information and a clearer view about 
immigration. 
 The following section explains immigration in the context of the UK. The 
UK is arguably an interesting setting for research on immigration as it has 
experienced a large influx of immigrants in recent years and the impact of 
immigration has been an area of major public concern. 
1.1.2 Immigration in the UK 
 Immigration towards Europe increased rapidly after World War II. As far 
as the UK is concerned, immigration increased after the 1950s when 
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immigration started from the New Commonwealth4 countries as their citizens 
were not subject to immigration controls. Due to rapidly increasing 
immigration from these countries, Commonwealth citizens were brought 
under immigration control on 1st July, 1962 under “The Commonwealth 
Immigration Act 1962”. In 1967, Kenyan Asians and Ugandan Asians, started 
immigration into the UK due to discriminatory behaviour experienced in their 
home country. They started to immigrate at a rate of about 1000/month on 
the basis of having British citizenship after independence, meaning that they 
did not come under immigration control according to “The Commonwealth 
Immigration Act 1962”. This lead to a revision of the former immigration act 
to “The Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968” that ensured to bring all the 
entrants without a parent/grandparent born in the UK, under immigration 
controls. Immigration was further tightened by introduction of “The 
Immigration Act 1971” which was implemented in 1973 that removed the 
differentiation between Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth citizens to 
enter into the UK. 
 Figure 1.1 shows immigration, emigration and net migration into the 
UK since 1964.5 Since 1994, net immigration has always been positive. In 
2006, under “The Immigration Regulations 2006” family members of 
European Economic Area citizens who were not citizens of European 
Economic Area were granted the rights to work and live in the UK without 
prior permission and as a result immigration hit the highest recorded number 
of 596,000 immigrants into the UK. 
                                       
 
4 In the year 1949 Modern Commonwealth began. Countries ruled by Britain who joined 
Commonwealth before 1945 are informally known as Old Commonwealth countries (for 
example, Australia, Canada, New Zealand). Countries who got independence later and joined 
Commonwealth are known as New Commonwealth countries (for example, Bangladesh, India, 
and Pakistan). 
5 Standard definitions of the terms immigration, emigration and net immigration are used. 
Immigration is the term used to refer to the people entering into the UK. Emigration is the 
term used to refer to the people leaving the UK. Net migration is the difference between 
immigration and emigration. If net migration is positive it means that more people entered 
into the UK to stay than people left it to live somewhere else. 
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Figure 1.1: Migration in the UK since 1964 
 
Source: International Migration Data – ONS 
Dotted lines show provisional immigration and emigration 
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In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union and gained 
the rights to live and work in the UK under “The Accession Immigration and 
Worker Authorisation” and the net migration hit the highest recorded number 
of 273,000 breaking the earlier highest net migration record of 268,000 
migrants in 2004. In 2008, 427,000 emigrants – the highest recorded number 
ever – left the UK during the late 2000s UK recession. From June 2009 to June 
2010, 591,000 immigrants came to the UK and the number of immigrants 
coming to the UK has been around this level since 2004. Net migration from 
2004 to 2011 remained within minimum of 229,000 migrants in 2008 and 
2009 and highest of 273,000 in 2007, followed by a decrease in net migration 
to 177,000 migrants in the UK in 2012. In the labour market, 690,000 
National Insurance Numbers were issued to people having any nationality 
other than British in the year up to September 2011. This allocation of 
National Insurance Numbers was an increase of 11% as compared to the 
previous year. 
According to the Office for National Statistics’ quarterly report published 
in February 2012, immigrants from New Commonwealth countries hit the 
highest recorded number of 170,000 among the immigrants entering into the 
UK in a year from June 2010 to June 2011, (ONS, 2012). Two thirds came to 
the UK to study. The total number of immigrants on student visas in the year 
up to June 2011 was 242,000 out of which 46% were from New 
Commonwealth countries. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka had a 
75% share in study immigrants from the New Commonwealth countries. The 
dotted lines in figure 1.1 show provisional numbers of immigration, emigration 
and net migration. According to the provisional numbers, net migration in the 
year ending March 2013 is standing at 175,000 immigrants into the UK. Net 
migration went up with an increase of 68,000 migrants to a provisional total 
of 243,000 migrants in the year ending March 2014. 
Immigrants into the UK has been coming from several countries. So 
heterogeneity in immigrants is expected in the UK. Due to this heterogeneity 
in immigrants, different cohort of immigrants coming into the UK in different 
time periods or immigrants coming from different countries or immigrants 
with different ethnicities may behave differently and may have different 
attitudes towards immigration. Immigrants coming from non-English 
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speaking Eastern European or Asian countries are generally less educated as 
compared to the immigrants coming from commonwealth countries. These 
immigrant groups coming from different countries also differ in their 
command over English language. Then the immigrant composition becomes 
heterogeneous by negative selection (generally from non-English speaking 
Eastern European or Asian countries) and positive selection (generally from 
commonwealth countries). It is possible that these two groups of immigrants 
have a different effect on the educational outcomes. This negative vs. positive 
selection may have implications on findings of chapter 6, however due to data 
restrictions immigrant heterogeneity could not be controlled for. We try to 
control for immigrant heterogeneity in this thesis wherever it is possible. Like, 
in chapter 4 we try to identify two immigrant groups on the basis of their stay 
in the UK. Although, this identification strategy is not flawless but given the 
data constraints it is not possible to identify immigrants in more detail and on 
other levels. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate opposition towards further 
immigration and impact of immigration on educational outcomes and schools’ 
resources. Despite the extensive literature trying to explain why people oppose 
further immigration, a large part of the question of why immigration is 
opposed is still unanswered. This thesis tries to explore this question from 
different angles. While literature exists on natives who are opposed towards 
immigration, little is known about the views of immigrants towards further 
immigration. As immigration is increasing in the UK, this makes research on 
the views of immigrants towards immigration even more important. 
To begin with, this thesis explores the determinants of being opposed 
towards further immigration. Additionally, it explores the opposition of 
immigrants towards further immigration. Moreover, for a deeper 
understanding of the views of immigrants towards immigration, immigrants 
are further divided into earlier and recent immigrants. The former being the 
ones who have been in the UK for more than five years and latter being the 
ones who came to the UK in last five years. In the next step, this thesis then 
compares the views of natives towards further immigration with the views of 
earlier and recent immigrants. It also investigates how natives’ and 
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immigrants’ views towards immigration change in the face of economic and 
financial shocks. Data from the UK Citizenship Survey (2007 – 2010) is used 
for the analysis and OLS is employed for estimation. For checking the 
robustness of our findings, a wide range of procedures and combination of 
procedures is used such as different sample restrictions, different outcome 
categorizations and usage of probit and ordered probit methodologies for the 
estimation. We find that a clear heterogeneity is present among immigrants. 
Immigrants who have been in the UK longer are more similar to natives in 
being opposed to further immigration, while recent immigrants are more in 
favour of further immigration. Financial and economic shocks are associated 
with stronger anti-immigration responses, even when holding the level of the 
respective variable constant. However, labour market concerns do not play a 
large role for either natives or either group of immigrants in determining views 
towards further immigration. 
Even though the initial investigation shows no evidence for a role of the 
labour market in determining views of natives towards further immigration, 
this thesis explores this question more deeply in chapter 5. For this purpose, 
data from the UK Citizenship Survey (2009 – 2011) is employed. A Fuzzy RDD 
is used for estimating the change in views of native males towards further 
immigration upon retirement from paid work. The idea is that if the labour 
market plays any role in determining views of natives towards further 
immigration, there should be a change in views from being anti-immigration 
to pro/neutral views towards further immigration on exit from the labour 
market. As effectively, once a person is retired he is out of the labour force 
then the labour market competition and the labour market concerns become 
less of a concern. The findings once again suggest that the labour market does 
not play a large role in establishing anti-immigration views. OLS results do 
not show any significant change in views of native males towards further 
immigration on exit from the labour market. Even after controlling for the 
potential selection bias and endogeneity bias using RDD, views of native males 
mostly remain unchanged, however a little evidence of reduced opposition 
towards further immigration is found for natives males on their exit from the 
labour market.  
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As a final step, this thesis investigates the impact of immigration on the 
public services. There is a possibility that natives may oppose immigration 
due to the competition between immigrants and natives in the public services. 
It is likely that immigrant concentrated areas experience more pressures on 
resources than other areas. Although, immigrants and natives are not 
competitors in the labour market but they are certainly competitors in 
accessing the public services. This competition in public services can be the 
source of negative attitudes towards immigration. This thesis tries to find the 
impact of immigrants on educational outcomes and schools’ resources using 
panel data on primary schools in England. The data about schools is taken 
from the “School League Tables” provided by the Department for Education 
and data about immigration at local authority level and at a low level 
geographical region is taken from the censuses conducted in year 2001 and 
2011 by the Office for National Statistics.  
This chapter uses various fixed effects regressions as well as IV, where 
past location choice of immigrants is used to account for the non-random 
selection of immigrants into areas. We find that increased immigration has 
improved educational outcomes, both in English and maths, but also placed 
resource pressures on primary schools, as class sizes have increased and 
schools had to hire additional teachers. The novel and innovative point is that 
this is the first study of its type that simultaneously studies the trade-off 
between expenditures and improved educational outcomes (schools’ 
performance) on the face of increased immigration. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis has been divided into seven chapters with additional 
appendices found at the end. Chapter 1 describes the research background 
concerning immigration in general, describing broad immigration issues, 
followed by a brief history of immigration into the UK. 
Chapter 2 describes all the data sets used in this thesis in detail. It 
opens with an explanation of the UK Citizenship Survey and then moves on to 
describe data from the Office for National Statistics and finally ends with a 
description of School Performance Table data from the Department for 
Education. Chapter 3 is about methodologies used in this thesis. It explains 
OLS, why it is used, what are its advantages and what problems we face when 
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using OLS. Subsequently, probit and ordered probit are explained, along with 
their advantages, disadvantages and reasons of use. Afterwards, Instrumental 
Variable (IV) is explained, why IV is preferred and what problems are 
addressed by the use of IV. It also explains the benefits of using IV when OLS 
fails. Eventually, Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is elaborated with its 
strengths and weaknesses. This chapter ends with an explanation of fixed 
effects estimates, why fixed effects are used and what type of fixed effects can 
be employed in different situations. 
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter of the thesis and investigates 
views towards further immigration. It explores views of natives and 
immigrants and finds that there is a clear heterogeneity within immigrants in 
their views towards further immigration: Immigrants who have been in the UK 
more than five years are more similar to natives in their opposition to further 
immigration, while recent immigrants who have arrived in the UK within the 
last five years are more in favour of further immigration. Afterwards, 
determinants of natives’, earlier immigrants’ and recent immigrants’ views are 
compared. Finally, this chapter explores the views of the three respondent 
groups towards further immigration in the face of financial difficulties and 
economic shocks. It suggests that financial and economic shocks are 
associated with stronger anti-immigration responses, whereas, labour market 
concerns do not play a large role for either natives or for either group of 
immigrants.  
The role of the labour market in shaping views towards further 
immigration is investigated in greater detail in chapter 5. It employs a Fuzzy 
RDD exploiting discontinuity in labour market participation upon reaching 
the state retirement age. The last two waves of the UK Citizenship Survey are 
used for this chapter due to the non-availability of some variables in other 
waves. It estimates the change in views of natives towards further immigration 
upon exit from the labour market due to retirement from paid work and finds 
that views of natives remain unchanged. This chapter reinforces findings of 
chapter 4 that the labour market does not play a significant role in 
determining views towards further immigration. To further explore possible 
reasons  for natives’ opposition towards immigration, lastly, this thesis 
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investigates whether immigrants and natives compete for public services 
(primary schools in this case) in chapter 6.  
Chapter 6 investigates whether immigrants are a burden on public 
services. Primary schools as being one of the main public services are 
considered in this chapter. Data for schools are taken from the School League 
Tables provided by the Department for Education and low-level regional data 
on immigration are taken from the UK Censuses 2001 and 2011 provided by 
the Office for National Statistics. These data sets are then combined to see the 
impact of immigration on educational outcomes and schools’ resources in 
England. This chapter uses various fixed effects regressions as well as IV, 
where past location choice of immigrants is used to account for the non-
random selection of immigrants into areas. This chapter suggests that 
increased immigration has improved educational outcomes, both in English 
and maths, but also placed resource pressure on primary schools, as class 
sizes have increased and schools had to hire additional teachers. 
Chapter 7 concludes estimations and findings of all the empirical 
chapters, with appendices presented in chapter 8 and references given at the 
end of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2. Data 
This chapter provides detailed information about all the data sets used 
in this thesis. It explains the choice of data, their importance, and their 
advantages and limitations. Data used for this thesis are obtained from three 
main sources, namely, the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG), the Office for National Statistics (ONS), and the 
Department for Education.  
2.1 Citizenship Survey 
The Citizenship Survey formerly known as “Home Office Citizenship 
Survey” (HOCS) began in 2001 is a repeated cross-sectional study. Initially it 
was a biennial survey conducted by the Home Office in 2001, 2003, 2005 and 
2007 – 2008. In May 2006, the Citizenship Survey fell under the sponsorship 
of the Communities and Local Government department (now known as the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)). From 2007 
onwards the survey has been conducted annually, with data collection taking 
place each quarter. The publicly available data for this period combines four 
quarters, giving surveys for 2007 – 08, 2008 – 09, 2009 – 10, and 2010 – 2011. 
In March 2008, this survey was awarded National Statistics status meaning 
that the data have been certified by the UK Statistics Authority in compliance 
with the code of practise for Official Statistics. These data are in conformance 
with the standard principles, procedures and practices used to carry out big 
projects of data collection. In the field this survey is known as “Communities 
Studies”. 
The Citizenship Survey provides a national representative sample of the 
adolescent and adult population of age 16 and above living in England and 
Wales. The method of data collection used is face-to-face interview. A multi-
stage stratified random sampling method is used to obtain addresses of the 
houses selected for interviews. In the first stage, a systematic sample of wards 
is selected. There are about 8,800 wards in England and Wales each contains 
about 2,500 addresses. Any ward containing less than 500 addresses is 
grouped with a neighbouring ward. In the second stage, addresses are 
systematically sampled within the selected wards using a postcode address 
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file. Each wave has approximately 15,000 respondents. Face-to-face 
interviews are conducted over the year in four quarters. Each wave contains 
a core sample of 10,000 respondents (2,500 respondents interviewed each 
quarter) and has an ethnic boost sample of 5,000 respondents.6 The survey 
wave 2009 – 2010 contains a Muslim boost sample of around 3,000 
individuals. Ethnic boost samples and Muslim boost sample are obtained by 
a systematic oversampling in the respective category. 
Topics covered in all surveys include: feelings about the community, 
trust and influence, including community cohesion, trust and influence, 
identity and social networks, religion, volunteering, race and religious 
prejudice, civic engagement, perceptions of discrimination, mixing between 
people of different backgrounds, demographic, and values. Questions on 
further immigration are only included in the waves from 2007 onwards and 
hence data from 2007 – 2011 are used for this thesis. The questionnaire used 
for the Citizenship Survey includes standard established questions; 
demographic questions are mostly taken from the Office for National Statistics 
question booklets, questions about family and relationships are taken from 
the General Household Survey, questions on trust are taken from the World 
Values Survey and the British Social Attitudes Survey. Interviews are 
conducted by the trained professional staff of Ipsos MORI and TNS-BMRB. 
The Citizenship Survey data are used for this thesis for a number of 
reasons. This survey has the advantage that it includes the minority ethnic 
boost sample of around 5,000 respondents in each wave that enables us to 
investigate the views of immigrants towards further immigration. However, it 
does not have any information about the immigrants who left the UK. As the 
Citizenship Survey data are not panel data, so we are unable to follow the 
change in individuals’ attitudes over the years. A close comparison to the 
Citizenship Survey data is the British Social Attitudes Survey. The British 
Social Attitudes Survey also asks our question of interest about immigration. 
It is an annual survey and has been running since 1983. It has the advantage 
of having a large number of waves, 31st wave in 2014. However, the sample 
                                       
 
6 For greater details of sampling procedure see technical report of the Citizenship Survey 
(DCLG and Ipsos MORI, 2007). 
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size of the British Social Attitudes Survey is only around 3,000 individuals in 
each wave. It becomes even smaller when it comes to an ethnic minority 
sample. The small sample size of the British Social Attitudes Survey does not 
allow us to investigate the views of immigrants towards further immigration. 
In other words, a major part of the research question this thesis is 
investigating is impossible to write without the use of the Citizenship Survey 
data. 
2.2 Census Data 
Every ten years, a population census is conducted in England and Wales 
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). Apart from conducting a ten-yearly 
census, the ONS collects data in the UK on various subjects such as; economy, 
society at national, regional and local levels, demography, migration and 
crime, and publishes the official statistics. ONS is known as the national 
statistical institute of the UK and is the executive office of the UK Statistics 
Authority (ONS, 2014).  
Data on immigrants, measured by people born outside the UK, is 
collected as part of the censuses by the ONS during the census years 2001 
and 2011. We use this data at low level geographical regions to find the 
number of immigrants coming into the local areas. Although, some issues 
regarding the accuracy of this data can arise, however, this is the only 
available data set collected at the national level. All the residents with country 
of birth other than the UK are considered as immigrants. Data provided by 
ONS contains Middle-layer Super Output Area (MSOA) codes and Lower-layer 
Super Output Area (LSOA) codes with information on immigration at 
respective levels. LSOAs are based on post-codes, which in the UK are usually 
equivalent to streets, and are designed to remain stable over time. One can 
think of the LSOAs as being equivalent to neighbourhoods, while MSOAs are 
close to city quarters or smaller towns. LSOAs have a minimum population of 
1,000 with a mean of 1,500, equal to approximately 650 households. LSOAs 
are then combined to generate an MSOA. Each MSOA contains a minimum 
population of 5,000 with a mean of 7,500 or around 3,000 households. At 
present, there are 34,753 LSOAs and 7,201 MSOAs in England and Wales. 
These data are then combined using a postcode joining file, with the “School 
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League Tables” data also known as “School Performance Tables” explained in 
the following section. 
2.3 School Performance Tables / School League Tables 
“School Performance Tables” also known as “School League Tables” are 
published annually by the Department for Education.7 The underlying data is 
collected by LEAs (Local Education Authorities).8 The data provide school-level 
information on pupils’ performance and school characteristics, such as total 
number of pupils, pupil-teacher ratios and various performance measures. 
Outcomes that are measured in both years 2001 and 2011 and recorded in 
“School Performance Tables” are used for this thesis. We consider two sets of 
outcome variables; the first set of outcome variables is associated with school 
resources or general school characteristics, specifically the number of pupils 
eligible for key stage 2 assessment, the number of pupils whose first language 
is not English, the number of native pupils, the pupil-teacher ratio, and the 
number of teachers and the second set of outcome variables is educational 
achievement in the Key Stage 2 exams sat at the age of 11, the end of primary 
education.9 These are: the percentages of pupils achieving level 4-competency 
or above in English or Maths respectively10, the average point score in these 
exams, and the percentages of students not achieving any level of proficiency 
due to absence or disapplication (i.e., the percentage of pupils not sitting the 
respective exam) in English or Maths. 
                                       
 
7 The Department for Education is the official government authority responsible for the 
education of children in the early years, in primary and secondary schools and in further 
education of young adults under the age of 19 years (DfE, 2014). 
8 In England and Wales, local government has a lower level administrative layer called as a 
“local council”. Each local council has an education authority responsible for the education 
in a list of schools that comes under its control in its local area and is known as “Local 
Education Authority (LEA)”. 
9 The English school system is structured in 4 “Key Stages”. Each key stage refers to a certain 
age and completed educational years. Key Stage 1 starts with the reception class at the age 
of 4 and ends at the completion of 2 educational years at the age of 7 with an assessment in 
English and Maths. Key Stage 2 starts at the age of 7 and ends at the age of 11 after 
completion of 4 educational years with an assessment in English, Maths and Science. Primary 
education is completed at the end of the Key Stage 2 assessment, after which students begin 
their secondary education comprised on Key Stage 3 and Key Stage 4. 
10 Different levels represent the National Curriculum Test Levels, ranging from 1 to 8, with 
higher levels indicating higher competency. Key stage 2 exams cover levels 3 to 6, with 4 being 
the expected level of knowledge at this stage. The share of pupils achieving level 4 or above is 
thus equivalent to those performing at expected or higher levels at this stage of their 
education. 
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 The “School Performance Tables” data are publically available and 
contains a panel of schools recorded in both years of our interest. So far, to 
the best of our knowledge this is the only available data that provides 
information about school-level pupil outcomes and schools’ resources. 
However, another data set National Pupil Database (NPD) is also available. It 
contains pupils’ test and exam results at different key stages, data about 
students in non-maintained schools, independent schools, and further 
education colleges. Essentially, we do not use this data set as we are interested 
in school-level outcomes as presented in “School Performance Tables” in 
contrast to the pupil-level outcomes presented in National Pupil Database.  
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
This chapter explains the methodologies used in this thesis. All the 
empirical chapters apply with OLS as it gives the Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimates (BLUE) of beta coefficients given that the classical assumptions of 
OLS are satisfied. Problems arise when the classical assumptions are violated. 
To address the issues resulting from violation of assumptions, advanced 
methodologies are employed. This chapter explains why a particular 
methodology is used, what its necessary assumptions are, what problems that 
methodology addresses, how and why a methodology works. The formal setup, 
intuition behind each methodology, and a brief discussion on each 
methodology is also given in this chapter.  
3.1 Regression Methods 
Normally, OLS is used when the outcome variable is a continuous 
variable. Other methodologies like probit, and logit come in to the picture 
when the outcome is a limited dependent variable. A limited dependent 
variable is one that can only take a limited range of values for example, gender, 
education etc. OLS can also be used to model binary limited dependent 
variables using linear probability models (Angrist, 2001; Menard, 1995). 
However, one of the issues in modelling limited dependent outcome variables 
using linear probability models is that it may predict probabilities less than 0 
or greater than 1 (unbounded probabilities). It also breaks the classical 
assumptions of homoscedasticity and the normal distribution of the error 
term. Violation of homoscedasticity and normal distribution of the error term 
are not a significant problem because OLS estimates still remain unbiased. 
Due to the fact that in large samples the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) 
demonstrates that as the sample size increases, sampling distribution tends 
to normality. The most important problem is the former one. 
For tackling the issue of unbounded prediction of probabilities, 
methodologies like logit and probit are employed. If the error term has a 
logistic distribution then logit is used and if the error term has a normal 
distribution then probit is used. Generally, the choice of logit or probit rarely 
matters, as both methodologies give similar results. We use probit and ordered 
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probit in this thesis for comparison with OLS estimates. OLS is used as a 
starting point for all the analysis as there are some advantages of modelling 
probabilities using OLS such as: a) linear probability model using OLS is 
simple to estimate, b) it provides consistent estimates of betas, and c) the 
estimated model is easy to interpret i.e. the beta coefficients gives the marginal 
change in probability, ceteris paribus.  
Probit and likewise logit and many other estimation methods use a 
latent variable approach. They use an unobserved continuous latent variable 
Yi* that decides what is observed in the data. The latent variable is a linear 
function of the independent variables. Probit solves the unbounded probability 
prediction problem by using the latent variable Yi* that does not allow the 
predicted probability to fall outside 0 and 1. To illustrate the probit 
methodology, let us take a simple model with one observed binary outcome 
variable ‘Y’, one independent variable ‘X’ and ‘Y*’ is a latent unobserved 
variable. The formal setup is as follows. 
 
Yi* = α + βXi + εi          (3.1) 
 
If the latent variable Yi* ≤ 0 then we observe Yi = 0 
If the latent variable Yi* > 0 then we observe Yi = 1 
 
Yi = 1 if {Yi* > 0} = 1 {α + βXi + εi > 0} 
 
It is assumed that our latent variable Yi* is correlated with the 
independent variable ‘X’. The error term εi is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
the independent variable ‘X’ and has a parametric distribution. In 
parameterising the model, if the distribution chosen for the error term is a 
logistic distribution, then logit is used, whereas, if the distribution chosen for 
the error term is standard normal distribution then probit is used.  
There is a crucial point to remember in interpreting the coefficients of 
OLS and probit that their coefficients are neither directly comparable nor have 
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same interpretation.11 Coefficients of OLS are interpreted as a marginal 
change in Yi, whereas, probit coefficients give the change in the latent variable 
Yi*, this is not the change in the actual binary outcome variable Yi. 
Nevertheless, interpretation of the sign and significance is similar for both the 
latent variable Yi* and the original binary outcome variable Yi.  
Marginal effects provide us the change in Yi for a one unit change in the 
value of ‘X’. The main disadvantage of the probit is that the change in Yi  is 
different for different values of ‘X’. For instance, in figure 3.1, one unit increase 
in ‘X’ from 3 to 4 has a different effect on change in probability of ‘Y’, compared 
to one unit increase in ‘X’ from 4 to 5. 
Figure 3.1: Interpretation of marginal effects in probit  
 
Interpretation of the marginal effects becomes even more complex when 
the number of independent variable ‘X’ is more than one. Then the change in 
Yi depends upon the values of all ‘X’ variables. To tackle this issue of so many 
marginal effects, sometimes marginal effects are calculated for an average 
individual after setting the values of all the ‘X’ variables to their sample mean. 
These are called “Marginal Effects at Mean”. An alternative way referred to as 
“Average Marginal Effects” is to calculate the marginal effect for each 
observation in the data and average across individuals. Occasionally, marginal 
                                       
 
11 Similar caution holds true for all other methodologies using latent variable approach such 
as logit, ordered probit, ordered logit etc. 
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effects are also calculated at interesting values related to the research 
question. 
After using probit for this thesis, we also use ordered probit to 
investigate how much the choice of methodology affects our findings. Our 
outcome variable for chapter 4 and chapter 5 is originally an ordered 
polytomous variable that is converted into a binary variable for estimating OLS 
and probit regressions. Ordered probit is explained in the following section. 
3.2 Ordered Probit 
Ordered probit is used whenever the outcome variable is an ordered 
limited dependent variable, for example in a question about controlling 
immigration into the UK, respondents may choose from “increase a lot”, 
“increase a little”, “remain the same”, “reduce a little” and “reduce a lot”. In 
this example, there is clearly a meaningful order in terms of information 
respondents wanting a tighter or loose immigration policy. The benefit of using 
ordered probit is that we do not lose the information contained in the ordering.  
Just like probit, ordered probit also uses a latent variable approach. The 
formal setup is given below. 
We have a sample of respondents. The outcome can take a value out of 
the given values, let us say {1, 2, …, j} where j is some known integer. Using 
the latent variable approach our latent variable Yi* is modelled like this 
 
Yi* = βXi + εi          (3.2) 
 
We assume that εi has a standard normal distribution which leads us 
to ordered probit. In an alternative scenario if we parameterise the εi 
distribution as logistic then we get an ordered logit. To illustrate the idea, let 
us say that that there are 5 values (i.e. j = 5) for the outcome Yi. The 
probabilities of our outcomes become as follows 
 
P (Yi = 1) = P (εi  ≤ -βX)  
P (Yi = 2) = P (εi  ≤ u1 - βX) - P (εi  ≤ -βX) 
P (Yi = 3) = P (εi  ≤ u2 - βX) - P (εi  ≤ u1 - βX) 
P (Yi = 4) = P (εi  ≤ u3 - βX) - P (εi  ≤ u2 - βX) 
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P (Yi = 5) = P (εi  ≤ u4 - βX) - P (εi  ≤ u3 - βX) 
 
Here u1, u2, u3, and u4 are the threshold parameters that determine the 
cut points of the probability distribution function. These threshold parameters 
divide the probability density function and the area bounded between the cut 
points gives us the respective probabilities. The observed outcome is 
determined by the value of the latent variable Yi* and the unknown threshold 
parameters u1, u2, u3, and u4 determining the cut points. 
An important point to remember here is that these threshold parameters 
are also coefficients that need to be estimated. 
 
If the latent variable Yi* < u1, we observe Yi = 1 
If u1 < Yi* < u2, we observe Yi = 2 
If u2 < Yi* < u3, we observe Yi = 3 
If u3 < Yi* < u4, we observe Yi = 4 
If u4 < Yi*, we observe Yi = 5 
 
Just like probit, ordered probit also calculates its coefficients and 
threshold parameters, using maximum likelihood method. These threshold 
parameters divide the probability density function into parts, and area within 
each part gives us the probability associated with the respective threshold 
parameter.  If we move the cut points we change the probabilities as well, 
because area within each compartment changes. For interpretation of the 
coefficients we again need to calculate marginal effects. In ordered probit, 
calculating marginal effects and their interpretations becomes even more 
complex because a change in ‘X’, changes the whole probability distribution 
function and ends up changing probabilities (area bounded within each cut 
point) in each compartment. 
In calculating the marginal effects, we first need to state which 
probability change we are looking for, because moving the cut point changes 
the probabilities. For instance, as presented in figure 3.2, a one unit increase 
in ‘X’, shifts the whole distribution to the right side, which changes the area 
in each compartment. After the shift, under the new distribution (shown with 
a dashed line), the area in the right tail increases at P (Yi = 5), whereas, area 
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in the left tail at P (Yi = 1) decreases, while the effect on the middle choices 
remains unknown and requires even more calculations. 
Figure 3.2: Interpretation of ordered probit coefficients 
 
 
In other words, the marginal effects for P (Yi = 1) are different from the 
marginal effects of P (Yi = 5) and all other probability outcomes for every 
increase in ‘X’. Even after calculation of the marginal effects at specified 
probabilities, just like probit coefficients, they are not directly comparable with 
the OLS coefficients. OLS coefficients give us the average marginal change in 
outcome whereas, marginal effects calculated on the specified probability gives 
us the change in that probability at a specific value.  
Our base methodology for this thesis is OLS. We use probit and ordered 
probit to check the robustness of our estimates and see whether the choice of 
the methodology changes the results. We find that the results look 
qualitatively similar, which means that in this case, the choice of OLS as the 
primary methodology is not a problem. When the outcome variable is a limited 
dependent variable and the most serious problem of unbounded probability 
prediction is faced in using the OLS, most common solutions to this problem 
are discussed above. OLS faces another serious problem called endogeneity. 
Endogeneity, its consequences and solution to the said problem are explained 
in the following section.   
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3.3 Instrumental Variables (IV)  
The Instrumental Variables strategy is normally employed when the OLS 
suffers from the bias arising from endogeneity. Endogeneity refers to a 
situation where there is a correlation between the regressor and the error 
term. It can occur due to several reasons such as: a) an omitted variable which 
is consequently part of the error term, and affects both the dependent and one 
or more independent variables, b) due to measurement errors, for example, 
erroneous data can lead to a systematic error term in the model which can be 
the source of endogeneity, c) endogeneity can also result from simultaneity 
when the dependent and independent variables get into a loop of affecting 
each other, for example, in structural equation modelling. In the presence of 
endogeneity, coefficients from simple regressions cannot be interpreted as 
causal. The Instrumental Variables approach is a very powerful solution that 
tackles endogeneity and gives estimates that can be interpreted as causal 
(Angrist, 1989; Angrist and Krueger, 1991). 
Let us take an example of estimating the causal effect of immigration on 
the UK public services. The major difficulty in estimating the impact of 
immigration arises from the non-random location choice of immigrants. We 
know from previous research that immigrants self-select into areas, possibly 
on the basis of the existence of successful immigrant communities or similar 
ethnic groups or because of current favourable conditions in an area (see, for 
example, Abraham and Shryock, 2000; Åslund, 2005; Bartel, 1989; Hatton 
and Wheatley Price, 1999; Lymperopoulou, 2013; Pacyga, 1991; Phillimore 
and Goodson, 2006; Phillips, 2007; Schwirian, 1983; Styan, 2003; Zorlu and 
Mulder, 2008). To fix this potential endogeneity of the change in immigrant 
numbers in an area, we use an instrumental variable strategy based on past 
location choices, first developed by Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001) 
and subsequently used in the immigration literature by many, for example, 
Bianchi et al. (2012), Card (2009), Cortes (2008), Gonzalez and Ortega (2013), 
Hunt (2012), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), and Saiz (2006). 
The underlying idea is that the tendency of immigrants to move to areas 
with many existing immigrants allows one to use historic settlement patterns 
of immigrants to instrument for current settlement. In principal, past-
immigration patterns should influence current settlement decisions, while the 
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historical distribution of immigrants should be unaffected by any current 
change in the quality of public services. More formally, to model this 
endogenous treatment using an instrumental variable design, consider an 
initial population regression of the form given below. 
 
Yi = α + Di + ξ*Mi + ηi         (3.3) 
 
Here Yi represents an outcome for some UK public service, Di represents 
immigration into the UK and Mi is the immigration induced endogeneity that 
we cannot observe. So we estimate the population regression of the form 
presented by equation (3.4), where the endogenous variable Di is correlated 
with the error term εi  
 
Yi = α + Di + εi   here, εi = ξ*Mi + ηi     (3.4) 
 
As explained above, the problem is that immigration represented by Di 
is an endogenous variable correlated with the error term εi leading to 
endogeneity. The underlying idea of IV is to decompose the variation of Di in 
two parts: a) part of variation in Di that is not correlated with the error term εi 
but correlated with the endogenous variable Di and, b) part of variation in Di 
that is correlated with the error term εi.  The part that is uncorrelated with the 
error term εi is then used to estimate To do this, a new variable “Z” is used 
which affects Yi only through its effect on Di. Here “Z” is an instrument 
provided that it fulfils the following two conditions. 
 
1- Relevance 
“Z” is correlated with the endogenous variable D, formally 
Cov (D,Z) ≠ 0 
 
2- Exogeneity 
“Z” is uncorrelated with the error term ε and the outcome Y, formally 
Cov (Z, ε) = 0 and Cov (Z, Y) = 0 
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Explaining the above two conditions in the context of our example. Here, 
“Z” is “historical immigration pattern”. As explained earlier that immigrants 
follow a certain pattern in their location choices (see, for example, Abraham 
and Shryock, 2000; Åslund, 2005; Bartel, 1989; Hatton and Wheatley Price, 
1999; Lymperopoulou, 2013; Pacyga, 1991; Phillimore and Goodson, 2006; 
Phillips, 2007; Schwirian, 1983; Styan, 2003; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008). Our 
first condition is satisfied as our instrument “historical immigration pattern” 
labelled as “Z” is correlated with our endogenous variable “D” that is “current 
immigration” into the UK. We also know that “historical immigration pattern” 
is not correlated with our outcome variable “Y” that is outcome of any public 
service in the UK. Similarly, our instrument “historical immigration pattern” 
named “Z” is also uncorrelated with the error term ε. 
As the instrument “Z” satisfies the two necessary conditions, it means 
that the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) can be used for estimation. In the 
regression equation form, first stage reduced form looks like equation (3.5) 
given below 
 
Di = π0 + π1*Zi + υi          (3.5) 
 
Now part of the endogenous variable (Di) uncorrelated with the error 
term (εi) is picked up by the coefficient (π1) and is called the “first-stage effect” 
of the instrument. Whereas, correlated part of Di with the error term εi is now 
included in the last expression υi, and is eliminated. After getting the predicted 
values (?̂?𝑖), the endogenous variable (Di) in the short population regression 
equation (3.4) is replaced by the predicted values (?̂?𝑖) and gives us the second 
stage which is formally written as equation (3.6) below 
 
Yi = α + ?̂?𝑖 + εi          (3.6) 
 
However, the IV estimates are normally not calculated using this method 
because it produces incorrect standard errors. For correct calculation there is 
another useful equation that gives the change in the outcome variable (Yi) with 
a change in the instrument (Zi) and is formally written as equation (3.7) below 
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Yi = α + β*Zi + εi          (3.7) 
 
Here β is the “reduce-form effect”. When there is one endogenous 
variable and one instrument then the IV estimator is the ratio of the reduce-
form effect to the first-stage effect and can be written as equation (3.8) below 
 
IV = β/π1           (3.8) 
 
IV = [Cov(Yi,Zi)/V(Zi)]/[Cov(Di,Zi)/V(Zi)]      (3.9) 
 
IV = Cov(Yi,Zi)/Cov(Di,Zi) (3.10) 
 
Now substituting the initial model presented by equation (3.3) in 
equation (3.10) we get 
 
IV = Cov([α + Di + ξ*Mi + ηi],Zi)/Cov(Di,Zi) (3.11) 
 
In the above given equation,  
Cov([Mi],Zi) = 0 and Cov([ηi],Zi) = 0 due to exclusion restriction 
 
Whereas, 
Cov([Di],Zi) ≠ 0 due to the relevance restriction and existence of first 
stage. 
 
?̂?IV  (3.12) 
 
Now our  is interpreted as a causal effect of immigration on the public 
services in the UK. 
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However, if the first stage is not considerably different from zero, we 
have a weak instrument problem.12 As a consequence of using a weak 
instrument (low correlation between the endogenous variable and the 
instrument) for estimation can lead to inconsistent IV estimates. Moreover, in 
finite samples, if the instrument is weak it can lead to bias towards OLS 
estimates (see, Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995)). To test the weak instrument 
problem the first stage F-Statistic is used. Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) and 
Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that if the F-statistic is above 10, we can 
assume that our instrument does not suffer from the weak instrument 
problem. The higher the F-statistic, the better it is.  It indicates that first stage 
exists and there is enough correlation between the endogenous regressor and 
the instrument that can be used for the unbiased causal estimation. 
Nevertheless, if there is a problem of weak instrument (weak relationship 
between Yi and Zi) then we probably need to think about using a better 
instrument or a different methodology. 
In the context of the earlier example, our instrument works because the 
predicted and actual numbers of immigrants should be correlated as 
immigrants are likely to settle in regions with a history of immigration. At the 
same time, as the instrument is a purely mechanical redistribution of 
nationwide changes in immigration based on historical settlement patterns, it 
should be uncorrelated with any changes in public services and economic 
conditions that might affect immigrants’ location choices. 
So far we use classical IV, in which we assume that there is a 
homogenous causal effect (constant treatment effect) of the treatment on all 
the individuals in the estimated sample. Suppose our instrument is a binary 
variable which assigns 1 if the individual is selected to participate in the 
experiment and 0 if not selected. We get four possible groups based on the 
observed value and treatment value. These groups are described as follow: 1) 
Always-takers: individuals who always participate irrespective of the value of 
the instrument, 2) Never-takers: those who will not participate whether the 
instrument assigns them 1 or 0, 3) Defiers:  individuals who participate if the 
                                       
 
12 Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) highlighted the problems associated with the instrumental 
variables. 
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instrument assigns them 0 and do not participate if the instrument assigns 
them 1, and 4) Compliers: anyone who will act according to the assigned value 
by the instrument. Without the assumption of constant treatment effect, IV 
only gives us the average effect for the subsample. This subsample – out of the 
estimated sample – includes the individuals who changed their value driven 
by the instrument and are referred to as “compliers” and their average 
treatment effect is called Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). In other 
words, LATE is defined as the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) for those 
observations that change their treatment status in response to a change in 
the instrument (for greater details, see, for example, Angrist, Imbens and 
Rubin, 1996; Imbens and Angrist, 1994). However, using IV to estimate ATE 
for the whole population is usually not possible. 
Now we will explore what IV estimates if the treatment has a different 
effect (heterogeneous treatment effect) on the individuals in the estimated 
sample. It is assumed that there are no defiers in the data because presence 
of defiers can cancel out the effect on compliers and lead to a reduced form 
near to 0. Without further assumptions LATE is not informative about the 
sub-sample of always-takers. A necessary assumption that the LATE is equal 
for compliers and always-takers is required to interpret the LATE as the 
Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATT). It is important to note here that 
the LATE and the ATT are not same without assuming that the LATE is equal 
for compliers and always-takers. However, if there are no always-takers in the 
data, in that case LATE is equal to ATT. There are two disadvantages and one 
advantage of using the LATE approach. The problem with using the LATE is 
that, it is the effect for a non-observable population because mostly we are 
unable to practically identify the compliers. LATE is completely instrument 
dependent which means that estimates from using two different instruments 
are not directly comparable. However, the advantage of using the LATE is that 
it gives us the effect of the experiment which is very helpful in analysing the 
policy changes and other natural experiments. 
Apart from the IV, there is another useful design called Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD) used in this thesis and is explained in the 
following section.  
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3.4 Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) 
Regression Discontinuity Design exploits a cut-off point between two 
groups, first introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell, (1960) using OLS 
and later developed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux 
(2010).13 It is a special case of selection on observables where an individual 
receives the treatment depending on the value of one variable referred to as a 
“forcing variable” and some known threshold. It is normally used in estimating 
the causal effect of a policy or a change in one attribute in two otherwise 
similar groups of people at one point in time. Epidemiologists normally use it 
in quasi-experimental studies. This design has high internal validity. It is easy 
to use and very reliable given that the conditions of using an RDD design are 
fulfilled, with a limitation of low external validity. RDD has two types 
 
1- Sharp RDD 
2- Fuzzy RDD 
 
Sharp RDD is used when there are no treated individuals to the left and 
no untreated individuals to the right side of the threshold. In other words, 
Sharp RDD is used when the individuals are unable to self-select into the left 
or right side of the threshold. In contrast, Fuzzy RDD is used when there are 
treated and untreated units on both sides of the threshold. 
This thesis uses a Fuzzy RDD to estimate the change in views of native 
males towards further immigration once they retire from paid work. It is an 
effort to capture the causal effect of leaving the labour market on the views 
towards further immigration. For the period covered by the data, the state 
retirement age in England and Wales was 65 and 60 for males and females 
respectively, and is used as a threshold that defines the cut-off point. We only 
focus on men because we are unable to distinguish retired females who have 
left the labour force and those who have retired from positions which were not 
part of the labour force. We use state retirement age (65) as an instrument to 
determine retirement (exit from the labour market) and estimate the change 
                                       
 
13 For a historical insight about the development of Regression Discontinuity Design, see, 
Cook (2008). 
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in attitudes towards further immigration caused by this retirement. The 
starting point of a Fuzzy RDD is that there are treated and untreated 
individuals on both sides of the threshold. Putting it into the context, it means 
that there are retired and working individuals on both sides of the threshold 
age 65. The underlying idea is that observations on each side near to the 
threshold can be used as a counterfactual for the other group. The Fuzzy RDD 
can only be used if there is a clear visible discontinuous jump at the threshold 
point. In a Fuzzy RDD we also need the estimates for the likelihood of getting 
the treatment. We estimate for the average outcomes the likelihood of receiving 
the treatment on the left and right side of the threshold by trimming the 
sample near to the threshold on both sides and run a regression. A Fuzzy RDD 
is just an IV with a forced threshold value and is explained below (also see, 
section 6.2 in Angrist and Pischke (2009)). In this design, discontinuity 
becomes an instrument for the treatment.14  The formal setup of a Fuzzy RDD 
is as follows. 
In the first stage of a Fuzzy RDD, we plot a graph of the treatment Di 
against the forcing variable Si (see, Imbens and Lemieux (2008)). The graph 
should show a clear visible discontinuous jump in the data at the threshold s̅. 
This can be tested by plotting the density of the forcing variable (s) for all its 
values. This enables the researcher to explore the distribution of the forcing 
variable and shows whether the discontinuity is present only at the threshold 
(?̅?) or, are there discontinuities elsewhere as well (see, McCrary (2008)). If 
suddenly there are more observations on one side of the threshold, or there 
are discontinuities at other points, it means individuals are trying to self-select 
or trying to manipulate the forcing variable according to their preference. The 
design is Fuzzy as individuals younger than 65 (left side of the threshold) can 
be retired due to any reason such as early retirement and likewise individuals 
aged 65 or more (right side of the threshold) can still be working in a paid job. 
For a Fuzzy RDD to work, we need the first stage to exist. It means that the 
inequality (presented below by equation (3.13)) between the probability of 
getting treatment before and after the threshold should hold true 
                                       
 
14 Trochim (1984) introduced the idea of using discontinuous jump in the likelihood of 
getting the treatment at threshold point as an identification strategy.  
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Pr (Di = 1 |Si = s+) ≠ Pr (Di = 1 | Si = s-) (3.13) 
 
Here Di refers to the treatment status of an individual i (retired from paid 
work or still working), Si refers to the age of the individual i and s+ and s- refers 
to the right and left sides of the threshold respectively. The above expression 
shows that although we have treated individuals on both sides of the 
threshold, there should be a clear visible discontinuous jump in the likelihood 
of getting treatment at the threshold. Apart from the pivotal assumption of a 
visible discontinuous jump at the threshold, another important assumption 
of the RDD is continuity of the outcome variable at the threshold in the 
counterfactual situation without the treatment (see, Imbens and Lemieux 
(2008)). This cannot be tested because we do not observe ‘Y’ at the threshold 
?̅? in the counterfactual situation. In principle, the basic intuition is that we 
observe a discontinuous jump at the threshold because the treatment comes 
into play at that point. This becomes even more convincing if ‘Y’ does not show 
any discontinuous jumps at places other than at ?̅?. This assumption implies 
that if there is a jump in the outcome after treatment; it is caused by the 
treatment alone and nothing else. In this given example, if there is a change 
in the views of respondents towards immigration after the retirement then it 
is due to exit from the labour market alone and nothing else. 
 
For estimating effect of the treatment, we use following equation 
 
E[Yi|Si=s+] – E [Yi|Si=s-] / E[Di|Si=s+] – E [Di|Si=s-] (3.14) 
 
The above equation estimates an average causal effect of the treatment 
by calculating the ratio of the jump in the outcome (Yi) to the jump in the 
probability of getting treatment (Di) at the threshold ?̅? (age 65). Here, can be 
interpreted as the causal effect on compliers (see, section 3.3 for explanation 
on compliers and LATE interpretation).15 Equation (3.14) produces a Wald 
                                       
 
15 Interpretation of the average causal effect in a Fuzzy RDD as a LATE was first introduced 
by Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001). 
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estimator that is equivalent to an IV estimator. Explained in greater detail 
below, a Fuzzy RDD is similar to IV estimation; hence, standard IV 
assumptions apply (see also, section 6.2 in Angrist and Pischke (2009)). 
Equation (3.15) presents a Fuzzy RDD model that is equivalent to an IV 
estimate. We run 2SLS on equation (3.15) to get  
 
yi= α + β1*g(si Di + εi  where, Zi = 1 when Si≥?̅? (3.15) 
 
In the above given equation, Si is the forcing variable, ?̅? is the threshold 
that defines the cut-off point and in this case ?̅? is age 65 as the state retirement 
age in the UK is 65. g(si) is some function of si that assumes a difference in 
slopes on both sides of the threshold. yi is the outcome variable (opposed 
towards further immigration in this case). Zi is used to instrument Di in the 
first stage and assumes that no individual is able to self-select whether to get 
the treatment or not. When instrumenting Di, if the age of a native male is 
greater or equal to 65 then Zi = 1 and the individual gets treatment and if age 
is less than 65 then Zi = 0 and the individual does not get treatment, 
irrespective of the fact what we actually observe for them.  
Now  is the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of the treated.  can 
be interpreted as the change in views of native males towards further 
immigration – at the threshold point (age 65) – due to retirement (exit from the 
labour market) alone and nothing else. This estimate of  is considered as a 
causal effect of retirement (exit from the labour market) on the views of native 
males towards further immigration.   
3.5 Fixed Effects 
Estimates can also become biased when there are time constant un-
observables involved in the model for example, differences in intelligence 
between two individuals remain fixed over time. To control for these time-
invariant un-observables we use fixed effects estimation. 
Fixed effects estimation is most commonly used in panel data to control for 
the un-observables that remain fixed over time. For demonstrating the 
advantage of using fixed effects estimation let us take an example in the 
context of this thesis. For instance, in chapter 6 we control for area fixed 
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effects and school fixed effects. In principle, there may be some time-invariant 
characteristics between areas that lead towards more immigration in certain 
areas for example some immigrants prefer to live in areas with high 
concentration of their ethnicity. Similarly, schools may possess some time-
invariant characteristics that remain unchanged between schools and are 
source of attractiveness for the immigrants. These time-invariant 
characteristics for areas and schools need to be controlled for so that our 
estimates are not biased and misleading. Let us assume that we have a 
population regression panel model of the form given below 
 
Yit = αi + λt + βXit + εit (3.16) 
 
Where Yit represents the outcome Y for an individual “i” in year “t”. The 
unobserved individual-fixed-effect is represented by αi. Whereas, λt controls 
for year-fixed-effects. β represents the coefficients associated with the 
observables and εit is the error term. 
There are following three ways to control for the time-invariant un-
observables. 
 
1- Least Square Dummy Variables (LSDV) 
2- Within Estimator (also known as “analysis of covariance” / “deviations-
from-means” / “absorbing”) 
3- First Differencing 
 
In this thesis, we use the “within estimator” to control for the individual-fixed-
effects. Fixed effects using a within estimator are estimated using the 
equations below. In the first step, individual averages are calculated across 
time for all the individuals in the panel to get the between estimator of the 
form given below. 
 
𝑌i = αi + 𝜆 + β𝑋i + 𝜀i   (3.17) 
 
36 
 
Then these averages are subtracted from the original population regression 
panel model (3.16) that gives us this 
 
Yit - 𝑌i = λt - 𝜆 + β(Xit - 𝑋i ) + (εit - 𝜀i) (3.18) 
 
The above equation shows that deviations from means absorb the unobserved 
individual-fixed effects (αi). This method is recommended when the sample 
size is large and time duration is small. Whereas, when the time duration is 
large and sample size is small an alternative way for estimating fixed effects 
known as “differencing” is recommended to use. If the data has only two time 
periods (as in chapter 6) then differencing is algebraically similar to within 
estimator. Within estimator is more efficient than differencing when the error 
term (εit) is homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated. Within estimator also 
gives smaller standard errors as compared to LSDV.  
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Chapter 4. Are Immigrants in Favour of Immigration? 
Using the UK Citizenship Survey for the years 2007 – 2010, this chapter 
investigates how immigrants view immigration and how these views compare 
to natives. Immigrants who have been in the UK longer are similar to natives 
in being opposed to further immigration, while recent immigrants are more in 
favour of further immigration. Labour market concerns do not play a large role 
for natives nor does it play for either group of immigrants. However, financial 
and economic shocks are associated with stronger anti-immigration 
responses, even when holding the level of the respective variable constant.  
4.1 Introduction 
Most of the literature considering the support for, or opposition to, 
immigration has focused on natives, while the views of immigrants already in 
the country have gained lesser attention. Much of the previous economics 
literature, that this thesis draws upon, has referred to “attitudes” rather than 
views. In wider social sciences, “attitudes” are often taken to represent a 
deeper psychological consideration that cannot be identified from the 
questions normally used in the research in economics on attitudes. For 
purpose of this thesis the terms “attitudes/views” are used interchangeably 
assuming that even if they are not identical they are highly correlated.  
According to the UK Citizenship Survey (2007 – 2010) around 71% of 
the respondents are opposed to further immigration. There are marked 
differences between natives and immigrants: 83% of all natives and 48.48% of 
all immigrants oppose further immigration. However immigrants are not 
homogeneous and we consider two groups of immigrants – those who have 
been in the country for 5 years or more (earlier immigrants) and those who 
have been in the country for less than 5 years (recent immigrants). For the 
former group 53% of respondents are opposed to further immigration, and for 
the latter group only 33% are opposed, demonstrating clear heterogeneity. In 
this chapter, we investigate these differences. We find that they are not simply 
the result of different socio-economic characteristics of the three groups 
(natives, earlier immigrants and recent immigrants), even though conditioning 
on them narrows the gap to some extent. Labour market concerns do not play 
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a large role for either group of immigrants (or natives). However, lower income, 
and financial and economic shocks, are associated with stronger anti-
immigration responses. Immigrants who have been in the UK for five years or 
more are similar to natives in being opposed to further immigration, while 
recent immigrants are more in favour of further immigration.  
The literature investigating the views of natives towards further 
immigration is growing rapidly. Among others, some of the recent research 
papers on this topic using data from the European Social Survey include, 
Bridges and Mateut (2014), Malchow-Moller et al. (2009), Malchow-Moller et 
al. (2008), Markaki and Longhi (2013), Ortega and Polavieja (2012), and 
O’Connell (2011).16 Most of the literature on natives’ views finds evidence for 
a strong positive relation between education and support for (further) 
immigration.17 Another common finding that emerges from this literature is 
that labour market concerns, or labour market outcomes, do not appear to be 
strongly associated with anti-immigration views. Furthermore, a range of 
studies find that welfare concerns or non-economic concerns, such as a loss 
of identity are more important than the labour market concerns.18 For a 
comprehensive review of literature on views of natives towards further 
immigration, see, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014a). 
In contrast, the literature investigating attitudes of immigrants towards 
immigration and determinants of immigrants’ attitudes is very little. Most of 
the research about attitudes of immigrants towards immigrants exist for the 
US (see, for example, Binder, Polinard and Wrinkle, 1997; Hood, Morris, and 
Shirkey, 1997; Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1984; Polindar, Wrinkle, and de 
la Garza, 1984; Sanchez and Masouka, 2010). A recent addition on this topic 
                                       
 
16 For a critical review of immigration related theories and immigration related literature that 
used multinational survey data sets, see, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010). 
17 Card et al. (2005), Constant and Zimmermann (2013), Dustmann and Preston (2004), and 
Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2013) for Europe, Dustmann and Preston (2001) for England, 
Vervoort (2012) for Netherlands, Bauer et al. (2000), for OECD countries and Citrin et al. 
(1997), Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014b), and Scheve 
and Slaughter (2001) for USA. 
18 Card et al. (2012), Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) and Rustenbach (2010), for Europe, 
Dustmann and Preston (2007), for England, Fetzer (2011) for U.S. and Europe, Bakker and 
Dekker (2012) for Amsterdam, Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola (2013) for South Africa, Stanley 
et al. (2012) for Australia, Nielsen et al. (2012) for a small Italian town, and Mayda (2006) for 
developed and developing countries emphasize the importance of social interaction, social 
capital, sense of society, interpersonal trust and compositional concerns. 
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is by Just and Anderson, (2015) for 18 European countries. They use data 
from 5 rounds of the European Social Survey conducted 2002 – 2011 for 18 
European countries. They explore two opposing channels of immigrants’ 
attitudes towards immigration: a) shared experiences, unity and ties with 
other immigrants and b) integration into the host country.  Where former 
channel leads to supporting attitudes and latter channel generates opposing 
attitudes towards further immigration. 
There are three main reasons why further immigration may be opposed. 
Firstly, future immigration may have a detrimental effect on the labour market 
prospects of natives and immigrants who are already in the host country. New 
immigrants may be seen as a potential competition for jobs in the host labour 
market (see for example, Malchow-Moller et al. (2008)).19 On this basis it may 
be expected that new immigrants are closer substitutes for recent immigrants, 
or earlier immigrants, than they are for natives. This may suggest that 
immigrants may be more opposed to immigration than natives. Recent 
research (see, for example, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) for the US, Dustmann 
et al. (2013) and Manacorda et al. (2012) for the UK) suggest that earlier and 
latter immigrants are substitutes in the labour market and as such are likely 
to compete for the same jobs.20 Secondly, all three groups (natives, earlier and 
recent immigrants) may be opposed to further immigration if immigration 
places a strain on public services, such as education (see, for example, Betts 
and Fairlie, 2003; Geay et al., 2013; Ohinata and van Ours, 2013; or 
Schneeweis, 2013), public safety (for example, Bell et al., 2013), health care 
or welfare. Thirdly, there may be opposition to immigration because of the fear 
that it may be seen as a threat to the culture of the host nation. Natives and 
earlier immigrants may view immigration as an erosion of social cohesion 
(Hickman, Crowley and Mai 2008).  
                                       
 
19 Although this may be a fallacy of individuals’ perceptions of the fixed number of available 
jobs in the host labour market, whereas, new jobs are created as a natural reaction to the 
expansion and growth of businesses and economy on the influx of new immigrants. 
20 See the special issue of the Journal of the European Economic Association (Card, 
Dustmann and Preston, 2012; Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth, 2012; Ottaviano and 
Peri, 2012; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson, 2012; Card, 2012; Dustmann and Preston, 2012) for 
a comprehensive discussion of the current state of the literature.  
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On the other hand, natives’ pro-immigration views could be because 
they see further immigration as beneficial for their businesses, as it can result 
in wage drops in job sectors in which immigrant workers are concentrated 
(see, for example, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) for the US, Dustmann et al. (2013) 
and Manacorda et al. (2012) for the UK). Natives may also favour immigration 
as they consider immigration is beneficial for the host country’s economy (see, 
for example, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007)). 
Immigrants may also favour further immigration as it enables them to 
form links with people who share the same culture and heritage. They may 
also want to bring their families to the host country. Such desires stem from 
the want for familiarity and social cohesion – although this may lead to 
tensions with natives who view this as an erosion of social cohesion (see, Just 
and Anderson, (2015)). 
The opposition to, or support for, further immigration will vary between 
and within the three groups identified (natives, earlier immigrants and recent 
immigrants). Earlier and recent immigrants may hold different views on 
further immigration because of a stronger assimilation of earlier immigrants 
into British culture. Manning and Roy (2010) provide some evidence on this 
assimilation process. They find that immigrants – with the exception of Irish 
and Italians – consider themselves more British the longer they stay in the UK 
and that even immigrants from a culture that is very different from the British, 
integrate successfully. Given this assimilation, it appears entirely possible 
that immigrants also adopt the natives’ resistance to further immigration.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 
describes the dataset and methodology used in this chapter, section 4.3 
presents results and section 4.4 concludes. 
4.2 Data and Estimation 
This chapter uses the three waves (2007 – 2010) of the UK Citizenship 
Survey.21 The survey is conducted in England and Wales, covers people aged 
                                       
 
21 The survey has been collected since 2001. Initially it was a biennial survey conducted by 
the Home Office, in 2006 it fell under the auspices of the Communities and Local Government 
department now the Department for Communities and Local Government. From 2007 
onwards the survey has been conducted annually, with data collection taking place each 
quarter. The publicly available data for this period combines four quarters, giving surveys for 
2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, and 2010-11. 
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16 and above and consists of a core sample and a minority ethnic boost 
sample. Each wave of the Citizenship Survey has a sample size of around 
15,000 people and consists of a core sample of around 10,000 individuals with 
a minority ethnic boost sample of around 5,000 further individuals. 
For this chapter and chapter 5 respondents are categorized on the basis 
of country of birth of respondent and country of birth of their mother and 
father in order to differentiate between immigrants and natives. This 
classification gives us the six broad categories listed below. These 
classifications are subdivided on the basis of ethnicity and self-assessed 
nationality and are shown in table 4.1.  
1. Respondents born in the UK with both parents born in the UK. 
2. Respondents born in the UK with one parent born abroad. 
3. Respondents born in the UK with both parents born abroad. 
4. Respondents born abroad with both parents born in the UK. 
5. Respondents born abroad with one of the parents born abroad. 
6. Respondents born abroad with both parents born abroad. 
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Table 4.1: Respondent categorisation based on ethnicity and nationality (2007 
– 2010) 
Sr. 
No. Categorisation (2007 – 2010) 
 
Total 
45152 
1 Respondent born in the UK with both parents born in the UK  23600 
 1.1 White (based on ethnicity) 22560 
23592 
1.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 1032 
1.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 20 
23600 1.4 Only British (based on national identity) 21691 
1.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 1889 
2 Respondent born in the UK with one parent born abroad  1959 
 2.1 White (based on ethnicity) 866 
1959 
2.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 1093 
2.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 32 
1959 2.4 Only British (based on national identity) 1754 
2.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 173 
3 Respondent born in the UK with both parents born abroad  4287 
 3.1 White (based on ethnicity) 298 
4286 
3.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 3988 
3.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 138 
4287 3.4 Only British (based on national identity) 3658 
3.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 491 
4 Respondent born abroad and both parents born in the UK  258 
 4.1 White (based on ethnicity) 244 
258 
4.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 14 
4.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 3 
258 4.4 Only British (based on national identity) 220 
4.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 35 
5 Respondent born abroad with one of the parents born abroad  275 
 5.1 White (based on ethnicity) 156 
275 
5.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 119 
5.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 14 
275 5.4 Only British (based on national identity) 204 
5.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 57 
6 Respondent born abroad with both parents born abroad  14469 
 6.1 White (based on ethnicity) 1192 
14465 
6.2 Non-White (based on ethnicity) 13273 
6.3 British + Other (based on national identity) 511 
14469 6.4 Only British (based on national identity) 7823 
6.5 Only Other (based on national identity) 6135 
     
Note: There are 304 missing values in country of birth identifiers due to unknown country 
of birth of the respondent, his mother or his father. 13 missing in ethnicity. 
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We focus on groups 1 and 6 only. We refer to the first group as “natives” and 
group 6 as “immigrants”. While this classification may be imperfect there is 
no further information available for more precise classifications and we believe 
that they provide mechanism for distinguishing between natives and 
immigrants.  These two categories make up 85% of the total respondents, with 
55% falling into the native and 30% falling into the immigrant category. The 
remaining 15% of respondents fall into one of the other four groups making it 
difficult to assign individuals to “natives” or “immigrants”. For example, both 
group 2 and 5 could contain children of British servicemen who married while 
on duty abroad with the only difference being the place of birth of the child. 
Given these ambiguities, it appears unreasonable to treat one of these as a 
native and the other as an immigrant and we consequently omit all 
respondents who fall into those four categories.  
Immigrants are further divided into two categories: earlier immigrants 
and recent immigrants. Earlier immigrants (forming 23% of the original 
sample), are all those immigrants who came to UK more than 5 years ago and 
recent immigrants (7%) are those who arrived within the last five years. The 
definition of 5 years is used to distinguish between earlier and recent 
immigrants due to data constraints, as information about when immigrants 
arrived is not available for all the waves for more than 5 years. There are 9,714 
earlier immigrants and 2,687 recent immigrants in our sample.  
The outcome variable is the answer to the question, “Do you think the 
number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased, 
reduced or should it remain the same?” If the respondent says increased or 
reduced then the interviewer asks if the number should be increased or 
reduced by a little or a lot. For most of the analysis, “increased a lot”, 
“increased a little” and “remain the same” are grouped together, as all indicate 
that the respondent does not want immigration to be cut. People replying 
“increased a lot” and “increased a little” are clearly in favour of immigration, 
while those replying “remain the same” are also not against it. We also group 
the choices “reduced a lot” and “reduced a little” as both indicate a wish to see 
immigration reduced. Respondents selecting “cannot choose” are excluded 
from the analysis. This generates an indicator variable of whether an 
individual is opposed to further immigration (or not). We assess the 
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robustness of these choices in two ways: We run ordered probit models on the 
original (5 category) outcome variable and we also run the same models 
without individuals who replied “remain the same”.22 Results do not change 
fundamentally. Our estimating equation for all the models is  
 
Y = α + β’X + ε          (4.1) 
 
Where Y is the outcome variable, α is the intercept, β is the coefficient 
vector, X contains all the independent variables and ε represents the error 
term. Control variables used are: survey year, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, 
practicing religion, and region. Dummy variables are generated for all of these 
variables. Control variables for all the models are same unless mentioned. The 
omitted category for the variable survey year is “wave 2007 – 2008”, for gender 
it is “male”, and “London” for the regions. 
Ethnicity variable has seven dummies namely, “White”, “Black”, 
“Subcontinent”, “Chinese”, “other Asian”, “mixed race” and “other ethnicities”. 
Where “Black” ethnicity is comprised of “Black Caribbean”, “Black African” 
and “other black ethnicities”. Subcontinent includes “Indian”, “Pakistani” and 
“Bangladeshi” ethnicities. For ethnicity variable “white” is the omitted category 
in the analysis. Eight dummies are created for the religion variable and are 
labelled as, “Budh”, “Hindu”, “Jewish”, “Muslim”, “Christian”, “Sikh”, “no 
religion” and “other religion”. “Christian” is the omitted dummy for religion. 
For the variable whether a person is “practicing religion or not”, two dummies 
are creating and “not practicing religion” is considered as the reference 
category. 
These control variables have been included because most of the 
literature on attitudes uses these variables in their regressions (see for 
example, Dustmann and Preston (2007)). Although some variables that may 
be found in other literature on attitudes could not be included because of the 
                                       
 
22 In appendix B, Table B 1 presents the descriptive statistics, Table B 2 presents the 
conditional and unconditional comparison of the regressions, Table B 3 presents the 
coefficients of natives, earlier and recent immigrants and Table B 4 presents the coefficients 
of models for 2009 – 2010, after dropping remain the same category. 
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data restrictions (for example data on formal acquisition of citizenship of 
immigrants is not available). 
Our key variable of interest is an individual’s migration status. Being 
native serves as the reference group enabling us to explore differences between 
natives, earlier immigrants and recent immigrants.  We are also interested in 
a range of variables related to economic status and economic shocks. 
Employment status is important for investigating the role that the labour 
market plays in influencing people’s views towards further immigration. 
“Employed” is the reference group for employment status dummies. Income of 
the respondent is used to proxy for social status. The reference category for 
the income variable is “£10,000 – £15,000”. 
Due to data restrictions we unfortunately face a trade-off in relation to 
education variables as only respondents up to the age of 65 are asked about 
their education. Our main estimates contain all respondents at the cost of 
omitting information on education. However, we also estimated models with 
and without education on a sample restricted to individuals up to 65 and 
found that these changes made very little difference to native/immigrant 
differences in their views towards further immigration. When we included 
education and estimated the model on the reduced (under age 65) sample the 
coefficient of our key variable, migrant status, remained largely unchanged; 
however, we found that higher education is associated with favourable views 
towards immigration for natives, earlier and recent immigrants. OLS results 
of these estimates are presented in appendix A. 
Finally, we also use the 2009/10 data that contains additional 
information on economic shocks, such as job loss or having to cut back on 
certain expenditures in last twelve months, details are provided latter in this 
section. These are included in separate models to consider how the onset of 
financial difficulties affects support for immigration.  
 
 
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for our sample.23 
                                       
 
23 Table A 1, Table A 2, and Table A 3 for natives, earlier immigrants and recent immigrants 
in appendix A present descriptive statistics of the samples used for robustness checks by 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics (2007 – 2010) 
Variables Natives Earlier 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
       
Reduce 
Migration 
0.823 0.382 0.530 0.499 0.334 0.472 
Increase 
Migration 
0.177 0.382 0.470 0.499 0.666 0.472 
Out of Labour 
Force 
0.313 0.464 0.323 0.468 0.218 0.413 
Self Employed 0.069 0.254 0.082 0.274 0.039 0.193 
Unemployed 0.150 0.357 0.162 0.368 0.181 0.385 
Employed 0.468 0.499 0.434 0.496 0.563 0.496 
Male 0.449 0.497 0.484 0.500 0.538 0.499 
Female 0.551 0.497 0.516 0.500 0.462 0.499 
Age 50.262 18.589 46.622 15.422 31.319 9.449 
Income below 5K 0.189 0.392 0.257 0.437 0.344 0.475 
Income 5K to 
10K 
0.209 0.407 0.198 0.399 0.165 0.371 
Income 10K to 
15K 
0.156 0.363 0.158 0.365 0.163 0.369 
Income 15K to 
20K 
0.117 0.321 0.107 0.309 0.096 0.294 
Income 20K to 
30K 
0.158 0.365 0.149 0.356 0.125 0.331 
Income 30K to 
50K 
0.125 0.330 0.098 0.297 0.071 0.256 
Income above 
50K 
0.045 0.208 0.033 0.180 0.036 0.186 
White 0.956 0.204 0.078 0.268 0.112 0.315 
Subcontinent 0.016 0.126 0.456 0.498 0.388 0.488 
Other Asian 0.001 0.027 0.057 0.232 0.078 0.268 
Black 0.010 0.100 0.265 0.441 0.202 0.402 
Mixed Race 0.010 0.101 0.038 0.190 0.035 0.184 
Chinese 0.000 0.007 0.025 0.157 0.049 0.215 
Other Ethnicities 0.006 0.079 0.080 0.272 0.136 0.343 
Christian 0.776 0.417 0.341 0.474 0.368 0.482 
Budh 0.002 0.045 0.016 0.127 0.037 0.189 
Hindu 0.002 0.039 0.135 0.341 0.152 0.359 
                                       
 
running all the regressions after excluding respondents over 65 and including the 
qualification variable. 
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Jewish 0.003 0.052 0.003 0.051 0.001 0.035 
Muslim 0.017 0.129 0.385 0.487 0.330 0.470 
Sikh 0.001 0.037 0.053 0.225 0.027 0.162 
Other Religion 0.019 0.138 0.026 0.159 0.021 0.144 
No Religion 0.180 0.384 0.040 0.197 0.063 0.243 
Practicing 
Religion 
0.271 0.444 0.739 0.439 0.715 0.451 
Not Practicing 
Religion 
0.729 0.444 0.261 0.439 0.285 0.451 
       
Observations 20125 8399 2448 
Variables available only for 2009 – 2010 
 
Lost Job 0.059 0.236 0.055 0.228 0.088 0.284 
Drop in Income 0.259 0.438 0.240 0.427 0.187 0.390 
Cutbacks in 
Luxuries 
0.390 0.488 0.307 0.461 0.213 0.410 
Cutbacks in 
Necessities 
0.332 0.471 0.334 0.472 0.228 0.420 
Non listed 0.420 0.494 0.457 0.498 0.565 0.496 
Observations 7068 3119 817 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows that immigrants are on average younger than natives, and 
recent immigrants are, on average, the youngest group. Recent immigrants 
are more likely to be male, employed (and unemployed) and less likely to be 
out of the labour force than natives. Immigrants have, on average, lower 
incomes than natives, with recent immigrants having over a third of 
respondents in the lowest income group. Natives are mostly “White” by 
ethnicity, “Subcontinent” is the most dominant ethnicity in earlier and recent 
immigrants. Natives are mostly “Christian” by faith, whereas earlier 
immigrants are mostly “Muslim” and recent immigrants follow “Christian” 
faith mostly.  
We begin by looking first at raw differences between natives, earlier and 
recent immigrants. Subsequently, we include the other right hand side 
variables described above to check to what extent the differences between 
natives and immigrants can be explained by different socio-economic 
characteristics. We estimate these regressions by OLS, probit and ordered 
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probit. However, results do not change much. We also estimated all models 
separately by gender and found no difference in the results. 
We then split the sample into natives, earlier and recent immigrants to 
investigate to what extent the determinants of opposed views towards 
immigration differs between the three groups.  Finally, we focus on the role of 
economic and financial worries using the 2009/10 data. Four types of 
economic worries are considered, specifically whether the respondent has lost 
his/her job, experienced a drop in income, had to cutback spending on 
necessities such as food or shelter, or had to cutback spending on non-
necessities, such as entertainment expenses or charity donations in last 
twelve months. The reference category for this variable is “not reporting any 
worry”. These four additional models are estimated for the pooled sample and 
for natives, earlier and recent immigrants separately. 
4.3 Results 
Table 4.3 compares the unconditional and regression-adjusted 
conditional differences in immigration views between natives, earlier and 
recent immigrants.24 The conditional models control for employment status, 
income level, age dummies, ethnicity, gender, religion, wave year and 
Government Office Region of residence. All models suggest that both 
immigrant groups are less opposed to further immigration than natives. 
Furthermore, earlier immigrants are always between natives and recent 
immigrants. Quantitatively, the unconditional models suggest that earlier 
immigrants are between 26 and 29 percentage points less likely to oppose 
immigration than natives, while the corresponding numbers for recent 
immigrants are between 41 and 49 percentage points. Both coefficients are 
economically large and highly significant. We also obtain the same pattern of 
results when using an ordered probit. 
In the conditional models, the differences between natives and 
immigrants are reduced considerably.  Earlier immigrants are now between 
                                       
 
24 Table A 4 and Table A 5 in appendix A present unconditional and conditional OLS estimates 
of all the regressions after excluding respondents over 65 and including the qualification 
variable. Whereas, Table A 9 and Table A 10 in appendix A present unconditional and 
conditional OLS estimates of all the regressions after excluding respondents over 65 and 
dropping the qualification variable. 
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12 and 13 percentage points less likely to oppose further immigration than 
natives, while recent immigrants are between 24 and 30 percentage points 
less likely, as presented in column (5) and (6) of table 4.3. However, the 
differences between the three groups remain large and statistically significant. 
From these results, it is clear that support for further immigration differs 
widely between the three groups and that earlier immigrants hold views that, 
on average, fall between the views of natives and recent immigrants. 
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Table 4.3: Comparison of unconditional and conditional models 
Reduce 
Immigration 
Unconditional Models Conditional Models 
OLS Probit 
AME 
Probit 
Coefficients 
Ordered 
Probit 
OLS Probit 
AME 
Probit 
Coefficients 
Ordered 
Probit 
   Coefficients    Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Recent 
Immigrants 
-.488*** 
(.010) 
-.414*** 
(.008) 
-1.353*** 
(.028) 
-1.28*** 
(.022) 
-.299*** 
(.015) 
-.243*** 
(.012) 
-.836*** 
(.041) 
-.761*** 
(.033) 
Earlier 
Immigrants
  
-.292*** 
(.006) 
-.260*** 
(.005) 
-.850*** 
(0.017) 
-.816*** 
(.015) 
-.131*** 
(.012) 
-.120*** 
(.010) 
-.412*** 
(.035) 
-.392*** 
(.029) 
Constant .823*** 
(.003) 
 .925*** 
(.010) 
 .378*** 
(.015) 
 .663 
(.682) 
 
Sample Size 30972 30972 30972 30972 30972 30969 30969 30972 
R2/ Pseudo R2 .135  .108 .064 .181  .150 .090 
 
Conditional models control for employment status, wave year, age dummies, ethnicity, religion, practising religion or 
not, income, and region. Omitted category for migrant status dummy is “natives”. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
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The separate models for natives, earlier and recent immigrants (see, 
table 4.4) suggest that, by and large and with the exception of earlier 
immigrants who are out of the labour force, none of the labour market 
dummies are significant.25 It is interesting to note that the significant 
coefficient for “out of the labour force” suggests that these respondents are, if 
anything, more in favour of further immigration than employed respondents.  
Based on these results, it appears that labour market status is largely 
unrelated to anti-immigration views for any of the groups. These findings are 
in line with the findings of Dustmann and Preston (2007) and Card et al. 
(2012) who also find that labour market concerns are not important in 
determining natives’ views towards immigration. 
Among the two immigrant groups, women appear to be between 3 and 
4 percentage points more opposed to further immigration than men, while 
there is no evidence for gender differences among natives.  
Income dummies are used to analyze the impact of economic status on 
opposition to further immigration. It is interesting to note that for natives and 
earlier immigrants a clear gradient emerges: Natives and immigrants with 
higher income are more likely to be in support of further immigration. For 
recent immigrants the pattern appears to be less clear. Relative to individuals 
earning between £10k and £15k, individuals with lower incomes are between 
8 and 1 percentage points less likely to oppose immigration, while respondent 
with higher income are also less opposed towards further immigration, 
resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and opposition 
to immigration.  A potential explanation for this somewhat unexpected result 
at low incomes could be the role of non-monetary motives such as family 
reunification or the wish to see more of their compatriots immigrating, which 
should be stronger for recent immigrants than for earlier immigrants or 
natives. 
Pooled model shows that all ethnicities except “Subcontinent” are in 
favour of immigration by between 5.1 – 15.8 percentage points with high 
                                       
 
25 Table A 6, Table A 7, and Table A 8 in appendix A present separate OLS estimates of natives, 
earlier and recent immigrants for the regressions after excluding respondents over 65 and 
including the qualification variable. Whereas, Table A 11, Table A 12 and Table A 13 in 
appendix A present separate OLS estimates natives, earlier and recent immigrant for the 
regressions after excluding respondents over 65 and dropping the qualification variable. 
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significance as compared to “White” ethnicity. Whereas, when the regressions 
are run on individual samples for natives, earlier and recent immigrants, 
favour towards further immigration is only shown by natives with “Black” and 
“mixed race” ethnicity by 27.3 and 7.3 percentage points respectively. In 
earlier immigrants, this favour of “Black” and “mixed race” ethnicity drop 
down to 9.8 and 6.1 percentage points. It is to be noted that “Black” ethnicity 
remains significantly in favour of further immigration with coefficient reaching 
11.2 percentage points for recent immigrants. Religion dummies mostly show 
that respondents with any faith are generally in favour of further immigration 
as compared to the respondents with “Christian” faith in their sample group.  
 
Table 4.4: Coefficients of main controls for each respondent category (2007 – 
2010) 
Reduce 
Immigration 
OLS 
Pooled Natives Earlier 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
-0.299*** 
(0.015) 
   
Earlier 
Immigrants 
-0.131*** 
(0.012) 
   
Female 0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.030*** 
(0.012) 
0.046** 
(0.021) 
Out of Labour 
Force 
-0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.044*** 
(0.017) 
-0.024 
(0.030) 
Self Employed 
 
0.001 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.006 
(0.050) 
Unemployed 
 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.030) 
Income below 5K 
 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
-0.100*** 
(0.032) 
Income 5K to 
10K 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.026 
(0.018) 
-0.088** 
(0.034) 
Income 15K to 
20K 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.021) 
-0.048 
(0.041) 
Income 20K to 
30K 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.046*** 
(0.010) 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
-0.088** 
(0.037) 
Income 30K to 
50K 
-0.086*** 
(0.010) 
-0.092*** 
(0.011) 
-0.066*** 
(0.022) 
-0.150*** 
(0.044) 
Income above 
50K 
-0.128*** 
(0.014) 
-0.142*** 
(0.017) 
-0.079** 
(0.034) 
-0.195*** 
(0.055) 
Subcontinent -0.018 
(0.017) 
0.045 
(0.051) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
0.039 
(0.043) 
Other Asian -0.073*** 
(0.023) 
0.139 
(0.127) 
-0.022 
(0.031) 
-0.040 
(0.049) 
Black -0.158*** -0.273*** -0.098*** -0.112*** 
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(0.015) (0.035) (0.022) (0.039) 
Mixed Race -0.087*** 
(0.021) 
-0.073** 
(0.033) 
-0.061* 
(0.033) 
-0.009 
(0.060) 
Chinese -0.094*** 
(0.029) 
0.606*** 
(0.053) 
0.014 
(0.040) 
-0.071 
(0.057) 
Other Ethnicities -0.051*** 
(0.018) 
-0.015 
(0.038) 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
0.021 
(0.043) 
Budh -0.092*** 
(0.030) 
-0.053 
(0.067) 
-0.154*** 
(0.043) 
-0.002 
(0.057) 
Hindu -0.011 
(0.018) 
-0.258*** 
(0.097) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
-0.054 
(0.038) 
Jewish -0.156*** 
(0.054) 
-0.138** 
(0.064) 
-0.210* 
(0.107) 
0.029 
(0.275) 
Muslim -0.109*** 
(0.014) 
-0.314*** 
(0.048) 
-0.075*** 
(0.018) 
-0.012 
(0.030) 
Sikh 0.012 
(0.025) 
-0.188* 
(0.100) 
0.010 
(0.029) 
0.104 
(0.067) 
Other Religion 0.000 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.034) 
0.086 
(0.073) 
No Religion -0.075*** 
(0.008) 
-0.081*** 
(0.008) 
-0.141*** 
(0.031) 
-0.032 
(0.049) 
Practicing 
Religion 
-0.055*** 
(0.006) 
-0.050*** 
(0.006) 
-0.058*** 
(0.013) 
-0.023 
(0.025) 
Constant 
 
0.378*** 
(0.015) 
1.120*** 
(0.016) 
-0.088*** 
(0.033) 
0.086 
(0.068) 
Sample Size 30972 20125 8399 2448 
R2 0.181 0.065 0.075 0.059 
 
All models control for: wave year, age dummies, and region. Omitted category 
for migrant status, employment status and income dummies is natives, 
employed and income10K to 15K respectively. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
Finally, we look at the effect of economic shocks experienced in the 
previous year. Our results, shown below in table 4.5, suggest that the 
experience of job loss (even holding constant current labour force status), a 
drop in income (again holding constant current income) or having to cut back 
on expenses on both necessities and luxuries are associated with a stronger 
opposition to further immigration (see, Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2013) for 
similar findings). 
For natives, job loss is associated with a 4 percentage points increase 
in opposition to further immigration, while drops in income and cutbacks in 
necessities are associated with a 2 percentage points fall. For earlier 
immigrants, drops in income and cutbacks in luxuries appear to matter most, 
while job loss and cutbacks in necessities appear to be less important. Finally, 
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the point estimates for recent immigrants suggest that they react more 
strongly to job losses, drops in income and in particular cutbacks in 
necessities than the other groups. These results suggest that changes in 
economic status such as drops in income or job loss matter for people’s views 
on immigration, even when holding the levels of these variables constant. 
On the whole, our results suggest that earlier immigrants appear to hold 
views closer to those of natives than to recent immigrants.26 
Table 4.5: Wave 2009 – 2010 models for each respondent category controlled 
for financial worry dummies 
Reduce 
Immigration 
OLS 
Pooled Natives Earlier 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
-0.292*** 
(0.023) 
   
Earlier 
Immigrants 
-0.111*** 
(0.019) 
   
Lost Job 0.038** 
(0.017) 
0.045** 
(0.019) 
0.021 
(0.041) 
0.052 
(0.066) 
Drop in Income 0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.021** 
(0.011) 
0.044** 
(0.022) 
0.074 
(0.048) 
Cutbacks in 
Luxuries 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.070*** 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.046) 
Cutbacks in 
Necessities 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.023** 
(0.011) 
0.025 
(0.021) 
0.100** 
(0.045) 
Out of Labour 
Force 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.026) 
-0.113** 
(0.045) 
Self Employed -0.009 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(0.036) 
-0.099 
(0.085) 
Unemployed -0.005 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.022 
(0.029) 
0.046 
(0.050) 
Female 0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
0.036 
(0.036) 
Income below 
5K 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
0.038 
(0.028) 
-0.111** 
(0.052) 
Income 5K to 
10K 
0.016 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
0.067** 
(0.029) 
-0.080 
(0.058) 
Income 15K to 
20K 
0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
0.075** 
(0.035) 
-0.059 
(0.078) 
Income 20K to 
30K 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.028* 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.032) 
-0.133** 
(0.066) 
                                       
 
26 As a robustness check, all the respondents who responded with “remain the same” to the 
outcome question are dropped from the data and all the models are rerun. Results from these 
regressions remain fairly similar. If anything, the similarities between earlier immigrants and 
natives increased (see, appendix B).  
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Income 30K to 
50K 
-0.069*** 
(0.017) 
-0.087*** 
(0.019) 
-0.032 
(0.037) 
-0.070 
(0.076) 
Income above 
50K 
-0.088*** 
(0.025) 
-0.112*** 
(0.028) 
-0.026 
(0.057) 
-0.155 
(0.107) 
Subcontinent -0.024 
(0.026) 
0.017 
(0.060) 
0.029 
(0.040) 
0.161** 
(0.078) 
Other Asian -0.108*** 
(0.036) 
0.122 
(0.139) 
-0.071 
(0.050) 
0.061 
(0.087) 
Black -0.189*** 
(0.023) 
-0.265*** 
(0.051) 
-0.123*** 
(0.038) 
-0.050 
(0.075) 
Mixed Race -0.052 
(0.036) 
-0.013 
(0.051) 
-0.021 
(0.061) 
0.041 
(0.134) 
Chinese -0.128*** 
(0.048) 
 0.049 
(0.069) 
-0.112 
(0.087) 
Other 
Ethnicities 
-0.099*** 
(0.031) 
-0.102 
(0.089) 
-0.016 
(0.047) 
0.031 
(0.077) 
Budh -0.039 
(0.054) 
0.023 
(0.102) 
-0.056 
(0.085) 
0.058 
(0.094) 
Hindu 0.015 
(0.031) 
-0.190* 
(0.113) 
0.026 
(0.038) 
0.061 
(0.071) 
Jewish -0.206** 
(0.096) 
-0.124 
(0.112) 
-0.340* 
(0.187) 
-0.356*** 
(0.107) 
Muslim -0.109*** 
(0.021) 
-0.257*** 
(0.059) 
-0.077*** 
(0.027) 
0.017 
(0.052) 
Sikh -0.015 
(0.042) 
-0.138 
(0.115) 
-0.017 
(0.050) 
0.039 
(0.122) 
Other Religion 0.010 
(0.033) 
-0.018 
(0.039) 
0.030 
(0.064) 
0.220 
(0.149) 
No Religion -0.054*** 
(0.012) 
-0.058*** 
(0.013) 
-0.179*** 
(0.054) 
0.104 
(0.090) 
Practicing 
Religion 
-0.051*** 
(0.010) 
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
-0.038 
(0.023) 
-0.052 
(0.044) 
Constant 
 
0.830*** 
(0.135) 
0.951*** 
(0.037) 
0.984*** 
(0.055) 
-0.152 
(0.106) 
Sample Size 11004 7068 3119 817 
R2 0.195 0.089 0.100 0.140 
 
All models control for: wave year, age dummies, and region. Omitted category 
for financial worry dummies is “not reporting any worry”. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses  
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4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
The novelty of this chapter is that it is a new addition to the sparse 
literature investigating how immigrants view further immigration, and how 
these views may vary between natives, earlier and more recent immigrants. 
Most of the previous literature has focused on the views of natives towards 
immigration. The main finding of this research is that there is heterogeneity 
in the attitudes of immigrants towards immigration, with recent immigrants 
being less opposed to immigration than earlier immigrants. The results for 
earlier immigrants consistently lie between those of natives and recent 
immigrants. This may be expected because, if there is any process of 
assimilation, immigrants should become closer to natives in their views. 
There are essentially two explanations why earlier immigrants are more 
similar to natives than recent ones. The first is that as time passes immigrants 
integrate into British society. Alternatively, it could be the case that only those 
immigrants who are similar to natives stay in the country, while other 
immigrants, with differing views, leave. The first explanation is supported by 
the findings of Manning and Roy (2010) concerning cultural integration; 
immigrants appear to become more similar to natives the longer they have 
been in the country. Manning and Roy (2010) find that immigrants integrate 
into the British culture very easily. 
The second explanation is essentially self-selection but the limited 
available information in the data, in particular the fact that we do not observe 
immigrants who have left, does not allow this to be tested. It can also be the 
case that people who left the UK in fact did not want to leave the UK but they 
had to leave because of the visa restrictions. This leads to our third 
explanation that may be recent immigrants want to be naturalized and that is 
why they are less opposed to further immigration so that the immigration 
policies do not change and they can obtain the UK citizenship and once they 
obtain the citizenship their views towards further immigration change. 
However, controlling for naturalisation can be one possible solution to 
further explore the difference in views towards further immigration between 
two immigrant groups given that the data are available for all those individuals 
who left the UK and who stayed. Without controlling for naturalisation it is 
hard to observe the counterfactual that whether an individual left because he 
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wanted to, or he left because he had to due to visa restrictions on immigrants. 
Just and Anderson, (2015), find some evidence of positive relationship 
between naturalisation and opposition towards further immigration. However, 
self-selection issue remains unaddressed in their paper, as they do not have 
the information on the immigrants who left.  
This study does not find any strong consistent evidence that the anti-
immigration views of natives, earlier and recent immigrants towards further 
immigration can be attributed to labour market outcomes. Even if the earlier 
immigrants and recent immigrants compete in the labour market, as 
suggested by the findings of Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Dustmann et al. 
(2013), there is no strong evidence that the current employment status affects 
views towards further immigration. 
Results on the income of natives and earlier immigrants suggest a clear 
gradient for respondents with higher income favouring further immigration, 
whereas there is some evidence for an inverted U-shape for recent immigrants. 
A potential explanation for this result is that low-income recent immigrants 
have concerns that family reunification may be made harder by tougher 
immigration laws, and these worries may overwhelm other concerns.  
We further find evidence in all three groups that economic shocks such 
as job loss or drops in income matter, even when holding employment status 
and the level of income constant. This finding is in line with the previous 
literature (see, for example, Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun, 2013; and Malchow-
Moller et al., 2008). This result suggests that people might be blaming 
immigrants for adverse shocks, regardless of whether they recover from the 
respective shock.  
Overall, this research suggests (a) that earlier immigrants and natives 
share more similar views towards further immigration than earlier and recent 
immigrants, (b) that employment status does not play a large role in explaining 
anti-immigration views, (c) income matters, even though the exact effects differ 
at low incomes between recent immigrants and natives and earlier 
immigrants, and (d) that economic shocks tend to be associated with more 
anti-immigration views. 
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Chapter 5. The Role of the Labour Market in Views 
towards Immigration 
This chapter employs a Fuzzy RDD and investigates what happens to the views 
of native males towards further immigration on exit from the labour market. 
The main conclusion of this chapter is that attitudes towards immigration 
largely remain unchanged after exit from the labour market, however, a little 
evidence of reduced opposition towards immigration is found after exit from 
the labour market. The OLS results do not show any significant change in 
views of native males towards further immigration on exit from the labour 
market. Even after controlling for the potential selection bias and endogeneity 
bias using a Fuzzy RDD, views of native males generally remain unchanged, 
with some evidence of reduced opposition towards further immigration after 
exit from the labour market.  
5.1 Introduction 
Immigration is often opposed, despite of the fact that there is little 
evidence in the literature demonstrating a detrimental impact on the natives’ 
earnings, employment prospects or their displacement (flight of natives from 
immigrant concentrated areas).27 In this chapter, we explore that how the 
views of natives change towards further immigration on exit from the labour 
market when they retire from paid work at state retirement age.  Labour 
market competition theories (see, for example, Borjas, 1999; Scheepers et al., 
2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Schneider, 2007) suggest that natives 
oppose immigration because they compete in the labour market. Although, 
recent research suggests that natives and immigrants do not compete in the 
labour market as they have different skill sets that make them imperfect 
substitutes (see, for example, Dustmann et al., 2013; Manacorda et al., 2012; 
                                       
 
27 Contrary to Borjas (2003) most findings suggest that immigration does not have any 
considerable adverse effect on local labour markets, see Card (1990), Altonji and Card (1991), 
Kuhn and Wooton (1991), LaLonde and Topel (1991), Card (2001) for the US, Dustmann  et 
al. (2003), Dustmann et al. (2005) for the UK, Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1994), 
Pischke and Velling (1997), Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1999) for Germany, Winter-
Ebmer and Zweimuller (1996), Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1999) for Austria, Hunt (1992) 
for France, Carrington and Lima (1996) for Portugal, and Angrist and Kugler (2003) for 
Western Europe as whole. 
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Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). Researchers have been trying to investigate the 
reasons for having views that are opposed to immigration by investigating the 
determinants of attitudes/views towards further immigration. Scheve and 
Slaughter (2001) using individual level data of National Election Studies 
(1992, 1994, and 1996) for USA find that skill level plays an important role in 
determining attitudes towards immigration. They find that low-skilled 
individuals are opposed to further immigration, whereas, high skilled 
individuals have more favourable views. 
Facchini, Mayda, and Mendola for South Africa (2013) using individual 
level data from the three waves of World Values Survey (1996, 2001, and 2007) 
for South Africa find that labour market concerns do not play a large role in 
determining anti-immigration attitudes. They find that non-economic factors 
such as religion and culture are very important in determining attitudes 
towards immigration. Bauer et al. (2000), for OECD countries, find that 
natives are more concerned about social issues if the immigrants are refugees, 
however, if the immigrants are economic migrants then it leads to labour 
market concerns among natives. Whereas, Citrin et al. (1997) for US find that 
individuals’ economic situation play a small role in determining views towards 
immigration, concerns about national economy, taxes, and general sentiments 
towards immigrant groups play a large role in determining attitudes towards 
further immigration.  
See, for example, Card et al. (2005) using European Social Survey find 
a strong positive relationship between education and attitudes towards 
immigration. They find that high qualified individuals are more in favour of 
immigration, this finding is in line with the findings of Dustmann and Preston 
(2004). Similarly, Constant and Zimmermann (2013), are also of the view that 
education is positively related to pro-immigration views. Dustmann and 
Preston (2001) using 5 years of British Social Attitudes Survey (1983, 1984, 
1986, 1989, 1990) investigate the attitudes of white respondents in England, 
and suggest that high density of ethnic minorities in local areas can result in 
more aggressive views towards immigration. This increased level of opposed 
views towards immigration due to high density of immigrants can stem from 
the fact that natives may feel threat to their identity or can breed fear if natives 
are of the view that immigrants are a reason of increased crime rate. One of 
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the reasons of fear of natives can be explained by lack of social connections 
with natives. Vervoort (2012) for Netherlands finds that if the neighbourhood 
is concentrated with minorities then immigrants are less likely to make social 
connections with native Dutch.   
Most of this literature has a common finding that labour market 
concerns are not strongly associated with opposed views towards immigration 
with an exception of few finding contrary evidence (in recent literature see, for 
example, Bridges and Mateut (2014), and Ortega and Polavieja (2012)). 
However, a range of studies stress that welfare concerns and non-economic 
concerns play a significant role in shaping views towards immigration.28 
Whereas, Mayda (2006) suggests that although non-economic concerns are 
more important than the economic concerns but economic concerns still play 
a role in determining attitudes towards immigration. Similarly, we find in 
chapter 4, that economic shocks play a large role in determining anti-
immigration views. These confirm the findings of Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun 
(2013).  
In this chapter, we are interested in estimating the effect of withdrawal 
from the labour market on attitudes towards immigration. This is hindered by 
an endogeneity problem as immigration might force people out of the labour 
market (for example, not obtaining any jobs). This endogeneity problem can 
lead towards biased estimates of OLS in the direction of increased opposition 
towards further immigration as respondents out of the labour force are 
essentially those with opposed views towards immigration. OLS estimation is 
also expected to suffer from selection bias that can arise because natives’ 
decision to retire early may be a result of their fear of immigrant competition 
in the labour market. 
To put it into the context, in our data, natives with opposing views 
towards immigration can be exactly those who may self-select to exit from the 
labour market early by choosing early-retirement due to the fear of immigrant 
competition in the labour market. This self-selection can result into majority 
                                       
 
28 Card et al. (2012) and Rustenbach (2010), for Europe, Dustmann and Preston (2007), for 
England, Fetzer (2011) for U.S. and Europe, Bakker and Dekker (2012) for Amsterdam, 
Stanley et al. (2012) for Australia, Nielsen et al. (2012) for a small Italian town, and Mayda 
(2006) for developed and developing countries emphasize the importance of social interaction, 
social capital, sense of society, interpersonal trust and compositional concerns. 
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of the respondents with opposing views towards immigration ending up in the 
data. Similarly, people out of the labour force can also be those who left the 
labour market as an outcome of increased immigration (endogeneity bias) and 
may have opposed views towards immigration. This self-selection and 
endogeneity can eventually cause biased OLS results in the direction of greater 
opposition. To sum up the above discussion, early-retired natives can be most 
likely natives with stronger anti-immigration views to begin with, and can 
eventually lead to biased results in favour of opposition to immigration. To get 
around this self-selection and endogeneity biases we use regression 
discontinuity design (explained in greater detail in section 3.4 and section 5.3).  
To illustrate the idea of the research in this chapter, let us say that 
labour market status does affect views towards immigration.  If this is the case 
then, in principle, a person’s views towards immigration should change 
effectively on exit from the labour market. The rationale of this change in views 
on exit from the labour market is that once a person is retired, effectively he 
or she is out of the labour market and a retired person should care less about 
immigration after exit from the labour market.  
The state retirement age in England and Wales for males and females is 
65 and 60 respectively.29 However, state retirement age in the UK has been 
phased out. State retirement age is the age at which one can claim state 
pension after establishing that he/she has retired from the paid work. Now, 
generally, anyone can carry on working without any age limit with no negative 
influence on their pension. Earlier, once a person established his retirement 
he/she could claim state pension past the retirement age, however if he/she 
worked after retirement they still get state pension but at a reduced rate 
depending upon the number of hours worked. On the other hand, if a person 
deferred his/her pension claim after the state retirement age, his/her pension 
raised at a specified rate according to a set formula. In our sample period, we 
expect to see respondents still working past retirement age. Respondents 
working past retirement age are most likely those who gain more than the loss 
from their pension due to working past retirement age. For greater details on 
                                       
 
29 It is true for the data used in this chapter.  
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the history of pensions and retirement in the UK read Bozio, A., Crawford, R. 
and Tetlow, G. (2010). 
One should expect neutral views after the retirement as immigrants will 
no longer be a threat to the job prospects and earnings of retired people. 
Intuitively, we hypothesise that if there is any role of labour market involved 
in anti-immigration views, we should find that natives become less opposed to 
further immigration after exit from the labour market on retirement. The 
rationale of having less opposed views towards further immigration on exit 
from the labour market is that once a native is retired, essentially, an 
individual is out of the labour market and is no longer competing for jobs. So, 
exit from the labour market should, make him or her indifferent towards 
immigration.30 
However, as explained earlier, OLS estimation of causal impact of 
retirement on views towards further immigration is hindered by endogeneity 
and self-selection issues. To deal with these issues, “retirement” (being an 
endogenous variable) is instrumented using state retirement age of 65 to  
generate a dummy instrumental variable “Ti” that assigns 1 if the respondent’s 
age is 65 or above at the time of survey and 0 otherwise. We use a regression 
discontinuity design (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) 
for this chapter, as one would expect a clear jump in the outcome variable 
(“reduce immigration”) when the treatment (“being retired”) kicks in at the 
threshold point (“state retirement age of 65”). The idea of this research is that 
if there is a sudden jump in views towards further immigration after the 
retirement, principally a Fuzzy RDD suggests that the jump is due to 
retirement alone and nothing else. In other words, if we find any change in the 
views towards further immigration after the retirement, we can say that this 
change occurred due to exit from the labour market because of retirement. 
                                       
 
30 We also tried to investigate the views of native males towards further immigration on entry 
into the labour market at their working age. Unfortunately, due to lack of available data we 
do not find any clear visible discontinuity that can be used for the regression discontinuity 
design. This non-existence of clear discontinuity at labour market entry age does not allow us 
to perform the analysis for labour market entry. 
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This design enables us to effectively find a causal impact of retirement 
on views towards further immigration.31 A Fuzzy RDD allows us to use the 
jump in the probability of getting treatment at the threshold point and use it 
as an instrument (Trochim, (1984)). The whole regression discontinuity design 
is explained in greater detail in section 3.4 and section 5.3.  
Following section explains the data used, outcome variables, and 
control variables, section 5.3 explains the methodology employed in greater 
detail, section 5.4 presents results and section 5.5 concludes this chapter. 
5.2 Data 
This chapter uses the two waves (2009-2011) of the UK Citizenship 
Survey.32 The survey is conducted in England and Wales, covers people aged 
16 and above and consists of a core sample and a minority ethnic boost 
sample. Each wave of the Citizenship Survey has a sample size of around 
15,000 people, consisting of a core sample of around 10,000 and a minority 
ethnic boost sample of around 5,000 individuals. 
Native respondents are identified on the basis of country of birth of 
respondent and country of birth of their mother and father, explained in 
greater details in chapter 4, section 4.2. In this chapter, “native” refers to a 
respondent who is born in the UK and whose both parents are born in the UK 
as well. The outcome variable named “reduce immigration” is the answer to 
the question, “Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain 
nowadays should be increased, reduced or should it remain the same?” If the 
respondent says increased or reduced, then the interviewer asks if the number 
should be increased or reduced by a little or a lot. 
To begin with, “increased a lot”, “increased a little” and “remain the 
same” are grouped together, as all indicate that the respondent does not want 
                                       
 
31 However, it is quite possible that time lag is involved in change of attitudes: firstly, as 
individuals may take time to realize that the problems they may or may not have faced in the 
labour market are no longer affecting them and secondly, change in attitudes are not likely to 
happen instantaneously.  
32 The survey has been collected since 2001. Initially it was a biennial survey conducted by 
the Home Office, in 2006 it fell under the auspices of the Communities and Local Government 
department (now the Department for Communities and Local Government. From 2007 
onwards the survey has been conducted annually, with data collection taking place each 
quarter. The publicly available data for this period combines four quarters, giving surveys for 
2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10 and 2010-11. 
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immigration to be cut. People replying “increased a lot” and “increased a little” 
are clearly in favour of immigration, while those replying “remain the same” 
are also not against it. We group the choices “reduced a lot” and “reduced a 
little” as both indicate a wish to see immigration reduced. This generates an 
indicator variable named “reduce immigration 1” (labelled as redmig in figures) 
of whether an individual is opposed to further immigration (or not). 
Our variable of interest for exit from the labour market is the answer to 
the question, “what was the main reason you did not look for work in the last 
4 weeks?” An indicator variable named “retired” is generated; value is 1 if 
respondent replied “retired from paid work” and 0 otherwise. The reference 
group for “retired” is “non-retired”. In principal, this reference group contains 
all the non-retired respondents such as students, people waiting for results of 
job applications, sick or injured people, long-term disabled people, people who 
believe no jobs are available, people who haven’t started looking for jobs, 
people who do not need employment, and any others who are not retired. 
Although, this classification is not perfect as it leads to heterogeneity within 
the reference group. However, we have to compromise on this issue as number 
of observations in each type of non-retired respondents become so few and 
sometimes no observations at all that Fuzzy RDD cannot be employed. Despite 
of this heterogeneity in the reference group, we can still interpret the results 
as compared to the non-retired respondents. We cannot imply this 
interpretation as a comparison with employed or unemployed respondents. 
Retired respondents may or may not have different views towards immigration 
as compared to the employed and unemployed respondents separately, 
however data restrictions do not allow us to test this. Interpretation of the 
results as compared to the non-retired respondents still holds true.    
Control variables used are: “normalized age” (age is normalized at 65 
(state retirement age for males) to center it at threshold for exit from the labour 
market), “survey year” dummy and an interaction between “retired” and 
“normalized age”. Interacted variable with normalized age allows us to see the 
difference of slope before and after the threshold. It gives the coefficient that 
whether age has a different or similar effect on retired and working people. 
Our instrument (probability of being retired) used for exit from the labour 
market is purely systematic that allows us to control for the potential selection 
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bias and endogeneity bias. Instrument being purely systematic is important 
to make the treatment random otherwise results can be biased. Methodology, 
instrument, how and why methodology works is further explained in section 
5.3. 
We assess the robustness of our results in two ways: a) Restricting the 
sample near to the threshold age 54 – 74 and 61 – 69 and b) re-estimation of 
the models after recoding the outcome variable; once by dropping the 
respondents selecting “cannot choose” from the analysis (referred to as 
“reduce immigration 2” and labelled as redmig2 in figures) and then by 
assigning 1 to respondents selecting “reduce a lot” and 0 otherwise (referred 
to as “reduce immigration 3” and labelled as redmig3 in figures). 
Categorization of the outcome variable is presented in table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1: Outcome variable categorization 
 
Categorization 
Reduce 
Immigration 
1  
Reduce 
Immigration 
2  
Reduce 
Immigration 
3 
Increase a lot 0 0 0 
Increase a 
little 
0 0 0 
Remain the 
same 
0 Dropped 0 
Reduce a little 1 1 0 
Reduce a lot 1 1 1 
 
Due to data restriction we restrict our sample to native males only, as 
we are unable to distinguish retired females who have left the labour force and 
those who have retired from positions which were not part of the labour force. 
However, graphical representation of treatment and the outcome for females 
is presented in appendix C but it is not discussed in this chapter. Descriptive 
statistics for the estimated sample for exit from the labour market is presented 
in table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for the estimated sample (Native males) 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Retired 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Age 51.12 18.50 16 95 
Increased a lot 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Increased a little 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Remain the same 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Reduce a little 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Reduce a lot 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Wave 2009 – 2010 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Wave 2010 – 2011 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Observations 7362 
 
Summary statistics show native males of around 51 years of age on 
average, with a minimum age of 16 years and maximum age of 95 and a 
standard deviation of over 18 years. Around 80 percent of the sample used for 
labour market exit analysis is opposed to further immigration, 17 percent of 
the sample wants the immigration to remain at the same level, and 3 percent 
wants an increase in immigration.  
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5.3 Methodology and Estimation 
Initially, OLS estimation is used for the analysis but OLS results are 
expected to be biased as selection and endogeneity problems can arise. Natives 
may self-select to exit from the labour market early due to any reason by 
choosing early retirement. Early retirement can be the result of anything such 
as family responsibilities, having enough wealth, or facing difficulty in finding 
a job. Essentially, anyone retiring early can lead to biased results as we will 
not be able to compute the exact impact of retirement (exit from the labour 
market) alone on attitudes towards immigration. It means that the results we 
get will be biased as they will be the combined effect of all the heterogeneity 
going on in retired respondents and estimates will be unable to tell us 
anything about the effect of retirement (exit from the labour market) alone on 
attitudes towards immigration. 
Whereas, if any of the reasons of early retirement sprouts from the anti-
immigration sentiments or from the perceived negative impact of immigration 
such as non-availability of jobs, reduced wages, labour market competition 
then this can result in the majority of the retired respondents already having 
negative views towards immigration. This can again leading to biased results 
towards greater opposition to immigration. In other words, this means that 
early retirement will create heterogeneity of respondents in the retired category 
with higher proportion of respondents opposed to immigration that will make 
it impossible to calculate the correct impact of retirement alone (impact of exit 
from the labour market) on attitudes of retired individuals towards 
immigrations due to exit from the labour market. 
To get around this issue of selection bias we use regression 
discontinuity design (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). 
Regression discontinuity design allows us to control for the self-selection 
problem by instrumenting the treatment using the discontinuity (Trochim 
(1984)). This technique has been used in programme evaluation, for example, 
in education Clark and Royer, (2010) and Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 
(1960).  
Our RD design is Fuzzy as we observe treated and untreated 
observations on both sides of the threshold. We are interested in estimating 
the causal relationship of exit from the labour market on attitudes towards 
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further immigration. In principle, the basic intuition is that we observe a 
discontinuous jump when the treatment kicks in at the threshold point (age 
65). This implies that if there is a jump in the outcome after treatment 
(retirement); it is caused by the treatment alone and nothing else. There is a 
difference between the probability of getting the treatment before and after the 
threshold point. This difference in probability of getting the treatment or not 
cannot suffer from self-selection or endogeneity. It means that, if there is a 
change in the views of respondents towards immigration after the retirement 
then it is due to exit from the labour market alone and nothing else. Our 
relationship of interest is presented by equation (5.1) below  
 
Yi = α + ρRi + β1Ai + β2Ai*Ti + β3Wi + εi      (5.1) 
 
where Yi is the binary outcome variable (reduce immigration) for individual i, 
Ri is the indicator variable for “being retired” that shows whether the individual 
i has retired from paid work or not, ρ is the causal coefficient of interest, Ai is 
the normalized age of the individual, Ti is the dummy indicating that the 
respondent’s age is 65 or above, Wi is the dummy for survey year and εi is the 
error term. Ai*Ti allows us to see the difference in slopes for individuals before 
and after the threshold. It should be noted that, Yi is a dummy variable that 
makes equation (5.1) a linear probability model. We run 2SLS to estimate a 
Fuzzy RDD. 
 
Our first stage regression looks like as below  
 
Ri = π0 + π1Ai + π2Ti + π3Ai *Ti + π4Wi + µi     (5.2) 
 
Here Ri is “being retired” and is instrumented using the instrument Ti. By 
substituting the first stage equation (5.2) into the causal relationship of 
interest equation (5.1) we get reduced form presented by equation (5.3) below 
 
Yi = α + β1Ti + β2Ai + β3 Ai*Ti + β4Wi + εi     (5.3) 
 
It produces a Wald estimator and is equivalent to an IV estimate 
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ρIV = β1/π2 
 
Now ρ is the causal effect of being retired from paid work (exit from the labour 
market). The pivotal part of the RDD is discontinuity at the threshold. Not just 
a simple increase but one should be able to see a clear jump at the threshold 
when plotted against the treatment. Graphical evidence in RD designs (sharp 
and fuzzy) is considered a central part of the RD analysis. Graphs are the first 
step in any RD analysis that indicates whether employing an RD design is 
feasible or not, as they provide a powerful, simple and convincing way to 
visualize the identification strategy. 
Figure 5.1 for exit from the labour market shows graphically the 
discontinuity and a visible jump in the treatment at the threshold point. On 
y-axis we have treatment status (retired or working) which is plotted against 
the normalized age of respondents in each age group on x-axis. All the graphs 
in figure 5.1 show a clear discontinuity at the threshold point. To begin with 
plotting the full sample, graph 5.1a) shows a discontinuity at the threshold 
point which remains there even when the respondents aged more than 74 and 
less than 54 are dropped from the analysis (graph 5.1b). Discontinuity at the 
threshold still appears in the graph 5.1c when the sample size is further 
reduced to the respondents aged 61 – 69.33 It means that the essential 
condition of discontinuity in the treatment holds true, so a RD design can be 
employed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
 
33 Figure C 1 in appendix C shows discontinuity graphs for the females.  
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Figure 5.1: Discontinuous jump in treatment at threshold  
 
 
Another important assumption of the RDD is continuity of the outcome 
variable at the threshold in the counterfactual situation without the 
treatment. The assumption implies that if there is a jump in the outcome after 
treatment it is caused by the treatment alone and nothing else, resulting in 
high internal validity.34 In this scenario, if there is a change in the views of 
respondents towards immigration after the retirement then it is due to exit 
from the labour market alone and nothing else. 
First stage results show that the likelihood of a person being retired at 
the state retirement age is significantly correlated with the actual retirement. 
Table 5.3 presents the first stage results for 9 different models, run by the 
combination of 3 different sample restrictions (age between 16 – 95, 54 – 74, 
and 61 – 69) and 3 different categorization of outcome variable (see, table 5.1). 
                                       
 
34 Internal validity means that these results hold true to a higher degree for this study at 
threshold point of 65. These results cannot be generalized; results may or may not change if 
the threshold point is changed or if estimated for a different population. 
5.1a) Discontinuous jump in treatment at threshold 5.1b) Discontinuous jump in treatment at threshold 
(sample trimmed at age 54 and 74) 
5.1c) Discontinuous jump in treatment at threshold 
(sample trimmed at age 61 and 69) 
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Table 5.3: First stage results (Exit from the labour market) 
Outcome Variables Reduce Immigration 1 Reduce Immigration 2 Reduce Immigration 3 
Retired (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Retirement at age 65 
or above 
.58*** 
(0.05) 
.25*** 
(0.02) 
.22*** 
(0.02) 
.59*** 
(0.05) 
.25*** 
(0.03) 
.22*** 
(0.03) 
.58*** 
(0.05) 
.25*** 
(0.02) 
.22*** 
(0.02) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 
stat (excl. 
instrument) 
144.45  112.26 121.16 130.20 69.88 69.10 144.45 112.26 121.16 
R2 0.670 0.369 0.176 0.669 0.377 0.175 0.670 0.369 0.176 
# observations 7362 2366 1239 6092 2060 1086 7362 2366 1239 
Sample Full Trimmed Trimmed Full Trimmed Trimmed Full Trimmed Trimmed 
Age boundaries 16 – 95 54 – 74 61 – 69 16 – 95 54 – 74 61 – 69 16 – 95 54 – 74 61 – 69 
 
Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. For IV, standard errors are adjusted by clustering at age. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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The estimated coefficient of “retirement at age 65 or above” is between 0.58 – 
0.59 with high significance for the full sample (see columns 1, 4 and 7 in table 
5.3); where the outcome variable is categorized in three different ways. The 
results for models estimated for the sample trimmed at age 54 and 74 (see 
column 2, 5 and 8 in table 5.3) and for models estimated for the sample 
trimmed at age 61 and 69 (see column 3, 6, and 9 in table 5.3) show a decrease 
in the estimated coefficients. These results change across the models because 
trimming changes sample sizes and individuals far away from the threshold 
with a very low probability of getting the treatment, for example, a person of 
age 17 is probably not going to retire at 17, are excluded from the estimation. 
This also makes trimmed models more meaningful. 
From the diagnostics there does not seem to be any weak instrument 
problem. The first stage F-values of all the models for the excluded instrument 
are between 69 and 144. Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) and Staiger and Stock 
(1997) suggest that if the F-statistic is above 10, we can imply that our 
instrument does not suffer from the weak instrument problem. It indicates 
that first stage exists for the instrument and there is enough correlation 
between the endogenous regressor and the instrument that can be used for 
the unbiased causal estimation. Estimation results are discussed in the 
following section. 
5.4 Results 
Initial OLS estimations show that on retirement views of native males 
towards further immigration remain the same. Panel A in table 5.4 (OLS 
models 1, 2, and 3) shows that OLS coefficients of being retired, for the full 
sample and the restricted samples age 54 – 74 and age 61 – 69  are 
insignificant and we are unable to reject the null of 0. It means that for a 
native male being retired has no significant negative or positive effect on the 
views towards further immigration. In other words, labour market seems to 
play no role in determining attitudes towards further immigration. The 
coefficients are insignificant and their magnitude is almost zero. However, as 
one would expect, OLS may over-estimate the impact of retirement on 
attitudes in favour of opposition towards further immigration, as respondents 
choosing to retire early may contain respondents opposed to further 
immigration that can hinder the true estimation of retirement effect on 
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attitudes towards further immigration. This issue is discussed earlier in 
greater detail in section 5.1 and 5.3, we employ IV estimation to fix this 
problem. 
Our IV estimation of model 1 also returns an insignificant coefficient. 
This relationship is graphically presented in figure 5.2 (graph 5.2a). The 
outcome variable is on y-axis and is plotted against the respondents’ age on 
x-axis. The discontinuity or jump between the two plotted lines before and 
after the threshold shows that there is not a huge change in attitudes towards 
further immigration after the retirement. The graph in figure 5.2 (graph 5.2a) 
shows no discontinuity on exit from the labour market for the full sample.35  
To be sure we restrict our sample near to the threshold to see a clearer 
picture (see, graph 5.2b and 5.2c in figure 5.2). IV estimation for the restricted 
models (Panel A in table 5.4 IV models 2, and 3) gives us statistically 
significant coefficients of retired dummy and show that a retired person has a 
lower probability of reporting views opposed to immigration by 0.20 p.p. and 
0.30 p.p. respectively as compared to a non-retired person. These estimates 
show that when a respondent leaves the labour market he is less likely to 
oppose immigration.  Looking at the graphs (see, graph 5.2b and 5.2c in figure 
5.2), when samples are restricted to age 54 – 74 and 61 – 69, we can see a 
slight downward jump – discontinuity – at the threshold point (age 65). It 
means we can safely say that native males’ opposition to immigration does not 
increase on exit from the labour market; if views change they become neutral 
or less opposed to immigration as there is a slight downward jump in the 
outcome after the retirement.  
  
                                       
 
35 Figure C 2 in appendix C presents the graphs of the outcome variable “reduce 
immigration 1” for female natives. 
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Figure 5.2: Continuity in outcome variable (Reduce Immigration 1) at threshold 
 
Reduce Immigration 1 is labelled as redmig in figure 5.2 
 
 
 
5.2a) Continuity in outcome variable 
(reduce immigration 1) at threshold 
5.2b) Slight discontinuity in outcome variable (reduce 
immigration 1) (sample restricted at age 54 and 74) 
5.2c) Slight discontinuity in outcome variable (reduce 
immigration 1) (sample restricted at age 61 and 69) 
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Table 5.4: OLS/IV estimates for all the models (Exit from the labour market) 
Panel A: Reduce Immigration 1 (1 for “reduce a little” & “reduce a lot” and 0 otherwise) 
Reduce Immigration 1 OLS (1) OLS (2)  OLS (3) IV (1) IV (2)  IV (3) 
Retired 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.20** 
(0.09) 
-0.30*** 
(0.11) 
Normalized Age 0.003*** 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.003*** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Normalized Age*above 65 -0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.85*** 
(0.01) 
0.86*** 
(0.02) 
0.85*** 
(0.03) 
0.85*** 
(0.02) 
0.99*** 
(0.05) 
1.06*** 
(0.06) 
N 7362 2366 1239 7362 2366 1239 
Panel B: Reduce Immigration 2 ( “remain the same” dropped from Panel A sample) 
Reduce Immigration 2 OLS (4) OLS (5)  OLS (6) IV (4) IV (5)  IV (6) 
Retired 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.04) 
Normalized Age 0.001*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.001** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Normalized Age*above 65 -0.001* 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.98*** 
(0.00) 
0.98*** 
(0.01) 
0.98*** 
(0.01) 
0.98*** 
(0.01) 
0.99*** 
(0.02) 
1.02*** 
(0.03) 
N 6092 2060 1086 6092 2060 1086 
Panel C: Reduce Immigration 3 (1 for “reduce a lot” and 0 otherwise) 
Reduce Immigration 3 OLS (7) OLS (8)  OLS (9) IV (7) IV (8)  IV (9) 
Retired 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.29** 
(0.13) 
-0.68*** 
(0.15) 
Normalized Age 0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Normalized Age*above 65 -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.66*** 
(0.01) 
0.68*** 
(0.03) 
0.66*** 
(0.04) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.86*** 
(0.07) 
1.12*** 
(0.08) 
N 7362 2366 1239 7362 2366 1239 
Sample Full Trimmed Trimmed Full Trimmed Trimmed 
Age boundaries (inclusive) 16 – 95 54 – 74 61 – 69  16 – 95 54 – 74 61 – 69  
 
Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. For IV, standard errors are 
adjusted by clustering at age. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Models 1,4 and 7 are estimated using the full sample of native males, models 
2,5, and 8 are estimated by trimming the sample at age 54 and 74, whereas, 
model 3,6 and 9 are estimated after trimming the sample at age 61 and 69. 
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If we look at Panel B of table 5.4, where respondents who answer 
“remain the same” are dropped from the analysis, OLS estimation shows that 
the coefficients of being retired, for full sample, restricted sample to age 54 – 
74 and to age 61 – 69 (OLS models 4, 5 , and 6) are  insignificant. A similar 
picture arises, retirement appears to play no role in views towards further 
immigration. Even when the native males exit from the labour market their 
views towards further immigration do not change. IV estimation of these 
models present a similar picture as well, coefficients of being retired for IV 
models 4, 5  and 6 are again insignificant, suggesting that treatment does not 
affect the outcome (see, figure 5.3). This can be clearly seen from the graphical 
representation in figure 5.3 that there is no visible jump in the outcome after 
the treatment.36  It is important to mention that in Panel B we can see that 
coefficients of retired dummy fairly remain the same for all sample restrictions 
and estimation methods: full sample, restricted sample to age 54 – 74, and to 
age 61 – 69 with both OLS and IV estimations. 
Figure 5.3: Continuity in outcome variable (Reduce Immigration 2) at 
threshold (Exit from the labour market) 
 
Reduce Immigration 2 is labelled as redmig2 in figure 5.3. 
                                       
 
36 Figure C 3 in appendix C presents the graphs of the outcome variable “reduce 
immigration 2” for female natives. 
5.3a) Continuity in outcome variable 
(Reduce Immigration 2) at threshold 
5.3b) Continuity in outcome variable (Reduce Immigration 
2) at threshold (sample restricted at 54 and 74) 
5.3c) Continuity in outcome (Reduce Immigration 2) at 
threshold (sample restricted at 61 and 69) 
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As a robustness check we use strictly categorized outcome variable (reduce 
immigration 3) by assigning 1 to only those respondents who are of the view 
to reduce immigration “a lot” and 0 otherwise.  Panel C in table 5.4, shows 
that retired native males have no different views than native males still in the 
labour market. Full sample of 7,362 respondents reduce to 2,366 and 1,239 
respondents on trimming the sample to 54 – 74 and 61 – 69 respectively. 
Coefficients of being retired are insignificant for models 7, 8 and 9 with 
OLS estimation, shown in Panel C. Whereas, this coefficient is insignificant 
for model 7 of IV estimation but statistically significant for model 8 and 9 
showing a favour of 0.29 p.p. and 0.68 p.p. of native retired males towards 
further immigration. It means that a retired native is likely to favour further 
immigration by 0.29 p.p. and 0.68 p.p. as compared to a non-retired native 
male, when the sample is restricted to 54 – 74 and 61 – 69 respectively. 
Looking at the graphs (see, figure 5.4), we see that native males’ opposition to 
immigration do not change on exit from the labour market (see, graph 5.4a in 
figure 5.4); if views change they become neutral or less opposed to immigration 
(see, graphs 5.4b and 5.4c in figure 5.4) as there is a slight evidence of 
downward jump in the outcome after the retirement.37 
Throughout our estimation we find a consistent finding that whenever 
we restrict the sample near to the threshold, we find that retired native males 
become less likely to report opposed to further immigration as compared to 
those who are not retired. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
 
37 Figure C 4 in appendix C presents the graphs of the outcome variable “reduce 
immigration 3” for female natives. 
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Figure 5.4: Continuity in outcome variable (Reduce Immigration 3) at threshold 
 
Reduce Immigration 3 is labelled as redmig3 in figure 5.4. 
 
For further robustness checks, we run all the models presented in table 
5.4 after controlling for the regional dummies, ethnicity dummies, religion 
dummies, and practicing religion dummy as in chapter 4. We find almost 
similar results presented in table c 1 in appendix C. Although, the sample size 
gets smaller for all the models due to missing values for some of the included 
control variables but results portray the same picture. This strengthen our 
earlier findings that labour market has a very little role in determining 
attitudes towards further immigration. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights that the labour market plays a slight role in 
determining opposition towards further immigration. Our results suggest that 
exit from the labour market does not largely change the attitudes towards 
further immigration, although a little evidence of reduced opposition is present 
after retirement from paid work and exit from the labour market.  
It is important to note that we imply retirement from the paid work gives 
us the underlying effect of exit from the labour market on attitude of being 
opposed to further immigration. Although, retirement, especially early 
retirement is correlated with many other factors such as health, wealth, family 
5.4a) Continuity in outcome variable 
(Reduce Immigration 3) at threshold 
5.4b) Slight discontinuity in outcome variable (Reduce 
Immigration 3) at threshold (sample restricted at age 54 and 
74) 
5.4c) Slight discontinuity in outcome (Reduce Immigration 3) 
(sample restricted at age 61 and 69) 
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responsibilities that may have resulted in retirement. But the basic argument 
that if labour market was playing any role in determining attitudes towards 
immigration then once a person is out of the labour market, labour market 
should become lesser of a concern for him/her. Conversely, there may be some 
retired individuals with some of their family members still in the labour 
market. These retired individuals may still be concerned about labour market 
issues for the success of their family members. This heterogeneity in retired 
natives explains the small magnitude of coefficient of being retired on attitudes 
towards further immigration. May be coefficients for retired individuals with 
family members still in the labour market and coefficients for retired 
individuals with no family member in the labour market have opposite signs 
and this ends up decreasing the overall coefficient. However, this 
heterogeneity cannot be controlled for due to the data limitations.  
Overall, results show that a large part of anti-immigration attitudes are 
most likely determined through other than the labour market channels. One 
of the channels often found to be associated with determining attitudes 
towards further immigration is social channel (see, for example, Card et al., 
2012; Dustmann and Preston, 2004). Evidence suggests that determinants 
like interpersonal trust, identity, perception, race and prejudice are often 
found to determine attitudes towards further immigration. 
This chapter finds that attitudes of native males largely remain 
unchanged and slightly become pro-immigration after retirement. It means 
that labour market does not play a large role in determining views towards 
further immigration. This finding is in line with our earlier analysis in chapter 
4 and the previous literature (see, for example, Card et al., 2005; Citrin et al., 
1997; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Dustmann and Preston, 2004; 
Dustmann and Preston, 2001; Rustenbach, 2010). If being in the labour 
market were influencing anti-immigration views then we would expect these 
views to change markedly as individuals exited from the labour market should 
care less about immigration as they no longer face the immigrant competition 
in the labour market.  
Our OLS results suggest that exit from the labour market does not 
change the views of native males towards further immigration. Whereas, after 
controlling for the selection bias and endogeneity bias we see a similar picture 
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– for the full sample models – that the views of retired natives do no change 
as compared to the ones who are still in the labour market. However, we find 
retired native males become less opposed to immigration on exit from the 
labour market, compared to still working native males. We find this evidence 
when the sample is trimmed near to the threshold and respondents reporting 
“remain the same” to the outcome question of further immigration are 
included.38  
The inclusion of respondents reporting “remain the same” makes the 
difference. They drive the coefficient of our variable of interest “retired” 
towards native males being less opposed to immigration on exit from the 
labour market – a sign of labour market competition playing a significant role 
in determining attitudes towards immigration. This happens because 
inclusion of respondents reporting “remain the same” increases the number 
of observations to the left side of the threshold whereas, in Panel B, on 
trimming the data and dropping “remain the same” we are left with small 
number of observations that does not allow us to see the effect with statistical 
significance, however sign is consistent with the other models. So careful 
interpretation is required, we can safely say that exit from the labour market 
does not completely change the attitudes towards further immigration; but 
some evidence of a decrease in opposition towards immigration after exit from 
the labour market is present. This finding of labour market playing a role in 
determining attitudes towards immigration is in line with Ortega and Polavieja 
(2012). 
 The main contribution of this chapter is that it explores the effect of 
labour market on the views towards further immigration using a Fuzzy RDD. 
It finds that attitudes towards immigration largely remain unchanged after 
exit from the labour market, however, a little evidence of reduced opposition 
towards immigration is found at retirement and exit from the labour market. 
It is safe to say that if labour market plays any role in determining views 
towards further immigration, the role is not that much big. 
Views may change after retirement because if there is any role of labour 
market in determining attitudes towards immigration then once an individual 
                                       
 
38 See, models IV (2), IV (3) in Panel A, and IV (8) and IV (9) in Panel C in table 5.4. 
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is out of the labour market, he/she is more likely to care less about 
immigration, as he/she is not part of the labour force anymore. However, we 
may expect a delay in change of attitudes after retirement as attitudes are not 
likely to change instantaneously on retirement. We must also not forget that 
a large part of opposition towards immigration is determined outside the 
labour market. So, it is likely, that the part of opposition towards immigration 
coming through the labour market channel may be so little that the change in 
attitudes after the retirement goes without being noticed. This chapter points 
out a slight decrease in opposition towards further immigration after exit from 
the labour market. To substantiate this finding, further research is needed to 
investigate the magnitude of the role of labour market in determining attitudes 
toward further immigration. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we are 
unable to do it with this data set. It is also worthwhile to investigate the change 
in attitudes at entry into the labour market and latter compare the two 
changes: a) at entry and b) at exit from the labour market, to see what exactly 
is the contribution of labour market in determining attitudes towards further 
immigration.  
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Chapter 6. Are Immigrants a Burden on Public Services? 
Immigration might have a negative impact on public services in the host 
country. This chapter focuses on the impact of immigrants on educational 
outcomes and school resources using longitudinal data on immigration and 
primary schools in England. It uses various fixed effects regressions as well 
as IV, where past location choice of immigrants is used to account for the non-
random selection of immigrants into areas. This chapter suggests that 
increased immigration has improved educational outcomes, both in English 
and maths, but also placed resource pressures on primary schools, as class 
sizes have increased and schools had to hire additional teachers. 
6.1 Introduction 
The impact of immigration on residents in the host country is a highly 
contentious issue. In addition to the debate on the labour market impacts of 
immigration,39 a major focus in the public debate – at least in the UK – has 
been the impact on public services, such as healthcare or education. This 
chapter considers the impact of immigration to the UK on the latter. England 
is arguably an interesting setting for this kind of research as it has experienced 
a large influx of immigrants in recent years and the impact of immigration has 
been an area of major public concern. We use a combination of school-level 
data on primary schools from performance tables published by the 
Department for Education, combined with low-level regional data on 
immigration from the 2001 and 2011 censuses. This detailed data allows us, 
to simultaneously look at school resources and school outcomes and thus to 
shed some light on the trade-offs states might face when dealing with an influx 
of immigrants. 
Ideally we would like to have considered the time period 1991 – 2011 
however, this is not possible due to data limitations. Our analysis is carried 
out at the “Super Output Area” level and these are only available for the 2001 
                                       
 
39 Summarized recently in a special issue in the Journal of the European Economic 
Association (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2012; Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth, 
2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson, 2012; Card, 2012; Dustmann 
and Preston, 2012).  
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and 2011 censuses. It is may be the case that our instrument may have a 
certain degree of correlation with the changes in school quality and economic 
conditions of local area that may have affected the immigrants’ location 
decisions in 2001. It means that if the location choice of immigrants in 2001 
is the outcome of changes in school quality and economic conditions at that 
time then validity of our instrument may have been compromised. Although, 
from the diagnostics in table 6.2, it shows that our analysis does not suffer 
from weak instrument problem.  This issue can be fully addressed by using 
the census data from 1991, which unfortunately cannot be used due to the 
unavailability of data at “Super Output Area” level. However, if there is any 
endogeneity raising from the changes in school quality and economic 
conditions then after controlling for local authority and school fixed effects, 
the issue of endogeneity becomes less severe.   
School funding in the England (and the UK more generally) is complex. 
Chowdry and Sibieta (2011) describe the funding models for different school 
types in England. While there is a formula for allocation central funds from 
Government to Local Authorities there are also various Local Authority 
formulas that allocate funding to individual schools. These formulas can  take 
account a number of factors including,  the number of pupils, school 
deprivation, special needs and the number of pupils with English as an 
additional language. So while there may be a link between the number of 
immigrants and school resources there is not direct funding formula. 
Most of the previous literature on the impact of immigration on schools 
has focused on (negative) peer effects on native education outcomes caused 
by a higher share of immigrants in the classroom or school population. In 
contrast, this chapter is concerned primarily with the question whether 
immigration puts a strain on school resources and, simultaneously, what 
happens to school outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, there is a very 
limited set of papers that look at the link between immigration and school 
resources and none that looks at both school resources and education 
outcomes. On the resource side, Coen-Pirani (2011) uses a calibrated model 
to look at increased Mexican immigration into California. His results, from 
counterfactual simulations, suggest that spending per pupil would have been 
24% higher in the year 2000 if immigration had remained on 1970-levels. 
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Speciale (2012) looks at 15 pre-enlargement EU countries using an 
identification strategy based on the inflow of immigrants following the Balkan 
Wars in the 1990s. His results suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in 
the population’s immigrant share leads to a 0.1% to 0.6% decrease in 
education expenditure per student.  
Some of the very few papers that look at immigration into geographical 
areas, rather than schools or classrooms, and its consequences for native 
outcomes are Betts (1998) and Hunt (2012) who use state-level data on 
immigration and native school outcomes. The former’s findings from fixed 
effects regressions suggest a negative link between immigration and natives’ 
high-school completion, while the latter’s results suggest a small positive 
effect. We use data on a much smaller spatial scale – roughly on the level of 
city quarters rather than US states or metropolitan areas. The only other 
paper we are aware of that also looks at the effect of (small-scale) 
neighbourhood characteristics on student outcomes is Gibbons et al. (2013). 
They focus on characteristics such as the average grade 3 score in English 
(reading and writing) and mathematics, the share of students eligible for free 
school meals, the share of students with special education needs and the 
fraction of males in spatially small neighbourhoods. Their results suggest no 
evidence for an effect of neighbourhood composition on test scores. However, 
they find evidence that neighbourhood characteristics affect several 
behavioural outcomes. 
This chapter is also complimentary to an existing literature that is 
concerned with the (peer) effects of having more immigrants in the classroom 
on the performance of native pupils. For England, Geay et al. (2013) 
investigated the impact of immigration, measured by being a non-native 
speaker, on native pupils’ school outcomes. Their evidence, from a range of 
empirical approaches suggests that increases in the share of non-native 
speakers has no impact on the reading, writing or mathematics performance 
of natives once a limited number of controls are included. For the Netherlands, 
Ohinata and van Ours (2013a) investigate the impact of immigrant students 
on the educational performance of native Dutch pupils. They find that – while 
immigration leads to more incidents of bullying or stealing – there is no strong 
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evidence of a negative impact on the educational performance of native Dutch 
pupils. 
In another paper, Ohinata and van Ours (2013b) use quantile regression 
and find that native students with the best marks are adversely affected by 
immigration, potentially reflecting an increase in teachers attention towards 
low-performing students. Finally, Schneeweis (2013) considered 22 school 
cohorts in Austria between 1980 and 2001. She shows that an increasing 
share of immigrants negatively affects the attendance of immigrants in the 
‘high track’40 schools, with no significant negative impacts for natives, 
suggesting that the negative impact of immigration is felt by immigrants 
themselves and not natives. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that the 
reallocation of immigrants to schools with a low concentration of immigrants 
reduces the differences in achievements between natives and immigrants, 
suggesting that mixed schools benefit immigrants with no discernible impact 
for natives. 
Much of this previous literature relies on within-school differences in 
the number of immigrants in each class or cohort. Given our focus on school-
level outcomes, such as the number of teachers, this approach is not feasible. 
Instead we consider how individual schools change in the face of increased 
immigration into the local area where they are situated. The major difficulty 
when estimating the impact of immigration in this way arises from the non-
random assignment of immigrants to local areas. Immigrants self-select into 
areas, possibly on the basis of the existence of successful immigrant 
communities or similar ethnic groups or because of current favourable 
conditions in an area, all of which might also matter for our outcomes (see, 
for example, Abraham and Shryock, 2000; Åslund, 2005; Bartel, 1989; Hatton 
and Wheatley Price, 1999; Lymperopoulou, 2013; Pacyga, 1991; Phillimore 
and Goodson, 2006; Phillips, 2007; Schwirian, 1983; Styan, 2003; Zorlu and 
Mulder, 2008). 
To attenuate eventual biases arising from this non-random selection 
into areas differing in school quality and other location characteristics, we use 
                                       
 
40 Austria, as well as several other countries such as Germany and Switzerland, operate a 
system where pupils are sorted into different school tracks based on their measured ability. 
High track schools get the most able students. 
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a variety of modelling strategies. In a first step we rely on school fixed effects 
that account for time-invariant differences between areas and schools that 
might influence immigrants’ location decisions.41 As we look at 10-year 
differences, these fixed effects are unlikely to fix all potential selection 
problems because the attractiveness of areas and schools might well change 
over time and it is entirely possible that immigrants react to these changes. 
To address this potential endogeneity of the change in immigrant numbers, 
we rely on an instrumental variable strategy based on past settlement 
patterns, first developed by Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001) and 
subsequently used in the immigration literature by, for example, Bianchi et 
al. (2012), Card (2009), Cortes (2008), Gonzalez and Ortega (2013), Hunt 
(2012), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), and Saiz (2006). The underlying idea is that 
the tendency of immigrants to move to areas with many existing immigrants 
allows one to use historic settlement patterns of immigrants to instrument for 
current settlement. To illustrate the idea: the instrument effectively 
redistributes the nationwide change in immigrants between t0 and t1 according 
to some initial distribution of immigrants across regions. A region that was 
initially home to, say, 5% of all immigrants would also receive 5% of all new 
arrivals during the observation period. The underlying logic is that past-
immigration patterns should influence current settlement decisions, while the 
historical distribution of immigrants should be unaffected by any current 
change in the quality of public schools.42  
This approach comes with two advantages and a disadvantage relative 
to the use of within-school comparisons. The first advantage is that it allows 
us to look at our outcomes of interest, in particular school resources, which 
vary on the school-level but not within schools. The second advantage is that 
it avoids a necessary assumption of the within-school comparison approach, 
namely that immigrants select into schools or areas, but are then more or less 
randomly distributed to classes within that school. Depending on the level of 
student management by head teachers this assumption may or may not hold. 
                                       
 
41 In alternative specifications we also used low-level regional fixed effects, leading to 
essentially identical estimates. 
42 Note that the fixed effects would take care of any pre-existing differences between areas 
that would have caused these historical settlement patterns. 
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An example where it would be violated are cases where head teachers send 
immigrants into those classes that they expect to be the most able to cope 
with such an influx, thus mitigating any potential negative impact on other 
students (Vigdor and Nechyba, 2007 provide some evidence for within-school 
sorting in the context of peer-effects estimation). 
Furthermore, within-school or within-cohort comparisons only consider 
spill-overs from immigrants to pupils in the same class or cohort, but not to 
those in other classes or cohorts in the same school. To the extent that pupils 
who live close to each other, but are not in the same class (or even the same 
school) influence each other, for example, through every-day social 
interactions, these comparisons might miss an important part of the picture. 
In the context of immigration, one could think of native pupils becoming 
friends with immigrant children in the same area and being influenced by each 
other’s values or learning from each other (see, Gibbons et al., 2013, for a 
similar argument in relation to other neighbourhood characteristics). In 
contrast our approach, of looking at the local area where the school is situated, 
allows for such interactions outside of the school and is also agnostic about 
how schools sort immigrants into classes. 
The advantages come at a price, however: The comparison of classes 
with different numbers of immigrants within the same school and cohort/year 
fully controls for the selection of immigrants into schools, and any difference 
between schools in the same year or within schools over the years, in a very 
simple way through the inclusion of school*year fixed effects. We, in contrast, 
have to rely on the instrumental variable strategy outlined above to attenuate 
concerns regarding these selection effects. 
Finally, it is important to be clear that it is possible for immigration to 
have both positive and negative effects, both on school resources and on 
school performance (i.e., educational outcomes of pupils), in particular over a 
relatively long time such as the 10-year period considered here. Firstly, 
increased immigration may place pressure on schools because of larger class 
sizes and increasing numbers of non-native (in this case non-English) 
language speakers, possibly leading to a worsening of school outcomes. 
However, these effects can be mitigated – at least in the medium to long term 
– if schools in affected areas are also given more resources to hire additional 
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teachers or to take other measures to deal with the increased population.43 
One should note, however, that the existing evidence – Coen-Pirani (2011) for 
California and Speciale (2012) for pre-enlargement EU-15 countries – find 
evidence for decreases in spending per pupil.  
Secondly, native parents might start to withdraw their children from 
schools facing or experiencing an inflow of immigrants and relocate them to 
schools with a lower concentration of immigrants, either in other areas or into 
other types of schools, such as private schools. There is evidence of such 
native flight in England (Geay et al., 2013) and the US (Casio and Lewis, 2012, 
and for secondary schools Betts and Fairlie, 2003). Furthermore, evidence on 
school choice from the Netherlands suggests that native parents will choose 
schools with low immigrant concentration (for example, Ladd et al., 2010). To 
the extent that parents of more able native children are more likely to 
withdraw their children from schools with a high share of immigrants, school 
outcomes might worsen as the composition of pupils change. However, it is 
equally possible that a higher inflow of immigrants improves school outcomes 
(for example, Burgess, 2014; Cook, 2014; Cook, 2013; Greaves et al., 2014): 
immigrants are usually positively selected from the home country’s 
population, which suggests that the average immigrant pupil might be of 
higher ability than the average native pupil. 
Furthermore, some immigrant groups, in particular Asians, are well-
known for placing a high value on education, which might again lead to a 
higher performance of their respective children (see, for example, Burgess, 
2011; Fuligni, 1997; Fuligni, 2001; Fuligni and Yoshika, 2004). Similarly, 
Burgess et al. (2009) and Wilson et al. (2011) found that after controlling for 
observables, pupils from all ethnic minority backgrounds show a better 
                                       
 
43 Note that recent evidence (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013, and Dustmann, et al., 2010) 
suggest that the fiscal impact of immigrants in the UK is positive, i.e., the state appears to 
gain more in taxes from immigrants than is spent on them. This should in principle allow for 
an increase in funding for schools affected by higher immigration, however, it is not clear 
whether this increase actually happens. Unfortunately, information on school funding is not 
available for 2001, so this question cannot be investigated in the same way as our main 
estimates. Anecdotally, reports in the press (for example, The Economist, 2014) suggest that 
schools with a high immigrant concentration often get additional funds as they are also in 
deprived areas and benefit from extra government funding. It is important to be clear, 
however, that there does not appear to be any extra funding directly tied to immigrant 
numbers. In section 6.5, we present some suggestive evidence that immigration is associated 
with lower spending per pupil in a number of categories. 
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progress in their secondary schooling as compared to the white British pupils. 
They show that most of the development in their educational achievements 
occurs at the end of compulsory schooling in their exams when the stakes are 
high and this is true for all the schools wherever these ethnic minority pupils 
are present.  
Burgess (2014) in his recent study use pupil level data of secondary 
schools from National Pupil Database 2012 – 2013 and stress that the better 
performance of London schools (initially pointed out by Cook in 2013 and 
referred to as ‘London Effect’) is caused by the ethnic composition of its 
schools. He states that the ethnic composition of schools has a positive effect 
on the GCSE results. Due to larger number of immigrant students present in 
London schools, white British students also perform better, most likely 
because of peer-effect. Burgess suggests that better results can be achieved 
by encouraging integrated multi-ethnic schools and by attracting immigrants 
in areas where there are comparatively fewer immigrants. Similarly, Greaves 
et al. (2014) for England using National Pupil Database from 2002 to 2012, 
found that disadvantaged pupils (eligible for free school meals) in inner 
London, Birmingham, and Manchester perform better as compared to the rest 
of England in Key Stage 4 exams (at the end of secondary school) is largely 
explained by: a) the higher number of pupils from ethnic minority 
backgrounds in these cities and b) prior better educational achievements at 
Key Stage 2 exams (at the end of primary school). 
Our results suggest that immigration leads to larger schools and also 
changes the composition of pupils in schools by leading to lower numbers of 
natives and higher numbers of non-native English speakers. Furthermore, 
schools appear to hire more teachers to respond to the growth in student 
numbers, even though pupil-teacher-ratios still increase. Given this evidence, 
that immigration does put pressure on school resources, we also examine to 
what extent measures of pupil performance change in response to 
immigration, focusing on several key exams that pupils sit at the end of 
primary schooling. Our results suggest that – in spite of the resource pressure 
– education outcomes improve with immigration. We find increases in the 
performance in Maths and English exams, as well as falls in the share of pupils 
being absent from examination. Finally, we also provide supplementary 
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evidence on spending per pupil – data on which, unfortunately, are only 
available for 2011. This evidence suggests that schools in high-immigrant 
neighbourhoods spend less per pupil in a number of categories than schools 
in neighbourhoods with fewer immigrants in the same local authority. 
However, the effects are comparatively small. This finding reinforces our 
earlier results on school resources and is consistent with sluggish adjustment 
of individual school budgets in the face of increased pupil numbers. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 explains the 
data used, section 6.3 describes methodology, section 6.4 presents our main 
results, while section 6.5 presents additional results for school spending and 
income. Section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2 Data 
This chapter focuses on schools in England using data from “School 
Performance Tables” combined with population data from the 2001 and 2011 
UK censuses. Data for primary schools are taken from “School Performance 
Tables” published annually by the Department for Education. The underlying 
data is collected by LEAs (Local Education Authorities). The data provide 
school-level information on pupils’ performance and school characteristics, 
such as total number of pupils, pupil-teacher ratios and various performance 
measures. 
In most of our analysis, we rely only on outcomes that are measured in 
both 2001 and 2011. Specifically, we consider two sets of outcome variables. 
The first set of outcome variables are associated with school resources or 
general school characteristics, specifically the number of pupils eligible for key 
stage 2 assessment, the number of pupils whose first language is not English, 
the number of native pupils, the pupil-teacher ratio, and the number of 
teachers. The second set relates to pupils’ educational achievement in the Key 
Stage 2 exams sat at the age of 11, the end of primary education.44 These are: 
                                       
 
44 The English school system is structured in 4 Key Stages. Each key stage refers to a certain 
age and completed educational years. Key Stage 1 starts with the reception class at the age 
of 4 and ends at the completion of 2 educational years at the age of 7 with an assessment in 
English and Maths. Key Stage 2 starts at the age of 7 and ends at the age of 11, with 
assessments in English, Maths and Science. Primary education is completed at the end of the 
Key Stage 2 assessment, after which students begin their secondary education comprised of 
Key Stage 3 and Key Stage 4. 
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the percentages of pupils achieving level 4-competency or above in English or 
Maths respectively, the average point score in these exams, and the 
percentages of students not achieving any level of proficiency due to absence 
or disapplication (i.e., the percentage of pupils not sitting the respective exam) 
in English or Maths. 
Different levels represent the National Curriculum Test Levels, ranging 
from 1 to 8, with higher levels indicating higher competency. Key stage 2 
exams cover levels 3 to 6, with 4 being the expected level of knowledge at this 
stage. The share of pupils achieving level 4 or above is thus equivalent to those 
performing at expected or higher levels at this stage of their education. Average 
point score of 27 is equivalent to the expected level 4 at this stage. Average 
point score is calculated by the following formula 
((a pupil’s reading test score +  writing teacher assessment)/2 +  maths)
2
 
We combine this data with information on immigrants in the local area 
taken from the censuses. It should be noted that the definition of immigrants 
has been changed as compared to the definition used in chapter 4 and chapter 
5. Now, immigrants are defined as individuals being born outside of England, 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland for the censuses data. Whereas, in the 
school league tables pupils whose first language is not English are considered 
as immigrants. While this mechanism for distinguishing between natives and 
immigrants may be imperfect but there is no further information available for 
more precise classifications.   
We construct information on the number of immigrants at the level of 
Lower-layer Super Output Areas (LSOA) and Middle-layer Super Output Areas 
(MSOA). Both are spatial units used for the publication of census data. They 
are based on post-codes, which in the UK are usually equivalent to streets, 
and are designed to remain stable over time. One can think of LSOAs as being 
equivalent to neighbourhoods, while MSOAs are close to city quarters or 
smaller towns. LSOAs have a minimum population of 1,000 with a mean of 
1,500, equal to approximately 650 households. LSOAs are then combined to 
generate an MSOA. Each MSOA contains a minimum population of 5,000 with 
a mean of 7,500 or around 3,000 households. At present, there are 34,753 
LSOAs and 7,201 MSOAs in England and Wales.  
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Each school is merged to the corresponding LSOA and MSOA based on 
its address. The level of observation in our estimation sample is the school, 
i.e., not all LSOAs are present in the final dataset. As this might mean that we 
miss information on some immigrants who attend school in an LSOA other 
than the one they live in, we also use MSOA-level information in some 
specifications, which generally makes no difference. This latter fact is also 
reassuring as neither LSOAs nor MSOAs perfectly map into school catchment 
areas, which means that our estimates will inevitably suffer from some 
measurement error. The fact that changes between LSOA and MSOA-level 
data do not matter much for the results suggests that this potential bias will 
not fundamentally alter the results. 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive information for our main estimation 
sample. It shows that, on average, schools have 77% and 80% of pupils 
achieving level 4 or above in Maths and English, with an average point score 
of around 27 in Key Stage 2 exams. Around 1% of the pupils in schools fail to 
achieve a level in English or Maths due to absence or disapplication. Schools 
have an average of around 42 pupils eligible for Key Stage 2 exams. There are 
around 35 pupils in every school whose first language is not English (and who 
are likely to be immigrants). On average, schools have around 13 teachers, 
250 native pupils and a pupil-teacher ratio of 22:1. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 
Outcome Variables Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or 
above in English 
79.682 13.707 13 100 
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or 
above in Maths 
77.185 14.789 7 100 
Average Point Score 27.565 1.679 20.4 33.7 
Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a 
level in English due to absence or 
disapplication 
1.110 2.264 0 38 
Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a 
level in Maths due to absence or 
disapplication 
1.033 2.173 0 38 
Number of Pupils eligible for Key Stage 2 
Assessment 
42.334 24.133 6 224 
Pupils whose first language is not English 34.926 71.026 0 689 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 22.157 3.492 6.8 135.3 
Native Pupils 249.749 117.982 1 916 
Total Teacher 12.672 5.919 1 99.1 
Observations 19376 
Schools 9688 
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6.3 Methodology 
Initially, we regress the outcomes on the number of immigrants in two 
simple models specified below. Model (6.1) includes the number of immigrants 
and year dummies. Model (6.2) replaces the year dummies with local 
authority/year dummies. Local authorities are the basic level of local 
government in the UK and are equivalent to (parts of) cities or amalgamations 
of various towns and rural areas. This specification is more flexible than Model 
(6.1) in that it accounts for local authority-year-specific factors that might 
attract immigrants and are also related to school resources or outcomes. 
Examples would be changes to the local economy or city-specific changes to 
schools such as building programmes. It is important to be clear that Model 
(6.2) fully accounts for all factors that induce immigrants to select into specific 
cities. The variation used for the identification of the immigration effects then 
comes from the fact that immigrants are not uniformly distributed among 
school neighbourhoods in a local authority, meaning that some schools in a 
city are situated in areas with many immigrants and others in areas with 
comparatively few immigrants. Specifically, we estimate 
 
Yslrt =  + *Immigrantslt + t + slrt       (6.1) 
and  
Yslrt =  + *Immigrantslt + rt + slrt      (6.2) 
 
where Yslrt is the outcome for school s in Lower Layer Super Output Area l in local authority r 
at time t. t is a dummy for the year 2011, which is replaced by local authority-year effects rt 
in model (6.2). The variable of interest, Immigrantslt, is the number of immigrants (in 100s) 
living in LSOA l in year t. slrt is the error term. 
It is also important to be clear why we use immigrant numbers instead 
of the immigrant share in the population: If immigration causes a pressure on 
resources through population growth, using shares (i.e., dividing by 
population size) would take out the part of the effect of interest that operates 
through an increase in the population. Effectively, population size is an 
intermediate outcome and thus a bad control when trying to uncover the 
causal effect of immigration (see, for example, Angrist and Pischke, 2009, ch. 
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3.2.3).45 We do not use a log-log specification for the model as almost all of 
our variables are already in percentages and using a log-log specification on 
variables in percentages makes the interpretation less convenient. However, 
we also estimated every model using immigrant shares as an additional 
robustness check. Results are qualitatively similar and can be found in the 
appendix D. 
As there is likely to be non-random selection into schools by immigrants, 
and as this selection might well be due to more or less the same factors that 
influence settlement choice on the level of the local authorities, estimates 
based on model (6.2) are still likely to be biased. To attenuate these concerns, 
we add school fixed effects to models (6.1) and (6.2) to arrive at models (6.3) 
and (6.4). 
 
Yslrt = s + *Immigrantslt + t + slrt      (6.3) 
and  
Yslrt = s + *Immigrantslt + rt + slrt      (6.4) 
 
where s is the school fixed effect for school s. The inclusion of fixed effects controls 
for any time-invariant selection mechanism and for any time-invariant school 
characteristics. The variation used for identification in these models now come 
from the fact that some schools in a city will have experienced a greater influx 
of immigrants into their neighbourhood than other schools in the same city.46 
However, even the use of fixed effects might not fully address the 
endogeneity problem caused by the non-random selection of immigrants into 
an area. Given the 10-year period covered by our data it is possible that there 
are time-varying factors affecting immigrant location choices that, even with 
the use of fixed effects, may lead to biased estimates of . To overcome these 
endogeneity problems we estimate two-stage least squares models using the 
residential-pattern instrument of Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001). 
                                       
 
45 For the same reason, it would also not make sense to include population size as an 
additional right-hand side regressor. 
46 We also experimented with using MSOA or LSOA fixed effects instead of school fixed effects. 
Estimates were essentially identical.  
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To calculate the instrument we first calculate the percentage of immigrants 
that lived in each LSOA in 2001 as 
 
Pct. Immigrantsl, 2001 = # immigrantsl, 2001 / immigrants in England2001.     
           (6.5) 
 
We then calculate the nationwide change in the number of immigrants in 
England as: 
Δ immig = # immigrants in England2011 – # immigrants in England2001.    
           (6.6) 
 
From these, the shift-share predicted change in the number of immigrants in 
an LSOA can be calculated as: 
 
Rl = Δ immig * Pct. Immigrantsl,2001,      (6.7) 
 
and the predicted number of immigrants in 2011 as: 
 
Predicted # of immigrantsl, 2011 = # of immigrantsl,2001 + Rl  (6.8) 
 
We then use the predicted number of immigrants as an instrument for the 
actual number of immigrants. The logic underlying this approach is as follows: 
The predicted and actual numbers of immigrants should be correlated as 
immigrants are likely to settle in regions with a history of immigration. At the 
same time, as the instrument is a purely mechanical redistribution of 
nationwide changes in immigration based on historical settlement patterns, it 
should be uncorrelated with any changes in school quality and economic 
conditions that might affect immigrants’ location choices. Ideally we would like 
to have considered the time period 1991 – 2011 however, this is not possible 
due to data limitations. However, in the worst case scenario, if the immigrants’ 
location decisions in 2001 is already an outcome of the changes in school 
quality and economic conditions then our instrument constructed on 
historical settlement pattern may lack validity. Although, from the diagnostics 
in table 6.2, there is no weak instrument problem. This issue can be fully 
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addressed by using the census data from 1991, which unfortunately cannot 
be used due to the unavailability of data at “Super Output Area” level.  
Our instrument is constructed at the local area level and not the school 
level. As highlighted earlier, this allows us to estimate models for variables 
that vary at the school level. It also means that our estimates will incorporate 
neighbourhood peer effects – in cases where pupils share the same 
neighbourhood but not the same school – that may possibly affect school 
outcomes. This approach does not require the assumption that immigrants 
are randomly assigned to classes within schools. Table 6.2 shows the first 
stage results from two-stage least squares regressions.47 The results 
demonstrate that the predicted number of immigrants is significantly 
correlated with the actual number of immigrants. The estimated coefficients 
are less than one, although they are very close to one for models (6.1) and 
(6.2). This is reflected in the very high R2 statistics for these two models and 
suggests that the instrument may be indistinguishable from the actual 
number of immigrants. The results for models (6.3) and (6.4) are more 
reassuring, the estimated coefficients and the R2 statistics are lower, reflecting 
the fact that once we control for school fixed effects and local authority/year 
dummies immigration patterns do vary, meaning that we have sufficient 
variation for identification. From the diagnostic statistics there does not seem 
to be any weak instrument problem. 
Table 6.2: First stage results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Shift-share predicted number of immigrants 0.92*** 
(0.01) 
0.88*** 
(0.01) 
0.72*** 
(0.02) 
0.56*** 
(0.04) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat (excl. instrument) 25979.11 7605.13 1260.91 260.094 
R2 0.90 0.92 0.57 0.67 
# observations 19376 19376 19376 19376 
# schools              9688 9688 9688 9688 
Year effects Yes No Yes No 
Local authority*year effects No Yes No Yes 
School fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the LSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
                                       
 
47 Table D 1 in appendix D presents the first stage results of all the specification when 
immigrant share is used instead of immigrant numbers. Whereas, Table E 1 in appendix E 
and Table F 1 in appendix F presents the first stage results of all the specifications of MSOA 
level data when immigrant numbers and immigrant shares are used respectively. 
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All models are estimated on balanced panels, as further robustness 
checks we also estimated all the models at the MSOA level, including the 
instrument generated at the MSOA level. We find that the results are 
essentially unchanged. Results estimated using MSOA level data with 
immigrant numbers are presented in appendix E and results estimated using 
MSOA level data with immigrant shares are presented in appendix F. 
6.4 Results 
We begin by looking at the results related to school resources displayed 
in table 6.3 The models in column (1) contain only year dummies and the 
variable of interest, while column (2) replaces the former with local-authority-
year effects. Columns (3) and (4) are equivalent to (1) and (2) but additionally 
add school fixed effects. 
The first thing to note is that all eight models show qualitatively identical 
results across all outcomes and only differ in magnitude. For an additional 
100 immigrants in an LSOA, the OLS estimates suggest that schools receive 
on average 1 additional pupil who is eligible for assessment at Key Stage 2. 
The IV estimates are much larger and suggest growth by between 1 and almost 
4 pupils, with larger estimates coming from our preferred specification with 
school fixed effects.  
The estimates also suggest two somewhat different effects on the 
numbers of foreign and native pupils respectively. Note that these are changes 
to the absolute number of pupils, not just increase in the numbers of pupils 
eligible for Key Stage 2 assessments. As one might expect, immigration 
increases the number of non-native speakers considerably. The estimates 
range from 10 to almost 30, with our preferred models, those including school 
fixed effects, suggesting increases at the lower end of this range. For the 
number of native pupils, most estimates suggest a decrease following an 
increase in immigrants. These effects are also sizeable and range from -3 in 
the school fixed effects estimates to -18 in some other specifications. 
Counterintuitively, the IV results with school fixed effects actually suggest that 
an increase in immigration also causes an increase in the number of native 
pupils. These effects are also large and range from increases of 5 to 12. A 
potential explanation for these results is that schools expand in response to 
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immigration, for example, by obtaining new buildings, and then subsequently 
accept more native and more immigrant pupils. In any case, all results point 
consistently towards an overall increase in the number of pupils in a given 
school caused by the increase in immigration. 
We would expect that increases in school size have an impact on pupil-
teacher ratios. However, our estimates suggest only relatively modest 
increases: Point estimates are usually relatively small and even the largest 
estimate of 0.9 is only equivalent to a roughly 0.25 standard deviation 
increase.  
Given the previously mentioned evidence on increases in school size, 
the only potential explanation for this result is an increase in teacher 
numbers. In principle, schools can react to increases in pupil numbers by 
hiring additional teachers – schools with more pupils receive more resources, 
with a lag, through the current funding arrangements. The evidence in the 
final panel of table 6.3 suggests that this is what schools indeed do: All models 
suggest an increase in the number of teachers employed in a school with point 
estimates ranging from 0.2 to 1.3, with our preferred IV estimates suggesting 
an increase by 0.8 to 1.3 teachers.48 These estimates suggest indeed that 
immigration has an impact on school resources: Schools receive more pupils 
and have to counter this effect by hiring additional teachers. The results on 
teacher-pupil-ratios suggest that they are broadly successful in this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
 
48 Table D 2 in appendix D presents the results of immigration, pupil structure and resources 
when immigrant share is used instead of immigrant numbers. Table E 2 in appendix E and 
Table F 2 in appendix F presents the results of immigration, pupil structure and resources 
for MSOA level data when immigrant numbers and immigrant shares are used respectively. 
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Table 6.3: Immigration, pupil structure and resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Pupils eligible for Key Stage 2 Assessment 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 1.39*** 
(0.11) 
0.51*** 
(0.16) 
1.08*** 
(0.10) 
0.81*** 
(0.13) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 1.47*** 
(0.11) 
0.91*** 
(0.18) 
2.69*** 
(0.17) 
3.88*** 
(0.39) 
Pupils whose first language is not English 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 24.90*** 
(0.51) 
24.93*** 
(0.87) 
13.39*** 
(0.52) 
10.24*** 
(0.61) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 25.90*** 
(0.56) 
29.02*** 
(1.05) 
15.01*** 
(0.77) 
11.50*** 
(1.61) 
Native Pupils 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -6.78*** 
(0.46) 
-16.69*** 
(0.72) 
-3.02*** 
(0.51) 
-3.95*** 
(0.66) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -7.51*** 
(0.49) 
-18.85*** 
(0.84) 
5.73*** 
(0.84) 
12.10*** 
(2.02) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.11*** 
(0.01) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.11*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.37*** 
(0.06) 
0.91*** 
(0.13) 
Number of teachers 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 0.95*** 
(0.03) 
0.45*** 
(0.05) 
0.65*** 
(0.04) 
0.24*** 
(0.04) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 0.98*** 
(0.04) 
0.54*** 
(0.06) 
1.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.78*** 
(0.14) 
# observations 19376 19376 19376 19376 
# schools 9688 9688 9688 9688 
Year effects Yes No Yes No 
Local authority*year effects No Yes No Yes 
School fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the LSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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OLS and IV estimates for the educational outcomes of schools are 
presented in table 6.4.49 For English, Mathematics and the school average 
point score, the OLS and IV results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that 
increasing immigration leads to worse school outcomes. The estimated 
coefficients are large and highly significant. The corresponding IV results are 
smaller in magnitude, but still support a detrimental effect of immigration on 
educational outcomes. 
Once school fixed effects are included in the model (columns (3) and (4)), 
the results change considerably for both the OLS and the IV estimates. For 
mathematics, English and the average point score, increases in immigration 
now seem to cause increases in performance. IV estimates are again more 
positive, suggesting that the OLS estimates are negatively biased. The effects 
are not particularly large relative to the respective variable’s standard 
deviation, but are too large to be completely negligible: The percentage of 
students achieving level 4 or above in the Key Stage 2 assessments increases 
by between 0.9 and 2 percentage points in English and by between 1.4 and 
2.1 percentage points in Mathematics, while the school point average 
increases by between 0.07 and 0.25. These results are consistent with a recent 
suspicion in the popular press that immigrants who send their children to 
schools with poorer initial results are improving the outcomes of these schools 
(Cook, 2014; Cook, 2013). In any case, it is difficult to conclude from these 
results that immigration harms education outcomes in schools to any relevant 
degree.  
It is possible that schools that face an inflow of immigrants maintain (or 
improve) performance by not submitting students for the Key Stage 2 exams. 
For example, a school with immigrants with low levels of English may find it 
worthwhile to not include them in assessment in order to maintain overall 
average performance. We investigate this by looking at the percentage of pupil 
failing to achieve a level in English and Maths due to absence or 
disapplication. The point estimates are usually small, often insignificant and 
                                       
 
49 Table D 3 in appendix D presents the results of educational outcomes of schools when 
immigrant share is used instead of immigrant numbers. Table E 3 in appendix E and Table F 
3 in appendix F presents the results of educational outcomes of schools for MSOA level data 
when immigrant numbers and immigrant shares are used respectively. 
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if anything negative, suggesting that immigration does not have any real 
impact – or a beneficial impact – on absence or disapplication. This suggests 
that schools have not been avoiding entering students for exams. 
Table 6.4: Immigration and educational outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or above in English 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.47*** 
(0.05) 
-1.04*** 
(0.09) 
1.46*** 
(0.14) 
0.93*** 
(0.17) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.28*** 
(0.05) 
-0.76*** 
(0.10) 
1.95*** 
(0.22) 
1.79*** 
(0.52) 
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or above in Maths 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.43*** 
(0.05) 
-0.94*** 
(0.09) 
1.61*** 
(0.17) 
1.35*** 
(0.20) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.28*** 
(0.05) 
-0.74*** 
(0.10) 
1.81*** 
(0.25) 
2.14*** 
(0.58) 
Average Point Score 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.14*** 
(0.02) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a level in English due to absence or disapplication 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.13*** 
(0.03) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a level in Maths due to absence or disapplication 
OLS 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
IV 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
# observations 19376 19376 19376 19376 
# schools 9688 9688 9688 9688 
Year effects Yes No Yes No 
Local authority*year effects No Yes No Yes 
School fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the LSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%  
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6.5 Supplementary evidence on school spending and income 
Arguably a more direct way to measure resource pressure on the 
education system would be to look into school budgets as done by, for 
example, Coen-Pirani (2011) and Speciale (2012). Unfortunately, data on 
school income and expenditures is only available from 2011 onwards. In this 
sub-section, we use data from the 2011 cross-section of the Department for 
Education’s spend per pupil data, again linked to census data on the LSOA 
level and to teacher salary data from the Department for Education’s school 
workforce data, to provide some additional insight whether schools in high-
immigration areas face budget pressures. In the data, we have information on 
13,758 primary schools. Table 6.5 presents summary statistics. 
Table 6.5: Summary statistics spending sample 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. 
Total income (£ per pupil) 5293.6 5362.9 
Total expenditure (£ per pupil) 5222.5 5241.6 
Average annual gross salary of all full-time teachers in school 36852.4 3354.9 
Spending for subgroups (£ per pupil) 
Teaching staff 2512.4 2007.6 
Supply staff 169.5 195.0 
Education support staff 1009.3 1702.2 
Premises (incl. staff cost) 368.1 480.8 
Back office (incl. staff cost) 400.6 511.4 
Catering office (incl. staff cost) 90.4 181.7 
Energy 74.3 86.6 
Learning resources 205.6 244.3 
Information and communication technology learning resources 60.2 88.7 
Observations 13,758 
 
104 
 
Given the fact that we only have a single cross-section of data available, 
we cannot estimate models with school fixed effects. Instead we begin by 
estimating simple bivariate OLS regressions with spending variables on the 
left hand side and the LSOA-level number of immigrants (in 100s) on the right 
hand side. We then subsequently add local authority fixed effects and finally 
instrument for the actual number of immigrants in the same way as in the 
previous section. These estimates are essentially identical to models (6.1) and 
(6.2) from the previous section. Table 6.6 presents first stage results for the IV 
regressions. These are very similar to the estimates for corresponding models 
in table 6.2. 
In the context of school funding, the models with and without local 
authority fixed effects measure slightly different things due to the way funding 
is allocated in the UK: Essentially, local authorities receive grants from the 
central government that they then distribute across schools. The models 
without local authority fixed effects would include the effects of (the 
eventually) higher grants benefitting all schools in local authorities that have 
been hit by increased immigration. Obviously, these models are also more 
likely to suffer from biases due to the non-random selection of immigrants. 
The estimates with local authority fixed effects compare schools within local 
authorities and provide evidence whether schools in neighbourhoods with 
increased immigrant numbers can spend more or less per student. In other 
words, if the central government had allocated additional funds to a region 
with high immigration numbers, this effect would be included in the effect of 
immigration in the estimates without local authority fixed effects but would 
be captured by the fixed effect in models with local authority fixed effects. 
Table 6.6: First stage results, spending sample 
 (1) (2) 
Shift-share predicted number of immigrants 0.93*** 
(0.01) 
0.86*** 
(0.01) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat (excl. instrument) 21501.34 5810.42 
R2 0.93 0.95 
# observations 13,758 13,758 
Local authority effects No Yes 
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Table 6.7 presents estimation results for school spending and income.50 
For the OLS estimates in column (1), results show that total expenditure per 
pupil, total income per pupil, teaching staff per pupil, supply teachers per 
pupil, education staff per pupil and average salary of full-time teachers 
increase by £11.92 – £355 when there is an increase of 100 immigrants into 
the local area. There is an increase of £3.84 – £9.84 in the expenditure on 
premises, back office, catering, learning resources, and ICT learning resources 
when an additional 100 immigrants come into the local area. However, when 
local authority fixed effects are introduced into the model (column (2)) signs 
are reversed for almost all the coefficients. Similar story emerges when IV is 
used without the local authority fixed effects (column (3)), there is an increase 
of £4 – £410 in all the spending categories. When local authority fixed effects 
are introduced into the model (column (4)), results show that spending per 
pupil is reduced with statistical signigbetween £2 – £88 in spending categories 
namely, total expenditure, total income, average salary of full-time teachers, 
teaching staff, and energy. 
Across almost all spending categories the results suggest essentially two 
things: First, all models without local authority fixed effects find that schools 
with more immigrants living nearby spend more per pupil than schools with 
fewer immigrants close by. Second, as soon as local authority fixed effects are 
included the picture is essentially reversed: While point estimates are 
generally smaller in absolute value and OLS estimates are often insignificant, 
the IV estimates indicate that per-pupil school income and spending drops the 
more immigrants live close by. These findings could be explained by a 
somewhat sluggish adjustment of individual school budgets to increases in 
the local population. The effects are small relative to the respective mean 
though, which again reaffirms our earlier findings that, while school resources 
seem to come under pressure, schools appear to be able to cope with these 
pressures. 
  
                                       
 
50 Table D 4 in appendix D presents the results for school spending and income when 
immigrant share is used instead of immigrant numbers. 
106 
 
Table 6.7: Immigration and school spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
 Total expenditure (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 157.73*** -29.09 154.32*** -83.64* 
 (22.34) (38.56) (22.41) (49.34) 
 Total income (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 162.29*** -31.30 158.74*** -88.29* 
 (22.61) (39.32) (22.63) (50.76) 
 Average salary of full-time teacher 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 355.31*** -82.86*** 410.40*** -62.02*** 
 (16.31) (20.56) (17.58) (23.95) 
 Teaching staff (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 46.73*** -30.47* 47.68*** -46.42** 
 (8.49) (15.66) (8.30) (21.71) 
 Supply teachers (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 11.92*** 2.44* 12.41*** 1.14 
 (1.19) (1.43) (1.31) (1.67) 
 Education support staff (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 41.62*** -2.60 38.08*** -19.67 
 (7.04) (11.90) (7.12) (13.92) 
 Premises (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 9.84*** -1.39 9.15*** -6.35 
 (1.81) (3.30) (1.82) (4.60) 
 Back office (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 16.84*** -0.64 17.00*** -6.24 
 (2.27) (3.84) (2.32) (4.21) 
 Catering (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 7.83*** 2.96*** 7.20*** 0.09 
 (0.48) (0.73) (0.51) (0.93) 
 Energy (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) -0.01 -0.47 -0.28 -1.57*** 
 (0.36) (0.56) (0.35) (0.60) 
 Learning resources (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 5.51*** 1.39 4.96*** -0.50 
 (1.51) (2.08) (1.45) (2.16) 
 ICT Learning resources (£/pupil) 
Number of immigrants (in 100s) 3.84*** 0.41 3.97*** -0.54 
 (0.43) (0.72) (0.42) (1.01) 
Local authority FEs No Yes No Yes 
Observations 13758 13758 13758 13758 
 
Coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the impact of immigration on school resources 
and educational outcomes. It uses panel data and IV methods that allow us 
to control for endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity providing robust 
causal estimates of the impact of immigration. Our results demonstrate that 
immigration has had an impact at the school level. As immigration increases 
the number of pupils and the number of non-English speaker pupils 
increases, there is some evidence of native flight from schools but this 
disappears when we control for endogeneity and school fixed effects. Further, 
the estimates for the number of native pupils (leaving) are always smaller than 
for the number of non-English speaking pupils, suggesting a net increase in 
pupils in all estimated models. In response to these changes schools have 
employed more teachers, largely maintaining school pupil-teacher ratios. They 
also appear to be spending somewhat less on each pupil in a range of 
categories. 
When we consider school achievements we see that increasing the 
number of immigrants has improved school outcomes, especially the 
percentages of pupils achieving level 4 or above competency in the Key Stage 
2 assessments in Maths and English, as well as schools’ average point scores. 
A potential explanation for these results is positive selection that immigrants 
generally have higher educational levels than natives (Dustmann and Glitz, 
2011; Dustmann et al., 2011) and immigrants normally demonstrate high 
levels of aspiration for both themselves and their children. Both of these 
factors might have an effect on overall school performance and can potentially 
lead to positive spillovers to natives as overall standards improve. It has in 
fact been suggested in the popular press that the improvement in results in 
inner city London schools for both immigrants and non-immigrant children is 
partly due to highly motivated immigrant children (Cook, 2014; Cook, 2013). 
Similarly a recent study by Burgess (2014) found that ethnic composition of 
schools in inner London is the main reason for their better performance in the 
GCSE exams. 
However, some degree of heterogeneity is expected in this positive effect 
of immigration on educational outcomes. This heterogeneity of immigrants 
could not be controlled for because of the data constraints. Generally, 
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immigrants with higher educational levels come from the commonwealth 
countries whereas immigrants from non-English speaking countries are less 
educated. It gives rise to the issue of positive vs. negative selection of 
immigrants. It is possible that these two groups of immigrants have a different 
effect on the educational outcomes. For instance, in the worst case scenario, 
even if the negatively selected immigrants have a negative effect on educational 
outcomes of schools. Still the positive effect of positively selected immigrants 
is big enough that is shown by our analysis. We can expect that if the data 
would have allowed us to control for the heterogeneity of immigrants, this 
positive effect of immigrants on educational outcomes would be higher in 
magnitude that may have been decreased at the moment by negatively 
selected immigrants.  
Our results for education outcomes are very similar to the findings for 
natives by Geay et al. (2013), even though we use a different identification 
strategy. While our results are robust for the data used and the time period 
considered some caution is required. The results suggest that increasing 
immigration is a good thing for school performance, and that schools have 
mitigation issues around more pupils, and more pupils from non-English 
speaking backgrounds by employing more teachers. However, with fixed 
budgets it would be a mistake to think that increasing immigration indefinitely 
would be a good thing. At some point resource constraints would become 
binding and it may be that immigration starts to have a detrimental impact 
on schools. In fact, within our sample, there may be school where immigration 
has caused resource and achievement difficulties, even though there seems to 
have been a positive effect on average. Furthermore, it is possible that in order 
to meet the resource demands for primary schools there have been negative 
impacts for secondary schools, or other parts of the education sector. Finally, 
Local Authorities and central Government may have diverted resources away 
from other public services, such as health care, personal care, or local 
facilities. Such wider budget issues are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Overall, we can see that over our observation period, immigration has 
placed schools under resource pressure, and that schools have responded to 
this pressure by employing more teachers. We can also see immigration has 
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benefits for school outcomes, improving average achievement and potentially 
having spill-over benefits for English speaking students. 
110 
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 
The novel and innovative points of this thesis are: a) it is an addition to a very 
small existing literature that looks into the views of immigrants towards 
further immigration, b) an examination of the role of the labour market in 
determining views towards further immigration, and c) it simultaneously 
estimates the trade-off between increased expenditures and improved 
educational outcomes/school outcomes as a consequence of increased 
immigration in the local area. The following sections present, the brief 
summary of this thesis, how its findings fit into the wider literature, impact of 
this piece of work and policy implications of this research. 
7.1 Views of Immigrants towards Immigration 
We investigate how immigrants view further immigration, and how these 
views may change between natives, earlier and more recent immigrants. We 
find that there is a clear heterogeneity in the attitudes of immigrants towards 
further immigration. Immigrants who have been in the UK within last five 
years are less opposed to immigration than immigrants who have been in the 
UK more than five years ago. The results for earlier immigrants consistently 
lie between those of natives and recent immigrants.  
There are essentially two explanations why earlier immigrants are more 
similar to natives than recent ones. The first is that as time passes immigrants 
integrate into British society and adopt natives’ attitudes towards further 
immigration as well. In a recent research, Just and Anderson (2015), find that 
foreign-born immigrants who get citizenship in the host country become 
opposed to further immigration. Similarly, Manning and Roy (2010) find the 
cultural integration of immigrants; they appear to become more similar to 
natives the longer they have been in the country. 
The second explanation is essentially self-selection but the limited 
available information in the data, in particular the fact that we do not observe 
immigrants who have left, does not allow this to be tested. It could be the case 
that only those immigrants who are similar to natives (more opposed to further 
immigration) stay in the country, while other immigrants, with favourable 
views, leave. This does not seem logical because if an immigrant wants to leave 
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then why he would favour further immigration. However, this could be linked 
to family reunification motives, there is some evidence found by Just and 
Anderson (2015) that this pro-immigration attitude of immigrants (immigrants 
without citizenship of the host country) stems from kinship, solidarity and 
unity sentiments for their fellow immigrants. However, this explanation also 
suffers from selection bias as every immigrant cannot apply for citizenship due 
to visa restrictions and we do not know that would the immigrants who left, 
given a chance, had they applied for citizenship. 
7.2 Financial and Economic Concerns 
Results on the income of natives and earlier immigrants suggest a clear 
gradient for respondents with higher income favouring further immigration, 
whereas there is some evidence for an inverted U-shape for recent immigrants. 
Income matters, even though the exact effects differ at low incomes between 
recent immigrants and natives and earlier immigrants. A potential explanation 
for this result is that low-income recent immigrants have concerns that family 
reunification may be made harder by tougher immigration laws, and these 
worries may overwhelm other concerns. Just and Anderson (2015), also find 
that family reunification – solidarity and kinship is what they call it – is 
positively associated with the attitudes of immigrants towards further 
immigration.  
We further find evidence in all three groups that economic shocks such 
as job loss or drops in income matter, even when holding employment status 
and the level of income constant. Economic shocks tend to be associated with 
more anti-immigration views. This result suggests that people might be 
blaming immigrants for adverse shocks, regardless of whether they recover 
from the respective shock. This is in line with the findings of Gang, Rivera-
Batiz and Yun (2013) and Malchow-Moller et al., (2008). 
7.3 Labour Market Concerns 
For the most part, this thesis is unable to find any strong consistent 
evidence that the anti-immigration views of natives, earlier and recent 
immigrants towards further immigration are associated with the labour 
market outcomes. We find that employment status does not play a large role 
in explaining anti-immigration views. Even if the earlier immigrants and 
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recent immigrants compete in the labour market, as suggested by the findings 
of Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Dustmann et al. (2013), there is no strong 
evidence that the current employment status affects views towards further 
immigration.  
Furthermore, the views of native males largely remain unchanged on 
retirement from the paid work and exit from the labour market. This shows 
that the labour market does not play any large role in determining views 
towards further immigration. This finding is in line with the previous literature 
(see, for example, Card et al., 2005; Citrin et al., 1997; Dustmann and Preston, 
2007; Dustmann and Preston, 2004; Dustmann and Preston, 2001; 
Rustenbach, 2010). Views of native males towards immigration should 
essentially change on exit from the labour market. If the labour market affects 
views towards immigration then once a person is out of the labour market he 
should care less about immigration as he no longer faces the immigrant 
competition in the labour market. Our OLS results suggest that exit from the 
labour market does not change the views of native males towards further 
immigration. 
Whereas, after controlling for the selection bias and endogeneity bias, 
using IV regressions, we see a similar picture – for the full sample models – 
that the views of retired natives do no change as compared to the ones who 
are still in the labour market. It means that labour market does not play an 
important role in determining views towards further immigration. 
However, we do find some evidence of native males’ reduced opposition 
towards further immigration after they exit from the labour market suggesting 
– in line with the finding of Ortega and Polavieja (2012) – that labour market 
concerns do play some role in determining native males’ attitudes towards 
immigration. This finding could not be substantiated because of fewer 
observations available for estimation, when respondents reporting “remain the 
same” to immigration question are dropped from the estimated sample. So a 
careful interpretation is required at this stage that native males become less 
opposed to immigration on exit from the labour market, compared to still 
working native males.   
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7.4 Impact of Immigration on School Resources 
As immigration increases in local areas, the number of pupils and the 
number of non-English speaker pupils increases in schools. In response to 
this increase in schools, there is some evidence of native flight from schools 
but this disappears when we control for endogeneity and school fixed effects. 
Further, the estimates for the number of native pupils (leaving) are always 
smaller than for the number of non-English speaking pupils, suggesting a net 
increase in pupils. In response to these changes schools have employed more 
teachers, largely maintaining school pupil-teacher ratios. They also appear to 
be spending somewhat less on each pupil in a range of categories. This finding 
is in line with Coen-Pirani (2011) for Mexican immigrants in California and 
Speciale (2012) for 15 EU-enlargement countries. 
The results suggest that increasing immigration is a good thing for 
school performance, and that schools have mitigation issues around more 
pupils, and more pupils from non-English speaking backgrounds by 
employing more teachers. However, with fixed budgets it would be a mistake 
to think that increasing immigration indefinitely would be a good thing. At 
some point resource constraints would become binding and it may be that 
immigration starts to have a detrimental impact on schools. In fact, within our 
sample, there may be schools where immigration has caused resource and 
achievement difficulties, even though there seems to have been a positive 
effect on average. 
Overall, we can see that over our observation period, immigration has 
placed schools under resource pressure, and that schools have responded to 
this pressure by employing more teachers. Furthermore, it is possible that in 
order to meet the resource demands for primary schools there have been 
negative impacts for secondary schools, or other parts of the education sector. 
Finally, Local Authorities and central Government may have diverted 
resources away from other public services, such as health care, personal care, 
or local facilities. Such wider budget issues are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
7.5 Impact of Immigration on Educational Outcomes 
We find immigration has benefits for school outcomes, improving 
average achievement and potentially having spill-over benefits for English 
speaking students. Our results for education outcomes are very similar to the 
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recent findings for natives by Burgess (2014), and Geay et al. (2013), even 
though we use a different identification strategy. While our results are robust 
for the data used and the time period considered some caution is required. We 
find that increases in immigration in local areas improved the educational 
outcomes in English and Maths. We also find that there is a rise in school 
attendance on the face of increases in immigration. Panel data and IV methods 
allows us to control for endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity that 
provide robust causal estimates of the impact of immigration. 
Our results demonstrate that immigration has had an impact at the 
school level. We see that increasing the number of immigrants has improved 
school outcomes, especially the percentages of pupils achieving level 4 or 
above competency in the Key Stage 2 assessments in Maths and English, as 
well as schools’ average point scores. A potential explanation for these results 
is that immigrants generally have higher educational levels than natives (see, 
for example, Dustmann and Glitz, 2011; Dustmann et al., 2011) and 
immigrants normally demonstrate high levels of aspiration for both 
themselves and their children. Both of these factors might have an effect on 
overall school performance and can potentially lead to positive spill-overs to 
natives as overall standards improve. 
It has in fact been suggested in the popular press that the improvement 
in results in inner city London schools for both immigrants and non-
immigrant children is partly due to highly motivated immigrant children 
(Cook, 2014; Cook, 2013). Similarly, recent study of Burgess (2014) 
strengthens our findings that presence of ethnic minority pupils in primary 
schools lead towards better primary school results.  
7.6 Research Impact and Policy Implications 
This research will have a larger impact and implications on the 
immigration policies, integration policies, education policies, public policies, 
and prioritization of budget allocation in the education sector. This thesis 
highlights the fact that immigration and attitudes towards further 
immigration are not straightforward and easy to understand. There is a 
complex interaction of variables playing their role in shaping attitudes towards 
further immigration. Attitudes towards immigration is not just a simple issue 
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but a complex interplay of economic, political, social and personal factors 
chipping in to form the individuals’ attitudes. 
This thesis highlights the fact that the views of immigrants towards 
further immigration cannot be neglected. As the world has become a global 
village, and immigration is increasing into developed countries in general and 
into English speaking countries such as the UK in particular, this research 
helps in understanding the attitudes of immigrants. It calls for the attention 
that the governments should design immigration policies considering 
immigrants as a stake holder in the country. This will give them a sense of 
ownership and help in better integration of immigrants into the society. This 
research can help the policy makers to design better immigration policies and 
integration policies to build a well-integrated society. A well-integrated 
community can help promote the culture of acceptance and tolerance which 
in-turn will help in forming better attitudes towards a rapidly diversifying 
global village. 
My research can help in designing better education policies; the 
research suggests how primary schools can be improved. Policy makers 
should form policies to encourage diversity in schools to strike a good balance 
of immigrant and native pupils in the primary schools. This can lead to better 
performance in primary schools as well as this will also show up in the GCSE 
exams as found by Greaves et al. (2014) that better primary school results are 
the basic reason of better performance in GCSE exams. This research will have 
impact on public policy design, on education policies, and can help in better 
budget allocations in the education sector.  It has impact on public 
expenditure and draws attention towards prioritising the budget allocation by 
finding the trade-offs between expenditure on primary schools and improved 
school outcomes in the face of increased immigration into the local areas. 
However, this is just a starting point, further research is required to 
substantiate the amount of trade-offs. 
7.7 Further Research Possibilities 
This thesis is just the beginning for many new research possibilities in 
the area of immigration. An immediate idea for further expansion of this 
research would be to explore how the attitudes of natives and immigrants 
change on the face of increased immigration in local areas. Although, data at 
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low level geographical areas is not available publically for the UK Citizenship 
Surveys but it would be worthwhile to contact data providers and request 
them data at low level geographical areas. 
As this thesis also sheds light on the impact of immigration in local 
areas on primary schools and educational outcomes of pupils. Similarly, in 
public services, impact of immigration on NHS (National Health Service, UK) 
waiting times in local areas and how these waiting times change the attitudes 
of local population towards immigration can be investigated. Not only this, 
impact of immigration on general health of natives in local areas can also be 
investigated. Another very interesting research topic is to investigate the 
impact of obtaining the citizenship, do immigrants stay in the UK longer to 
acquire the British passport and then leave after obtaining citizenship. As, 
British passport brings ease of mobility around the world and is listed as one 
of the most powerful passports in the world with visa-free/ visa on arrival 
entry into several countries.  
Nevertheless, data limitations may obstruct the above listed research 
ideas. However, data limitations can be addressed by exploring other data 
sources or by gathering new data. 
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Chapter 8. Appendices 
 
8.1 Appendix A: OLS estimates for with and without education 
variables excluding respondents over 65 years of age 
 
Table A 1: Descriptive Statistics of Natives (Excluding over 65) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
redmig 15069 .8041675 .3968534 0 1 
incmig 15069 .1958325 .3968534 0 1 
outoflabfo~e 15069 .1408189 .3478462 0 1 
selfemployed 15069 .0867344 .2814547 0 1 
unemployed 15069 .163979 .3702688 0 1 
      
employed 15069 .6084677 .4881092 0 1 
male 15069 .447674 .497271 0 1 
female 15069 .552326 .497271 0 1 
w200708 15069 .3219192 .4672277 0 1 
w200809 15069 .3251709 .4684542 0 1 
      
w200910 15069 .3529099 .4778909 0 1 
rage 15069 42.09483 13.39646 16 64 
white 15069 .9461809 .2256679 0 1 
subcont 15069 .0201075 .1403727 0 1 
otherasian 15069 .0009954 .0315356 0 1 
      
black 15069 .0131396 .1138761 0 1 
mixedrace 15069 .0135377 .1155653 0 1 
chinese 15069 .0000664 .0081463 0 1 
otherethnic 15069 .0059725 .0770535 0 1 
christ 15069 .734488 .4416201 0 1 
      
budh 15069 .0023226 .0481395 0 1 
hindu 15069 .0019908 .0445759 0 1 
jew 15069 .0030526 .055168 0 1 
muslim 15069 .0215011 .1450524 0 1 
sikh 15069 .001659 .0406988 0 1 
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othreli 15069 .0189794 .1364565 0 1 
noreli 15069 .2160064 .4115323 0 1 
reliyes 15069 .2244343 .4172231 0 1 
hdegree 15069 .0727321 .2597049 0 1 
fdegree 15069 .1483177 .3554265 0 1 
      
alevel_equiv 15069 .2611985 .4393025 0 1 
otherqual 15069 .0529564 .2239539 0 1 
Noqual 15069 .179773 .384011 0 1 
Relino 15069 .7755657 .4172231 0 1 
hdegree 15069 .0727321 .2597049 0 1 
      
fdegree 15069 .1483177 .3554265 0 1 
alevel_equiv 15069 .2611985 .4393025 0 1 
olevel_equiv 15069 .2850222 .45144 0 1 
otherqual 15069 .0529564 .2239539 0 1 
Noqual 15069 .179773 .384011 0 1 
      
incomebel~5k 15069 .1901254 .392413 0 1 
income5k~10k 15069 .1603955 .3669846 0 1 
income10~15k 15069 .1401553 .3471596 0 1 
income15~20k 15069 .1233659 .3288676 0 1 
income20~30k 15069 .1791758 .3835122 0 1 
      
income30~50k 15069 .1515031 .3585505 0 1 
income50kp 15069 .055279 .2285317 0 1 
London 15069 .088327 .2837793 0 1 
northeast 15069 .0619152 .2410094 0 1 
northwest 15069 .1412834 .3483252 0 1 
      
yorknhumber 15069 .1055146 .3072256 0 1 
eastmidland 15069 .0912469 .2879695 0 1 
westmidland 15069 .1053819 .3070551 0 1 
eastengland 15069 .1042538 .3055996 0 1 
southeast 15069 .1435397 .350634 0 1 
      
southwest 15069 .0939677 .2917935 0 1 
Wales 15069 .0645696 .2457731 0 1 
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Table A 2: Descriptive Statistics of Earlier Immigrants (Excluding over 65) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
redmig 7077 .5086901 .4999598 0 1 
incmig 7077 .4913099 .4999598 0 1 
outoflabfo~e 7077 .2344214 .4236666 0 1 
selfemployed 7077 .0934012 .2910143 0 1 
unemployed 7077 .1677264 .3736496 0 1 
      
employed 7077 .504451 .5000155 0 1 
male 7077 .4679949 .4990099 0 1 
female 7077 .5320051 .4990099 0 1 
w200708 7077 .2920729 .4547478 0 1 
w200809 7077 .3334746 .4714878 0 1 
      
w200910 7077 .3744525 .4840154 0 1 
rage 7077 41.82125 11.34203 16 64 
white 7077 .0674014 .2507337 0 1 
subcont 7077 .4631906 .4986785 0 1 
otherasian 7077 .0611841 .2396847 0 1 
      
black 7077 .2568885 .4369483 0 1 
mixedrace 7077 .0356083 .1853246 0 1 
chinese 7077 .027978 .1649213 0 1 
otherethnic 7077 .087749 .2829496 0 1 
christ 7077 .3146814 .4644217 0 1 
      
budh 7077 .0173802 .1306927 0 1 
hindu 7077 .134379 .3410831 0 1 
jew 7077 .0019782 .0444365 0 1 
muslim 7077 .4175498 .49319 0 1 
sikh 7077 .0491734 .2162452 0 1 
      
othreli 7077 .0235976 .1518024 0 1 
noreli 7077 .0412604 .198906 0 1 
reliyes 7077 .7354811 .4411078 0 1 
hdegree 7077 .1141727 .3180433 0 1 
fdegree 7077 .1427158 .3498075 0 1 
      
alevel_equiv 7077 .1877914 .3905731 0 1 
otherqual 7077 .1167161 .3211044 0 1 
120 
 
noqual 7077 .282323 .4501615 0 1 
relino 7077 .2645189 .4411078 0 1 
hdegree 7077 .1141727 .3180433 0 1 
      
fdegree 7077 .1427158 .3498075 0 1 
alevel_equiv 7077 .1877914 .3905731 0 1 
olevel_equiv 7077 .1562809 .3631471 0 1 
otherqual 7077 .1167161 .3211044 0 1 
noqual 7077 .282323 .4501615 0 1 
      
incomebel~5k 7077 .2590081 .438121 0 1 
income5k~10k 7077 .1658895 .3720077 0 1 
income10~15k 7077 .1555744 .362477 0 1 
income15~20k 7077 .1121944 .3156278 0 1 
income20~30k 7077 .1630634 .3694497 0 1 
      
income30~50k 7077 .1080967 .3105244 0 1 
income50kp 7077 .0361735 .1867349 0 1 
london 7077 .5515049 .4973753 0 1 
northeast 7077 .0077717 .08782 0 1 
northwest 7077 .0750318 .2634613 0 1 
      
yorknhumber 7077 .066271 .2487728 0 1 
eastmidland 7077 .0641515 .2450399 0 1 
westmidland 7077 .1000424 .3000777 0 1 
eastengland 7077 .0486082 .2150627 0 1 
southeast 7077 .0666949 .2495105 0 1 
      
southwest 7077 .0128586 .1126721 0 1 
wales 7077 .0070651 .0837629 0 1 
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Table A 3: Descriptive Statistics of Recent Immigrants (Excluding over 65) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
redmig 2429 .3342939 .4718402 0 1 
incmig 2429 .6657061 .4718402 0 1 
outoflabfo~e 2429 .2136682 .4099796 0 1 
selfemployed 2429 .0386991 .1929165 0 1 
unemployed 2429 .1811445 .3852172 0 1 
      
employed 2429 .5664883 .4956616 0 1 
male 2429 .5372581 .4987126 0 1 
female 2429 .4627419 .4987126 0 1 
w200708 2429 .3120626 .4634306 0 1 
w200809 2429 .3528201 .4779457 0 1 
      
w200910 2429 .3351173 .4721287 0 1 
rage 2429 31.04446 8.80788 16 63 
white 2429 .1123919 .3159131 0 1 
subcont 2429 .389049 .4876349 0 1 
otherasian 2429 .0773981 .2672771 0 1 
      
black 2429 .2013174 .4010672 0 1 
mixedrace 2429 .0349938 .183802 0 1 
chinese 2429 .0489914 .2158944 0 1 
otherethnic 2429 .1358584 .3427087 0 1 
christ 2429 .3692878 .4827113 0 1 
      
budh 2429 .037464 .1899349 0 1 
hindu 2429 .1515027 .358612 0 1 
jew 2429 .0012351 .0351292 0 1 
muslim 2429 .3285303 .4697755 0 1 
sikh 2429 .0271717 .1626169 0 1 
      
othreli 2429 .021408 .1447699 0 1 
noreli 2429 .0634006 .2437322 0 1 
reliyes 2429 .7134623 .4522367 0 1 
hdegree 2429 .2041993 .4031983 0 1 
fdegree 2429 .2009057 .4007602 0 1 
      
alevel_equiv 2429 .1683821 .3742823 0 1 
otherqual 2429 .1757925 .3807219 0 1 
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noqual 2429 .161795 .3683385 0 1 
relino 2429 .2865377 .4522367 0 1 
hdegree 2429 .2041993 .4031983 0 1 
      
fdegree 2429 .2009057 .4007602 0 1 
alevel_equiv 2429 .1683821 .3742823 0 1 
olevel_equiv 2429 .0889255 .2846948 0 1 
otherqual 2429 .1757925 .3807219 0 1 
noqual 2429 .161795 .3683385 0 1 
      
incomebel~5k 2429 .3441746 .4751962 0 1 
income5k~10k 2429 .1634417 .3698444 0 1 
income10~15k 2429 .1626184 .3690931 0 1 
income15~20k 2429 .0963359 .2951122 0 1 
income20~30k 2429 .1263895 .3323562 0 1 
      
income30~50k 2429 .0712227 .2572495 0 1 
income50kp 2429 .0358172 .1858724 0 1 
london 2429 .4676822 .4990572 0 1 
northeast 2429 .0222314 .1474656 0 1 
northwest 2429 .086867 .2816981 0 1 
      
yorknhumber 2429 .0827501 .2755609 0 1 
eastmidland 2429 .0765747 .2659702 0 1 
westmidland 2429 .0798683 .271145 0 1 
eastengland 2429 .0551667 .2283524 0 1 
southeast 2429 .0963359 .2951122 0 1 
      
southwest 2429 .0238781 .1527009 0 1 
wales 2429 .0086455 .0925976 0 1 
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Excluding over 65, OLS with education variables  
Table A 4: Pooled sample excluding over 65 for Natives, Earlier Immigrants, and Recent 
Immigrants (Regression without controls) 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 24575 
  F( 2, 24572) 
= 
1765.84 
  Prob > F = 0.0000 
  R-squared = 0.1347 
  Root MSE = .43653 
    
 Robust   
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
recmig -.4698735 .0101036 -46.51 0.000 -.4896771 -.45007 
oldmig -.2954774 .0067655 -43.67 0.000 -.3087381 -.2822167 
_cons .8041675 .003233 248.74 0.000 .7978307 .8105043 
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Excluding over 65, OLS with education variables  
Table A 5: Pooled sample excluding over 65 for Natives, Earlier Immigrants, and Recent 
Immigrants (Regression with controls) 
 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 24575 
  F( 90, 24484) = 68.54 
  Prob > F = 0.0000 
  R-squared = 0.1941 
  Root MSE = .42203 
    
  Robust  
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
recmig -.2656153 .0156685 -16.95 0.000 -.2963265 -.2349041 
oldmig -.1285076 .0137897 -9.32 0.000 -.1555364 -.1014789 
female .0129838 .0059186 2.19 0.028 .001383 .0245846 
outoflabforce -.027449 .0088573 -3.10 0.002 -.0448097 -.0100882 
selfemployed .0003738 .0100962 0.04 0.970 -.0194153 .0201629 
unemployed .0051968 .0083052 0.63 0.531 -.0110818 .0214755 
w200809 -.0340343 .0066912 -5.09 0.000 -.0471494 -.0209192 
w200910 -.0272757 .0066403 -4.11 0.000 -.0402911 -.0142603 
subcont -.014018 .0183236 -0.77 0.444 -.0499334 .0218973 
otherasian -.0779673 .0246782 -3.16 0.002 -.1263381 -.0295966 
black -.1808915 .0161639 -11.19 0.000 -.2125736 -.1492093 
mixedrace -.0863482 .0223274 -3.87 0.000 -.1301112 -.0425851 
chinese -.0784435 .0301875 -2.60 0.009 -.1376128 -.0192742 
otherethnic -.0588024 .0200628 -2.93 0.003 -.0981268 -.0194781 
budh -.0821899 .0310162 -2.65 0.008 -.1429835 -.0213963 
hindu .0064433 .0191237 0.34 0.736 -.0310404 .043927 
jew -.1532751 .0562089 -2.73 0.006 -.263448 -.0431023 
muslim -.1010983 .014369 -7.04 0.000 -.1292625 -.0729341 
sikh .008652 .027185 0.32 0.750 -.0446323 .0619363 
othreli -.0051093 .0203196 -0.25 0.801 -.044937 .0347184 
noreli -.0648909 .0081758 -7.94 0.000 -.080916 -.0488658 
reliyes -.0498248 .0069988 -7.12 0.000 -.0635428 -.0361068 
hdegree -.2090159 .0121043 -17.27 0.000 -.2327411 -.1852907 
fdegree -.1454938 .0097331 -14.95 0.000 -.1645713 -.1264163 
alevel_equiv -.0332974 .0075267 -4.42 0.000 -.0480502 -.0185446 
otherqual -.0396974 .0110616 -3.59 0.000 -.0613788 -.018016 
noqual -.0357149 .0080414 -4.44 0.000 -.0514765 -.0199533 
incomebelow5k -.0132618 .0097459 -1.36 0.174 -.0323644 .0058408 
income5kto10k -.0001893 .009563 -0.02 0.984 -.0189333 .0185548 
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income15kto20k .0025668 .010428 0.25 0.806 -.0178727 .0230064 
income20kto30k -.012556 .0098232 -1.28 0.201 -.0318101 .0066982 
income30kto50k -.0361282 .011002 -3.28 0.001 -.0576927 -.0145636 
income50kp -.051269 .0158817 -3.23 0.001 -.0823982 -.0201399 
northeast .051951 .0145998 3.56 0.000 .0233345 .0805676 
northwest .068497 .0109621 6.25 0.000 .0470107 .0899834 
yorknhumber .0648872 .0115832 5.60 0.000 .0421835 .0875909 
eastmidland .1049043 .0115721 9.07 0.000 .0822224 .1275862 
westmidland .0970801 .0110319 8.80 0.000 .0754569 .1187032 
eastengland .0998146 .0116786 8.55 0.000 .0769238 .1227054 
southeast .0716778 .0108655 6.60 0.000 .0503808 .0929748 
southwest .0734243 .0127525 5.76 0.000 .0484286 .0984199 
wales .0803251 .0145838 5.51 0.000 .05174 .1089103 
ragedumy1 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy2 .0008219 .0385507 0.02 0.983 -.0747398 .0763836 
ragedumy3 .0308785 .039764 0.78 0.437 -.0470615 .1088184 
ragedumy4 -.0070352 .0383554 -0.18 0.854 -.082214 .0681437 
ragedumy5 .0330304 .0381659 0.87 0.387 -.0417771 .1078379 
ragedumy6 .0243337 .0369169 0.66 0.510 -.0480256 .096693 
ragedumy7 .0213348 .0374104 0.57 0.568 -.051992 .0946615 
ragedumy8 .0329695 .036518 0.90 0.367 -.038608 .1045471 
ragedumy9 .0901233 .0357297 2.52 0.012 .0200909 .1601557 
ragedumy10 .0434823 .0355365 1.22 0.221 -.0261715 .113136 
ragedumy11 .0607428 .0351485 1.73 0.084 -.0081504 .1296359 
ragedumy12 .0363631 .0345207 1.05 0.292 -.0312996 .1040258 
ragedumy13 .0319744 .0342199 0.93 0.350 -.0350987 .0990475 
ragedumy14 .0514918 .0340598 1.51 0.131 -.0152675 .118251 
ragedumy15 .0486673 .0341092 1.43 0.154 -.0181888 .1155235 
ragedumy16 .0562778 .0346953 1.62 0.105 -.011727 .1242826 
ragedumy17 .0825642 .0342034 2.41 0.016 .0155235 .1496049 
ragedumy18 .0572797 .0339937 1.69 0.092 -.0093501 .1239095 
ragedumy19 .0394883 .0340267 1.16 0.246 -.027206 .1061827 
ragedumy20 .0833633 .0331468 2.51 0.012 .0183936 .148333 
ragedumy21 .0724134 .0337713 2.14 0.032 .0062196 .1386071 
ragedumy22 .099711 .0333454 2.99 0.003 .0343519 .1650701 
ragedumy23 .0586328 .033348 1.76 0.079 -.0067313 .1239969 
ragedumy24 .0604574 .0338583 1.79 0.074 -.0059068 .1268217 
ragedumy25 .0647324 .0333811 1.94 0.052 -.0006966 .1301614 
ragedumy26 .0708446 .0345309 2.05 0.040 .003162 .1385273 
ragedumy27 .0992267 .0330075 3.01 0.003 .03453 .1639233 
ragedumy28 .0972129 .0334954 2.90 0.004 .0315599 .162866 
ragedumy29 .0973861 .0334613 2.91 0.004 .0317998 .1629723 
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ragedumy30 .1209461 .0334132 3.62 0.000 .0554543 .186438 
ragedumy31 .1077106 .033961 3.17 0.002 .041145 .1742761 
ragedumy32 .1159369 .0340227 3.41 0.001 .0492502 .1826235 
ragedumy33 .1063877 .0341973 3.11 0.002 .0393589 .1734164 
ragedumy34 .1201133 .0345217 3.48 0.001 .0524486 .1877779 
ragedumy35 .1042066 .0343246 3.04 0.002 .0369283 .1714848 
ragedumy36 .1196759 .0346762 3.45 0.001 .0517085 .1876433 
ragedumy37 .1068181 .034054 3.14 0.002 .0400701 .173566 
ragedumy38 .1360489 .0343998 3.95 0.000 .0686232 .2034746 
ragedumy39 .1556691 .0340606 4.57 0.000 .0889083 .2224299 
ragedumy40 .1406309 .0344589 4.08 0.000 .0730894 .2081724 
ragedumy41 .092723 .035408 2.62 0.009 .0233211 .1621248 
ragedumy42 .1327757 .0343633 3.86 0.000 .0654216 .2001298 
ragedumy43 .1040966 .0343756 3.03 0.002 .0367182 .1714749 
ragedumy44 .1417467 .033927 4.18 0.000 .0752476 .2082457 
ragedumy45 .1430661 .0330846 4.32 0.000 .0782183 .207914 
ragedumy46 .1533309 .0333127 4.60 0.000 .0880361 .2186258 
ragedumy47 .1430479 .033285 4.30 0.000 .0778072 .2082885 
ragedumy48 .1540223 .0333289 4.62 0.000 .0886956 .2193489 
ragedumy49 .152104 .0338011 4.50 0.000 .0858518 .2183562 
ragedumy50 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy51 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy52 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy53 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy54 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy55 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy56 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy57 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy58 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy59 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy60 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy61 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy62 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy63 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy64 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy65 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy66 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy67 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy68 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy69 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy70 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy71 0 (omitted)    
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ragedumy72 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy73 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy74 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy75 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy76 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy77 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy78 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy79 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy80 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy81 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy82 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy83 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy84 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy85 0 (omitted)    
_cons .7577574 .0310515 24.40 0.000 .6968944 .8186203 
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Excluding over 65, OLS with education variables  
Table A 6: Natives Sample 
 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 15069 
  F( 87, 14980) = . 
  Prob > F = . 
  R-squared = 0.1083 
  Root MSE = .37585 
    
  Robust  
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
female .0052152 .006897 0.76 0.450 -.0083037 .0187341 
outoflabforce -.0097036 .0103372 -0.94 0.348 -.0299657 .0105585 
selfemployed .0101639 .0112558 0.90 0.367 -.0118988 .0322267 
unemployed .009246 .0093805 0.99 0.324 -.0091409 .0276328 
w200809 -.027164 .0075556 -3.60 0.000 -.0419738 -.0123541 
w200910 -.0096833 .0074972 -1.29 0.197 -.0243787 .0050122 
subcont .0520398 .053903 0.97 0.334 -.0536167 .1576963 
otherasian .1839112 .1439237 1.28 0.201 -.0981969 .4660193 
black -.2783515 .0359051 -7.75 0.000 -.3487299 -.2079731 
mixedrace -.0623254 .0327937 -1.90 0.057 -.126605 .0019542 
chinese .5418762 .0574481 9.43 0.000 .429271 .6544814 
otherethnic -.0252138 .0474651 -0.53 0.595 -.1182513 .0678236 
budh -.0020727 .0663251 -0.03 0.975 -.132078 .1279326 
hindu -.2559539 .1019495 -2.51 0.012 -.4557874 -.0561203 
jew -.1030423 .0623728 -1.65 0.099 -.2253006 .019216 
muslim -.3298466 .0511307 -6.45 0.000 -.4300691 -.2296242 
sikh -.2002452 .1002076 -2.00 0.046 -.3966644 -.0038261 
othreli -.0229475 .0237564 -0.97 0.334 -.069513 .0236179 
noreli -.0669046 .0084446 -7.92 0.000 -.083457 -.0503523 
reliyes -.0317957 .0082915 -3.83 0.000 -.0480481 -.0155434 
hdegree -.2926881 .0162801 -17.98 0.000 -.3245991 -.2607771 
fdegree -.1888776 .0115357 -16.37 0.000 -.211489 -.1662663 
alevel_equiv -.0413778 .0079866 -5.18 0.000 -.0570324 -.0257232 
otherqual .0028388 .0122749 0.23 0.817 -.0212215 .026899 
noqual .0048987 .0085374 0.57 0.566 -.0118357 .021633 
incomebelow5k -.0154924 .0112459 -1.38 0.168 -.0375357 .0065509 
income5kto10k -.0072734 .0105758 -0.69 0.492 -.0280033 .0134565 
income15kto20k -.0033655 .0115701 -0.29 0.771 -.0260443 .0193133 
income20kto30k -.0082906 .0110728 -0.75 0.454 -.0299946 .0134133 
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income30kto50k -.0158124 .0124259 -1.27 0.203 -.0401687 .0085438 
income50kp -.0387042 .0182503 -2.12 0.034 -.0744771 -.0029314 
northeast .0721089 .0182075 3.96 0.000 .0364199 .1077978 
northwest .0919081 .0156643 5.87 0.000 .0612042 .1226119 
yorknhumber .1007326 .0162726 6.19 0.000 .0688363 .1326289 
eastmidland .1325176 .0163055 8.13 0.000 .1005569 .1644783 
westmidland .1376134 .0158294 8.69 0.000 .1065858 .1686411 
eastengland .1289434 .0159073 8.11 0.000 .0977631 .1601237 
southeast .100718 .0156562 6.43 0.000 .07003 .131406 
southwest .1078926 .0166268 6.49 0.000 .075302 .1404831 
wales .096468 .0180552 5.34 0.000 .0610776 .1318583 
ragedumy1 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy2 .0130315 .0430494 0.30 0.762 -.0713507 .0974137 
ragedumy3 .0290586 .044689 0.65 0.516 -.0585373 .1166544 
ragedumy4 .0466896 .0437708 1.07 0.286 -.0391066 .1324857 
ragedumy5 .0672949 .0437385 1.54 0.124 -.0184379 .1530277 
ragedumy6 .0630588 .0432712 1.46 0.145 -.0217581 .1478758 
ragedumy7 .0609736 .0431151 1.41 0.157 -.0235372 .1454844 
ragedumy8 .0683943 .0425737 1.61 0.108 -.0150554 .151844 
ragedumy9 .1293039 .0404751 3.19 0.001 .0499678 .20864 
ragedumy10 .1212216 .0407075 2.98 0.003 .0414299 .2010132 
ragedumy11 .1239988 .0398365 3.11 0.002 .0459144 .2020832 
ragedumy12 .0940714 .0400363 2.35 0.019 .0155954 .1725474 
ragedumy13 .0696974 .0400492 1.74 0.082 -.0088039 .1481987 
ragedumy14 .1078193 .0390222 2.76 0.006 .031331 .1843075 
ragedumy15 .0954565 .0403456 2.37 0.018 .0163742 .1745387 
ragedumy16 .0816634 .0413715 1.97 0.048 .0005702 .1627567 
ragedumy17 .1029682 .040045 2.57 0.010 .0244751 .1814614 
ragedumy18 .0908127 .0397277 2.29 0.022 .0129415 .1686839 
ragedumy19 .0931581 .0394249 2.36 0.018 .0158804 .1704357 
ragedumy20 .1192954 .0378285 3.15 0.002 .0451469 .1934439 
ragedumy21 .0636115 .0389537 1.63 0.102 -.0127426 .1399655 
ragedumy22 .0967624 .0377281 2.56 0.010 .0228108 .170714 
ragedumy23 .0808299 .0378233 2.14 0.033 .0066916 .1549683 
ragedumy24 .056941 .0391716 1.45 0.146 -.0198401 .133722 
ragedumy25 .0694406 .0378361 1.84 0.066 -.0047227 .1436039 
ragedumy26 .0667093 .0390229 1.71 0.087 -.0097804 .143199 
ragedumy27 .1200283 .036794 3.26 0.001 .0479076 .192149 
ragedumy28 .0958469 .0375197 2.55 0.011 .0223037 .1693901 
ragedumy29 .1039405 .0374372 2.78 0.006 .030559 .1773221 
ragedumy30 .1214729 .0377018 3.22 0.001 .0475726 .1953731 
ragedumy31 .1292391 .0379245 3.41 0.001 .0549025 .2035757 
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ragedumy32 .0968668 .0380326 2.55 0.011 .0223182 .1714154 
ragedumy33 .0786994 .0382854 2.06 0.040 .0036553 .1537435 
ragedumy34 .0701276 .0392934 1.78 0.074 -.0068922 .1471473 
ragedumy35 .0611078 .0388434 1.57 0.116 -.01503 .1372455 
ragedumy36 .1182482 .0388262 3.05 0.002 .0421441 .1943522 
ragedumy37 .0841419 .0380538 2.21 0.027 .0095519 .1587319 
ragedumy38 .0928207 .0383972 2.42 0.016 .0175575 .1680838 
ragedumy39 .1445498 .0374804 3.86 0.000 .0710835 .218016 
ragedumy40 .0879145 .0387062 2.27 0.023 .0120456 .1637834 
ragedumy41 .0632011 .0394506 1.60 0.109 -.0141269 .140529 
ragedumy42 .1008772 .037991 2.66 0.008 .0264102 .1753442 
ragedumy43 .0719668 .0378941 1.90 0.058 -.0023102 .1462438 
ragedumy44 .118819 .0373613 3.18 0.001 .0455863 .1920516 
ragedumy45 .1392523 .0361696 3.85 0.000 .0683555 .2101492 
ragedumy46 .1297645 .0364751 3.56 0.000 .0582688 .2012603 
ragedumy47 .1281116 .0365435 3.51 0.000 .056482 .1997413 
ragedumy48 .123486 .0364885 3.38 0.001 .0519642 .1950079 
ragedumy49 .1378173 .0367658 3.75 0.000 .0657518 .2098828 
ragedumy50 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy51 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy52 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy53 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy54 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy55 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy56 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy57 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy58 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy59 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy60 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy61 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy62 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy63 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy64 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy65 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy66 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy67 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy68 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy69 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy70 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy71 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy72 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy73 0 (omitted)    
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ragedumy74 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy75 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy76 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy77 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy78 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy79 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy80 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy81 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy82 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy83 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy84 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy85 0 (omitted)    
_cons .7231429 .0363582 19.89 0.000 .6518765 .7944093 
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Excluding over 65, OLS with education variables  
Table A 7: Earlier Immigrants Sample 
 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 7077 
  F( 88, 6988) = 7.73 
  Prob > F = 0.0000 
  R-squared = 0.0778 
  Root MSE = .48313 
    
  Robust  
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
female .0354312 .0127585 2.78 0.005 .0104206 .0604418 
outoflabforce -.0476883 .0183643 -2.60 0.009 -.0836879 -.0116887 
selfemployed -.0083622 .02135 -0.39 0.695 -.0502147 .0334904 
unemployed -.0098247 .0182178 -0.54 0.590 -.0455371 .0258878 
w200809 -.0479946 .0146478 -3.28 0.001 -.0767087 -.0192805 
w200910 -.0349986 .0145028 -2.41 0.016 -.0634286 -.0065686 
subcont .0264204 .0279598 0.94 0.345 -.0283892 .0812301 
otherasian -.0282288 .0342675 -0.82 0.410 -.0954035 .0389459 
black -.1185312 .0258185 -4.59 0.000 -.1691434 -.067919 
mixedrace -.0694714 .0370314 -1.88 0.061 -.1420642 .0031214 
chinese .0092843 .0426136 0.22 0.828 -.0742512 .0928199 
otherethnic -.0222311 .0306387 -0.73 0.468 -.0822923 .03783 
budh -.1588691 .0456174 -3.48 0.000 -.2482929 -.0694452 
hindu .0378849 .0241199 1.57 0.116 -.0093975 .0851672 
jew -.3374081 .1192568 -2.83 0.005 -.5711876 -.1036286 
muslim -.0518649 .0190558 -2.72 0.007 -.08922 -.0145098 
sikh .0251028 .0318604 0.79 0.431 -.0373533 .0875589 
othreli .0083744 .0400123 0.21 0.834 -.0700617 .0868106 
noreli -.1176539 .0335182 -3.51 0.000 -.1833598 -.0519481 
reliyes -.0554079 .0144958 -3.82 0.000 -.083824 -.0269918 
hdegree -.1301316 .0239155 -5.44 0.000 -.1770132 -.08325 
fdegree -.0626745 .0218981 -2.86 0.004 -.1056015 -.0197476 
alevel_equiv .0041976 .0197437 0.21 0.832 -.0345062 .0429013 
otherqual -.0562566 .022566 -2.49 0.013 -.1004929 -.0120204 
noqual -.0542581 .0187828 -2.89 0.004 -.091078 -.0174382 
incomebelow5k .0129215 .0198422 0.65 0.515 -.0259752 .0518181 
income5kto10k .0236877 .0205523 1.15 0.249 -.0166011 .0639765 
income15kto20k .0216894 .0227672 0.95 0.341 -.0229413 .0663201 
income20kto30k -.0122756 .0210575 -0.58 0.560 -.0535547 .0290036 
133 
 
income30kto50k -.0403306 .0245188 -1.64 0.100 -.0883949 .0077337 
income50kp -.0044809 .0364432 -0.12 0.902 -.0759206 .0669587 
northeast .0488606 .0644248 0.76 0.448 -.0774316 .1751529 
northwest .0623333 .023835 2.62 0.009 .0156094 .1090572 
yorknhumber .0224151 .0250338 0.90 0.371 -.0266588 .0714891 
eastmidland .1040161 .0243423 4.27 0.000 .0562978 .1517344 
westmidland .0786876 .0205304 3.83 0.000 .0384419 .1189334 
eastengland .0770663 .0285648 2.70 0.007 .0210707 .133062 
southeast .0755414 .0236392 3.20 0.001 .0292015 .1218813 
southwest -.0283473 .051602 -0.55 0.583 -.1295028 .0728082 
wales .1759362 .0681162 2.58 0.010 .0424079 .3094646 
ragedumy1 -.061313 .11266 -0.54 0.586 -.2821607 .1595347 
ragedumy2 .0175463 .1198432 0.15 0.884 -.2173828 .2524753 
ragedumy3 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy4 -.0285901 .1137961 -0.25 0.802 -.2516651 .1944848 
ragedumy5 .0654301 .1162986 0.56 0.574 -.1625504 .2934106 
ragedumy6 .0403442 .1081547 0.37 0.709 -.1716718 .2523602 
ragedumy7 .0035299 .1096933 0.03 0.974 -.2115023 .218562 
ragedumy8 .0226534 .1034947 0.22 0.827 -.1802277 .2255344 
ragedumy9 -.0177384 .1022587 -0.17 0.862 -.2181964 .1827196 
ragedumy10 -.0527904 .100618 -0.52 0.600 -.2500322 .1444515 
ragedumy11 -.0175942 .0995295 -0.18 0.860 -.2127023 .1775139 
ragedumy12 .0015535 .0982401 0.02 0.987 -.191027 .194134 
ragedumy13 -.0411866 .0955822 -0.43 0.667 -.2285566 .1461835 
ragedumy14 -.0168242 .094928 -0.18 0.859 -.202912 .1692635 
ragedumy15 .0557647 .0940697 0.59 0.553 -.1286404 .2401698 
ragedumy16 .0233978 .0931737 0.25 0.802 -.1592509 .2060464 
ragedumy17 .0918694 .0930633 0.99 0.324 -.0905629 .2743018 
ragedumy18 .0346169 .0926744 0.37 0.709 -.147053 .2162868 
ragedumy19 .0000189 .0922387 0.00 1.000 -.1807969 .1808347 
ragedumy20 .0961018 .0917894 1.05 0.295 -.0838333 .2760369 
ragedumy21 .11012 .0921953 1.19 0.232 -.0706106 .2908507 
ragedumy22 .1546596 .0927759 1.67 0.096 -.0272093 .3365286 
ragedumy23 .079202 .0923826 0.86 0.391 -.1018959 .2602999 
ragedumy24 .1172905 .0924373 1.27 0.205 -.0639146 .2984955 
ragedumy25 .0803902 .0920424 0.87 0.382 -.100041 .2608213 
ragedumy26 .1247014 .0943879 1.32 0.186 -.0603274 .3097303 
ragedumy27 .1009871 .0927845 1.09 0.276 -.0808986 .2828729 
ragedumy28 .1257287 .0930249 1.35 0.177 -.0566282 .3080857 
ragedumy29 .1213509 .0941881 1.29 0.198 -.0632864 .3059882 
ragedumy30 .13913 .0922219 1.51 0.131 -.0416528 .3199129 
ragedumy31 .0971328 .0942858 1.03 0.303 -.0876959 .2819615 
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ragedumy32 .1573425 .093743 1.68 0.093 -.0264221 .3411071 
ragedumy33 .1989844 .0938433 2.12 0.034 .015023 .3829458 
ragedumy34 .2235031 .0932195 2.40 0.017 .0407646 .4062416 
ragedumy35 .2194296 .0934089 2.35 0.019 .0363199 .4025393 
ragedumy36 .1543584 .0945312 1.63 0.103 -.0309515 .3396683 
ragedumy37 .1924274 .0943607 2.04 0.041 .0074518 .377403 
ragedumy38 .2666332 .0945889 2.82 0.005 .0812103 .4520562 
ragedumy39 .2038888 .0951908 2.14 0.032 .017286 .3904916 
ragedumy40 .2838923 .0944149 3.01 0.003 .0988104 .4689742 
ragedumy41 .1827305 .0972216 1.88 0.060 -.0078532 .3733143 
ragedumy42 .2443767 .0962751 2.54 0.011 .0556483 .4331052 
ragedumy43 .1988059 .0962041 2.07 0.039 .0102166 .3873952 
ragedumy44 .2458283 .0982048 2.50 0.012 .053317 .4383396 
ragedumy45 .1741029 .0989633 1.76 0.079 -.0198952 .3681009 
ragedumy46 .2384217 .0978854 2.44 0.015 .0465366 .4303069 
ragedumy47 .1993397 .1000854 1.99 0.046 .003142 .3955375 
ragedumy48 .2441391 .0983219 2.48 0.013 .0513983 .4368798 
ragedumy49 .1657157 .0997408 1.66 0.097 -.0298065 .3612379 
ragedumy50 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy51 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy52 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy53 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy54 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy55 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy56 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy57 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy58 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy59 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy60 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy61 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy62 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy63 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy64 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy65 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy66 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy67 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy68 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy69 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy70 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy71 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy72 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy73 0 (omitted)    
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ragedumy74 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy75 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy76 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy77 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy78 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy79 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy80 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy81 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy82 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy83 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy84 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy85 0 (omitted)    
_cons .5128531 .0926367 5.54 0.000 .3312571 .6944491 
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Excluding over 65, OLS with education variables  
Table A 8: Recent Immigrants Sample 
 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 2429 
  F( 87, 2341) = 2.52 
  Prob > F = 0.0000 
  R-squared = 0.0572 
  Root MSE = .46658 
    
  Robust  
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
female .0428637 .0209799 2.04 0.041 .0017225 .0840049 
outoflabforce -.0247344 .0296194 -0.84 0.404 -.0828175 .0333486 
selfemployed -.0171611 .0498128 -0.34 0.730 -.1148429 .0805207 
unemployed .0142564 .0297029 0.48 0.631 -.0439902 .0725031 
w200809 -.0121758 .0240771 -0.51 0.613 -.0593905 .0350388 
w200910 -.054175 .02457 -2.20 0.028 -.1023563 -.0059937 
subcont .0456087 .0430747 1.06 0.290 -.0388599 .1300772 
otherasian -.0332237 .0496462 -0.67 0.503 -.1305788 .0641313 
black -.1099961 .0386323 -2.85 0.004 -.1857533 -.034239 
mixedrace .0013343 .0597729 0.02 0.982 -.115879 .1185475 
chinese -.0589175 .0571267 -1.03 0.302 -.1709417 .0531068 
otherethnic .0271172 .0431293 0.63 0.530 -.0574584 .1116928 
budh -.0046419 .0562426 -0.08 0.934 -.1149325 .1056486 
hindu -.050252 .0379812 -1.32 0.186 -.1247323 .0242283 
jew .020769 .2839915 0.07 0.942 -.536132 .57767 
muslim -.0075916 .0297519 -0.26 0.799 -.0659344 .0507513 
sikh .1068015 .0668235 1.60 0.110 -.024238 .2378409 
othreli .0930461 .0726283 1.28 0.200 -.0493765 .2354686 
noreli -.0299878 .0485459 -0.62 0.537 -.1251853 .0652096 
reliyes -.0239511 .0249661 -0.96 0.337 -.072909 .0250068 
hdegree -.0657163 .0434691 -1.51 0.131 -.1509582 .0195256 
fdegree -.0667682 .0427556 -1.56 0.119 -.1506109 .0170745 
alevel_equiv -.0436809 .0419177 -1.04 0.297 -.1258805 .0385187 
otherqual -.0037112 .0429518 -0.09 0.931 -.0879388 .0805163 
noqual -.0831289 .0425188 -1.96 0.051 -.1665073 .0002494 
incomebelow5k -.0969207 .0323188 -3.00 0.003 -.1602972 -.0335442 
income5kto10k -.0864178 .0344497 -2.51 0.012 -.1539729 -.0188627 
income15kto20k -.0485589 .0405924 -1.20 0.232 -.1281598 .031042 
income20kto30k -.0818198 .0375947 -2.18 0.030 -.1555421 -.0080975 
income30kto50k -.137173 .045106 -3.04 0.002 -.225625 -.0487211 
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income50kp -.1766846 .0564894 -3.13 0.002 -.2874592 -.06591 
northeast .0227589 .0666179 0.34 0.733 -.1078774 .1533953 
northwest .0562605 .0369165 1.52 0.128 -.0161318 .1286529 
yorknhumber .0533148 .037753 1.41 0.158 -.020718 .1273476 
eastmidland .0593294 .0379101 1.57 0.118 -.0150115 .1336703 
westmidland .0332817 .0382141 0.87 0.384 -.0416554 .1082187 
eastengland .0517692 .0456009 1.14 0.256 -.0376531 .1411915 
southeast .020172 .0345038 0.58 0.559 -.0474891 .0878331 
southwest .0194444 .0645449 0.30 0.763 -.1071267 .1460155 
wales .0668905 .1093545 0.61 0.541 -.1475513 .2813323 
ragedumy1 .413926 .1177052 3.52 0.000 .1831088 .6447433 
ragedumy2 .3052188 .0959104 3.18 0.001 .1171406 .4932969 
ragedumy3 .4433543 .0947149 4.68 0.000 .2576204 .6290881 
ragedumy4 .1972731 .0808637 2.44 0.015 .0387011 .355845 
ragedumy5 .286529 .0807695 3.55 0.000 .1281419 .4449161 
ragedumy6 .283744 .0718796 3.95 0.000 .1427896 .4246983 
ragedumy7 .2789014 .0751647 3.71 0.000 .1315051 .4262977 
ragedumy8 .2893397 .0748668 3.86 0.000 .1425275 .4361518 
ragedumy9 .3949786 .0806428 4.90 0.000 .2368399 .5531173 
ragedumy10 .2902293 .0700849 4.14 0.000 .1527943 .4276643 
ragedumy11 .3156521 .0708694 4.45 0.000 .1766787 .4546255 
ragedumy12 .2675381 .0686538 3.90 0.000 .1329096 .4021667 
ragedumy13 .3453256 .0669085 5.16 0.000 .2141196 .4765317 
ragedumy14 .329197 .0712409 4.62 0.000 .1894952 .4688988 
ragedumy15 .2672903 .0683079 3.91 0.000 .13334 .4012405 
ragedumy16 .4037734 .0714415 5.65 0.000 .2636782 .5438686 
ragedumy17 .3542726 .0722835 4.90 0.000 .2125263 .4960188 
ragedumy18 .4104854 .0771523 5.32 0.000 .2591914 .5617794 
ragedumy19 .3569046 .0772363 4.62 0.000 .2054459 .5083632 
ragedumy20 .2911571 .0780006 3.73 0.000 .1381996 .4441145 
ragedumy21 .387738 .0807237 4.80 0.000 .2294406 .5460355 
ragedumy22 .3459329 .0821852 4.21 0.000 .1847696 .5070962 
ragedumy23 .3417972 .0773033 4.42 0.000 .1902072 .4933873 
ragedumy24 .2918898 .0842619 3.46 0.001 .126654 .4571255 
ragedumy25 .4417794 .1043089 4.24 0.000 .2372319 .6463269 
ragedumy26 .3455176 .10857 3.18 0.001 .1326142 .558421 
ragedumy27 .3401754 .0995434 3.42 0.001 .144973 .5353777 
ragedumy28 .4127557 .1219399 3.38 0.001 .1736342 .6518772 
ragedumy29 .3627684 .1050738 3.45 0.001 .156721 .5688157 
ragedumy30 .5377397 .1064384 5.05 0.000 .3290164 .7464629 
ragedumy31 .4462922 .1068297 4.18 0.000 .2368016 .6557829 
ragedumy32 .5908895 .1318687 4.48 0.000 .332298 .849481 
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ragedumy33 .3328009 .1442387 2.31 0.021 .049952 .6156498 
ragedumy34 .4419688 .1228817 3.60 0.000 .2010005 .6829371 
ragedumy35 .3241534 .1297178 2.50 0.013 .0697798 .578527 
ragedumy36 .4118287 .1571161 2.62 0.009 .1037275 .7199299 
ragedumy37 .2326862 .133195 1.75 0.081 -.0285063 .4938786 
ragedumy38 .28563 .1522124 1.88 0.061 -.0128551 .5841151 
ragedumy39 .4892568 .1904676 2.57 0.010 .1157541 .8627594 
ragedumy40 .4552483 .1784875 2.55 0.011 .1052383 .8052583 
ragedumy41 .4929719 .211453 2.33 0.020 .0783173 .9076265 
ragedumy42 .2759938 .1926049 1.43 0.152 -.1017002 .6536878 
ragedumy43 .3646597 .2428125 1.50 0.133 -.1114902 .8408096 
ragedumy44 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy45 .2750261 .1656809 1.66 0.097 -.0498705 .5999228 
ragedumy46 .5128401 .2590956 1.98 0.048 .0047594 1.020921 
ragedumy47 .096961 .0938256 1.03 0.302 -.087029 .280951 
ragedumy48 .5603473 .3202514 1.75 0.080 -.0676586 1.188353 
ragedumy49 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy50 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy51 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy52 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy53 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy54 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy55 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy56 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy57 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy58 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy59 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy60 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy61 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy62 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy63 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy64 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy65 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy66 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy67 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy68 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy69 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy70 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy71 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy72 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy73 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy74 0 (omitted)    
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ragedumy75 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy76 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy77 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy78 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy79 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy80 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy81 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy82 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy83 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy84 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy85 0 (omitted)    
_cons .1378555 .0845719 1.63 0.103 -.0279882 .3036992 
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Excluding over 65, OLS without education variables  
Table A 9: Pooled sample excluding over 65 and qualification variable for Natives, Earlier 
Immigrants, and Recent Immigrants (Regression without controls) 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 24588 
  F( 2, 24585) = 1768.47 
  Prob > F = 0.0000 
  R-squared = 0.1348 
  Root MSE = .43651 
    
 Robust   
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
recmig -.4699397 .0100976 -46.54 0.000 -.4897317 -.4501477 
oldmig -.2956191 .0067632 -43.71 0.000 -.3088753 -.2823628 
_cons .8042325 .003232 248.83 0.000 .7978975 .8105674 
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Excluding over 65, OLS without education variables  
Table A 10: Pooled sample excluding over 65 and qualification variable for Natives, Earlier 
Immigrants, and Recent Immigrants (Regression with controls) 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 24588 
  F( 85, 24502) = 64.65 
  Prob > F = 0.0000 
  R-squared = 0.1783 
  Root MSE = .42612 
    
  Robust  
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
recmig -.3034122 .015457 -19.63 0.000 -.3337088 -.2731156 
oldmig -.1429683 .0138382 -10.33 0.000 -.1700919 -.1158446 
female .0076157 .0059547 1.28 0.201 -.0040559 .0192873 
outoflabforce -.0176277 .0087759 -2.01 0.045 -.034829 -.0004264 
selfemployed .005619 .0102689 0.55 0.584 -.0145087 .0257467 
unemployed .0051012 .0083469 0.61 0.541 -.0112592 .0214616 
w200809 -.0333001 .0067573 -4.93 0.000 -.0465447 -.0200555 
w200910 -.028225 .0066942 -4.22 0.000 -.0413461 -.0151039 
subcont -.0170841 .0183622 -0.93 0.352 -.0530752 .0189069 
otherasian -.0786339 .0244962 -3.21 0.001 -.1266479 -.0306199 
black -.1706452 .0161978 -10.54 0.000 -.2023938 -.1388966 
mixedrace -.0854078 .0224482 -3.80 0.000 -.1294075 -.041408 
chinese -.0963211 .0302616 -3.18 0.001 -.1556356 -.0370065 
otherethnic -.0571308 .0201316 -2.84 0.005 -.09659 -.0176716 
budh -.0877785 .0313438 -2.80 0.005 -.1492143 -.0263427 
hindu .0018028 .0191346 0.09 0.925 -.0357022 .0393079 
jew -.1862033 .0603533 -3.09 0.002 -.3044995 -.0679072 
muslim -.0914035 .0142675 -6.41 0.000 -.1193688 -.0634383 
sikh .0222725 .0271954 0.82 0.413 -.0310322 .0755772 
othreli -.0123121 .0206008 -0.60 0.550 -.0526909 .0280666 
noreli -.0726568 .0083472 -8.70 0.000 -.0890178 -.0562958 
reliyes -.0566293 .0070539 -8.03 0.000 -.0704554 -.0428032 
incomebelow5k -.0146763 .0097468 -1.51 0.132 -.0337806 .0044281 
income5kto10k .0023746 .0095906 0.25 0.804 -.0164235 .0211727 
income15kto20k -.0050811 .0104992 -0.48 0.628 -.0256602 .015498 
income20kto30k -.03804 .0097932 -3.88 0.000 -.0572354 -.0188447 
income30kto50k -.0918113 .0108078 -8.49 0.000 -.1129953 -.0706274 
income50kp -.1318936 .01565 -8.43 0.000 -.1625686 -.1012186 
northeast .060956 .0148499 4.10 0.000 .0318493 .0900626 
northwest .0753302 .0110606 6.81 0.000 .0536508 .0970096 
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yorknhumber .0741036 .0116498 6.36 0.000 .0512693 .0969379 
eastmidland .1155953 .0116576 9.92 0.000 .0927456 .1384449 
westmidland .1053774 .0110919 9.50 0.000 .0836366 .1271182 
eastengland .1095605 .011819 9.27 0.000 .0863945 .1327265 
southeast .0773501 .0109772 7.05 0.000 .055834 .0988661 
southwest .0822627 .0129103 6.37 0.000 .0569577 .1075677 
wales .086923 .0147103 5.91 0.000 .0580899 .1157562 
ragedumy1 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy2 .0042113 .0385237 0.11 0.913 -.0712976 .0797202 
ragedumy3 .0275802 .0398708 0.69 0.489 -.0505691 .1057295 
ragedumy4 -.0134046 .0382109 -0.35 0.726 -.0883003 .0614911 
ragedumy5 .0302382 .038145 0.79 0.428 -.0445284 .1050047 
ragedumy6 .0077685 .0368429 0.21 0.833 -.0644458 .0799828 
ragedumy7 -.0076227 .0375095 -0.20 0.839 -.0811437 .0658983 
ragedumy8 .0074184 .0365985 0.20 0.839 -.0643168 .0791536 
ragedumy9 .0548119 .035845 1.53 0.126 -.0154466 .1250703 
ragedumy10 .0019585 .0355952 0.06 0.956 -.0678103 .0717272 
ragedumy11 .0225013 .0352909 0.64 0.524 -.0466711 .0916737 
ragedumy12 .0039572 .0345755 0.11 0.909 -.0638128 .0717273 
ragedumy13 -.0061465 .0344246 -0.18 0.858 -.0736209 .0613278 
ragedumy14 .0128179 .0341889 0.37 0.708 -.0541944 .0798303 
ragedumy15 .0121967 .0340372 0.36 0.720 -.0545182 .0789117 
ragedumy16 .0217417 .0347361 0.63 0.531 -.0463432 .0898266 
ragedumy17 .0454018 .0342211 1.33 0.185 -.0216737 .1124773 
ragedumy18 .0203062 .0340638 0.60 0.551 -.0464609 .0870733 
ragedumy19 .0052364 .0342577 0.15 0.879 -.0619108 .0723836 
ragedumy20 .0488802 .0332355 1.47 0.141 -.0162634 .1140237 
ragedumy21 .0384488 .0338936 1.13 0.257 -.0279847 .1048823 
ragedumy22 .0701698 .0334476 2.10 0.036 .0046104 .1357292 
ragedumy23 .0331306 .0335216 0.99 0.323 -.0325736 .0988349 
ragedumy24 .0345005 .0338847 1.02 0.309 -.0319156 .1009166 
ragedumy25 .0423752 .0334325 1.27 0.205 -.0231545 .1079049 
ragedumy26 .0455897 .0346412 1.32 0.188 -.0223091 .1134885 
ragedumy27 .0745653 .0332428 2.24 0.025 .0094075 .1397232 
ragedumy28 .0735307 .0337001 2.18 0.029 .0074763 .139585 
ragedumy29 .076418 .0336403 2.27 0.023 .0104811 .142355 
ragedumy30 .0945587 .0334405 2.83 0.005 .0290133 .1601041 
ragedumy31 .0827583 .034148 2.42 0.015 .0158261 .1496905 
ragedumy32 .0942712 .034038 2.77 0.006 .0275547 .1609878 
ragedumy33 .0862737 .034396 2.51 0.012 .0188555 .1536919 
ragedumy34 .1017569 .0346189 2.94 0.003 .0339018 .169612 
ragedumy35 .0868565 .034427 2.52 0.012 .0193776 .1543354 
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ragedumy36 .0955244 .0347026 2.75 0.006 .0275052 .1635436 
ragedumy37 .0848852 .0341861 2.48 0.013 .0178784 .1518921 
ragedumy38 .1137787 .0345453 3.29 0.001 .0460678 .1814895 
ragedumy39 .1361562 .0341733 3.98 0.000 .0691745 .2031379 
ragedumy40 .1210863 .0345465 3.51 0.000 .053373 .1887996 
ragedumy41 .0682448 .0354799 1.92 0.054 -.0012979 .1377875 
ragedumy42 .10995 .0345896 3.18 0.001 .0421522 .1777478 
ragedumy43 .084117 .0345927 2.43 0.015 .0163132 .1519207 
ragedumy44 .1141993 .0340644 3.35 0.001 .0474311 .1809675 
ragedumy45 .1228457 .0331049 3.71 0.000 .0579581 .1877332 
ragedumy46 .1287542 .0333654 3.86 0.000 .0633561 .1941523 
ragedumy47 .1166791 .0333345 3.50 0.000 .0513414 .1820168 
ragedumy48 .1319944 .0333683 3.96 0.000 .0665905 .1973984 
ragedumy49 .1251345 .0338945 3.69 0.000 .0586993 .1915697 
ragedumy50 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy51 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy52 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy53 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy54 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy55 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy56 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy57 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy58 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy59 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy60 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy61 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy62 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy63 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy64 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy65 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy66 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy67 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy68 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy69 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy70 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy71 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy72 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy73 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy74 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy75 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy76 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy77 0 (omitted)    
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ragedumy78 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy79 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy80 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy81 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy82 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy83 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy84 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy85 0 (omitted)    
_cons .7441499 .0311917 23.86 0.000 .6830123 .8052874 
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Excluding over 65, OLS without education variables  
Table A 11: Natives Sample 
 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 15074 
  F( 82, 14990) = . 
  Prob > F = . 
  R-squared = 0.0658 
  Root MSE = .38459 
    
  Robust  
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
female -.0120307 .0070098 -1.72 0.086 -.0257709 .0017094 
outoflabforce .0042747 .0103462 0.41 0.679 -.0160051 .0245544 
selfemployed .0146114 .011678 1.25 0.211 -.008279 .0375018 
unemployed .0086942 .0095055 0.91 0.360 -.0099379 .0273262 
w200809 -.0279953 .007743 -3.62 0.000 -.0431726 -.0128181 
w200910 -.0096399 .0076541 -1.26 0.208 -.0246429 .0053631 
subcont .0697928 .0541712 1.29 0.198 -.0363892 .1759749 
otherasian .1560856 .1274081 1.23 0.221 -.0936498 .405821 
black -.262677 .0360334 -7.29 0.000 -.3333069 -.1920472 
mixedrace -.0536472 .0331457 -1.62 0.106 -.1186169 .0113225 
chinese .6235649 .0564493 11.05 0.000 .5129174 .7342124 
otherethnic -.0151364 .0485094 -0.31 0.755 -.1102208 .0799479 
budh -.0166368 .0669937 -0.25 0.804 -.1479526 .114679 
hindu -.282198 .1001143 -2.82 0.005 -.4784343 -.0859618 
jew -.1330737 .0708091 -1.88 0.060 -.2718683 .0057208 
muslim -.3199292 .0508711 -6.29 0.000 -.4196427 -.2202156 
sikh -.2313918 .1070161 -2.16 0.031 -.4411565 -.0216272 
othreli -.0323043 .0246875 -1.31 0.191 -.0806948 .0160862 
noreli -.0801785 .0086937 -9.22 0.000 -.0972193 -.0631378 
reliyes -.0542174 .0084541 -6.41 0.000 -.0707884 -.0376463 
incomebelow5k -.0121287 .0113096 -1.07 0.284 -.0342969 .0100395 
income5kto10k .0014455 .0107249 0.13 0.893 -.0195766 .0224676 
income15kto20k -.0192462 .0117948 -1.63 0.103 -.0423654 .0038731 
income20kto30k -.0484897 .0111813 -4.34 0.000 -.0704064 -.0265729 
income30kto50k -.0997291 .0123657 -8.07 0.000 -.1239673 -.0754909 
income50kp -.1565513 .0181419 -8.63 0.000 -.1921115 -.120991 
northeast .0885038 .0188438 4.70 0.000 .0515676 .12544 
northwest .1027514 .0162037 6.34 0.000 .0709902 .1345127 
yorknhumber .1128673 .0167821 6.73 0.000 .0799723 .1457623 
eastmidland .1478311 .0167698 8.82 0.000 .1149603 .1807019 
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westmidland .1475607 .0162996 9.05 0.000 .1156114 .1795099 
eastengland .1470837 .0164955 8.92 0.000 .1147506 .1794168 
southeast .1099496 .0161647 6.80 0.000 .0782647 .1416344 
southwest .1199354 .0171044 7.01 0.000 .0864086 .1534622 
wales .1088714 .0184563 5.90 0.000 .0726949 .145048 
ragedumy1 -.0552765 .0438873 -1.26 0.208 -.141301 .0307481 
ragedumy2 -.0489115 .0422143 -1.16 0.247 -.1316566 .0338337 
ragedumy3 -.0429691 .0439746 -0.98 0.329 -.1291647 .0432265 
ragedumy4 -.0244318 .0425664 -0.57 0.566 -.107867 .0590035 
ragedumy5 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy6 -.0185327 .0420927 -0.44 0.660 -.1010394 .0639741 
ragedumy7 -.0370223 .0422458 -0.88 0.381 -.1198292 .0457846 
ragedumy8 -.0182083 .0412024 -0.44 0.659 -.09897 .0625533 
ragedumy9 .0337353 .0392261 0.86 0.390 -.0431527 .1106233 
ragedumy10 .0173085 .039623 0.44 0.662 -.0603574 .0949745 
ragedumy11 .0316422 .0392368 0.81 0.420 -.0452667 .1085511 
ragedumy12 .0054116 .0386304 0.14 0.889 -.0703088 .081132 
ragedumy13 -.0288955 .0392521 -0.74 0.462 -.1058344 .0480434 
ragedumy14 .0077296 .0380365 0.20 0.839 -.0668266 .0822858 
ragedumy15 .0012321 .0387304 0.03 0.975 -.0746842 .0771485 
ragedumy16 -.0068196 .0402695 -0.17 0.866 -.0857527 .0721134 
ragedumy17 .0100528 .0387963 0.26 0.796 -.0659927 .0860983 
ragedumy18 -.0065373 .038504 -0.17 0.865 -.0820098 .0689351 
ragedumy19 -.0047742 .0387218 -0.12 0.902 -.0806737 .0711253 
ragedumy20 .0254915 .0367169 0.69 0.488 -.0464781 .0974612 
ragedumy21 -.0199355 .0377102 -0.53 0.597 -.0938521 .0539811 
ragedumy22 .0146376 .0365077 0.40 0.688 -.056922 .0861972 
ragedumy23 .0001313 .0369042 0.00 0.997 -.0722054 .0724681 
ragedumy24 -.0210266 .0378006 -0.56 0.578 -.0951204 .0530673 
ragedumy25 -.0003032 .0363947 -0.01 0.993 -.0716412 .0710347 
ragedumy26 -.012869 .0378306 -0.34 0.734 -.0870216 .0612836 
ragedumy27 .0432537 .0358583 1.21 0.228 -.0270329 .1135403 
ragedumy28 .0220176 .0364024 0.60 0.545 -.0493355 .0933707 
ragedumy29 .0375995 .036302 1.04 0.300 -.033557 .1087559 
ragedumy30 .0446621 .0364699 1.22 0.221 -.0268233 .1161475 
ragedumy31 .055711 .0367905 1.51 0.130 -.0164029 .1278249 
ragedumy32 .0324943 .0367065 0.89 0.376 -.039455 .1044436 
ragedumy33 .0066609 .0372338 0.18 0.858 -.0663219 .0796438 
ragedumy34 .0031412 .0381051 0.08 0.934 -.0715495 .0778318 
ragedumy35 -.0030632 .037578 -0.08 0.935 -.0767208 .0705943 
ragedumy36 .0421545 .0374465 1.13 0.260 -.0312451 .1155541 
ragedumy37 .0156646 .0369291 0.42 0.671 -.0567211 .0880502 
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ragedumy38 .0200097 .0372274 0.54 0.591 -.0529607 .09298 
ragedumy39 .0766136 .0361118 2.12 0.034 .00583 .1473972 
ragedumy40 .0190216 .0373942 0.51 0.611 -.0542756 .0923189 
ragedumy41 -.0069521 .0384803 -0.18 0.857 -.0823782 .0684739 
ragedumy42 .030275 .0371075 0.82 0.415 -.0424602 .1030101 
ragedumy43 .0091375 .0368996 0.25 0.804 -.0631901 .0814651 
ragedumy44 .0423826 .0360597 1.18 0.240 -.0282988 .113064 
ragedumy45 .0752268 .0347787 2.16 0.031 .0070563 .1433974 
ragedumy46 .0615791 .0352453 1.75 0.081 -.007506 .1306641 
ragedumy47 .0563165 .0352092 1.60 0.110 -.0126978 .1253308 
ragedumy48 .0595778 .0352619 1.69 0.091 -.0095399 .1286955 
ragedumy49 .0687774 .0355531 1.93 0.053 -.0009109 .1384658 
ragedumy50 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy51 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy52 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy53 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy54 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy55 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy56 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy57 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy58 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy59 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy60 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy61 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy62 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy63 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy64 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy65 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy66 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy67 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy68 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy69 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy70 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy71 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy72 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy73 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy74 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy75 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy76 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy77 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy78 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy79 0 (omitted)    
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ragedumy80 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy81 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy82 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy83 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy84 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy85 0 (omitted)    
_cons .7713556 .0348546 22.13 0.000 .7030364 .8396748 
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Excluding over 65, OLS without education variables  
Table A 12: Earlier Immigrants Sample 
 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 7082 
  F( 83, 6998) = 7.41 
  Prob > F = 0.0000 
  R-squared = 0.0720 
  Root MSE = .48448 
    
  Robust  
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
female .0388833 .0127017 3.06 0.002 .0139841 .0637825 
outoflabforce -.0519982 .017966 -2.89 0.004 -.0872171 -.0167793 
selfemployed -.0082103 .0214577 -0.38 0.702 -.0502739 .0338534 
unemployed -.0125436 .0182138 -0.69 0.491 -.0482482 .023161 
w200809 -.0483367 .014672 -3.29 0.001 -.0770982 -.0195751 
w200910 -.0357279 .0145364 -2.46 0.014 -.0642236 -.0072321 
subcont .0314367 .0281441 1.12 0.264 -.0237342 .0866076 
otherasian -.0256334 .0343594 -0.75 0.456 -.0929883 .0417215 
black -.1072595 .0260042 -4.12 0.000 -.1582357 -.0562833 
mixedrace -.0632907 .0375542 -1.69 0.092 -.1369083 .010327 
chinese .0102058 .042837 0.24 0.812 -.0737676 .0941793 
otherethnic -.0178615 .0308893 -0.58 0.563 -.078414 .042691 
budh -.1610008 .0457237 -3.52 0.000 -.2506331 -.0713686 
hindu .0347612 .0241435 1.44 0.150 -.0125674 .0820898 
jew -.369357 .1212322 -3.05 0.002 -.6070089 -.1317051 
muslim -.0525508 .0189458 -2.77 0.006 -.0896903 -.0154112 
sikh .0260894 .0318887 0.82 0.413 -.0364221 .0886008 
othreli .0031337 .0398369 0.08 0.937 -.0749587 .081226 
noreli -.1266549 .0338072 -3.75 0.000 -.1929273 -.0603825 
reliyes -.0565365 .0145177 -3.89 0.000 -.0849956 -.0280774 
incomebelow5k .011027 .0198386 0.56 0.578 -.0278626 .0499166 
income5kto10k .0244583 .0205278 1.19 0.234 -.0157823 .0646989 
income15kto20k .0245433 .0227728 1.08 0.281 -.0200983 .0691849 
income20kto30k -.0181723 .0207691 -0.87 0.382 -.0588861 .0225415 
income30kto50k -.06499 .0235879 -2.76 0.006 -.1112295 -.0187506 
income50kp -.047234 .0354213 -1.33 0.182 -.1166706 .0222026 
northeast .042094 .0645084 0.65 0.514 -.0843621 .1685501 
northwest .0607122 .0238556 2.54 0.011 .013948 .1074764 
yorknhumber .0207675 .024987 0.83 0.406 -.0282146 .0697497 
eastmidland .1052293 .0244142 4.31 0.000 .0573701 .1530886 
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westmidland .0800901 .0205554 3.90 0.000 .0397953 .1203849 
eastengland .0793243 .0285848 2.78 0.006 .0232895 .1353591 
southeast .0773515 .0237365 3.26 0.001 .0308208 .1238821 
southwest -.0240723 .0519982 -0.46 0.643 -.1260044 .0778598 
wales .1823591 .0686051 2.66 0.008 .0478724 .3168458 
ragedumy1 -.0827771 .1118539 -0.74 0.459 -.3020447 .1364905 
ragedumy2 .0183921 .1192134 0.15 0.877 -.2153023 .2520865 
ragedumy3 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy4 -.0313802 .1134542 -0.28 0.782 -.2537847 .1910244 
ragedumy5 .0662225 .1157355 0.57 0.567 -.1606543 .2930992 
ragedumy6 .0257496 .1070467 0.24 0.810 -.1840943 .2355935 
ragedumy7 -.0166376 .1087141 -0.15 0.878 -.2297503 .196475 
ragedumy8 -.0032507 .1030496 -0.03 0.975 -.2052592 .1987577 
ragedumy9 -.0527869 .1016006 -0.52 0.603 -.251955 .1463811 
ragedumy10 -.087057 .0998905 -0.87 0.383 -.2828726 .1087587 
ragedumy11 -.0633805 .0982625 -0.65 0.519 -.2560047 .1292438 
ragedumy12 -.0339664 .0974351 -0.35 0.727 -.2249687 .1570359 
ragedumy13 -.0818649 .0948453 -0.86 0.388 -.2677904 .1040606 
ragedumy14 -.0552555 .094158 -0.59 0.557 -.2398336 .1293227 
ragedumy15 .0101541 .0930611 0.11 0.913 -.1722738 .1925821 
ragedumy16 -.0182085 .0921632 -0.20 0.843 -.1988763 .1624593 
ragedumy17 .0465481 .0921781 0.50 0.614 -.134149 .2272452 
ragedumy18 -.0102626 .0916873 -0.11 0.911 -.1899975 .1694724 
ragedumy19 -.0427477 .0914232 -0.47 0.640 -.2219648 .1364694 
ragedumy20 .0534962 .0907533 0.59 0.556 -.1244078 .2314001 
ragedumy21 .0662126 .0914122 0.72 0.469 -.112983 .2454081 
ragedumy22 .1128905 .0917987 1.23 0.219 -.0670628 .2928438 
ragedumy23 .0366885 .0913542 0.40 0.688 -.1423934 .2157705 
ragedumy24 .0767552 .0914128 0.84 0.401 -.1024415 .255952 
ragedumy25 .0391858 .0910657 0.43 0.667 -.1393306 .2177022 
ragedumy26 .0845616 .0934888 0.90 0.366 -.0987049 .267828 
ragedumy27 .0615828 .091919 0.67 0.503 -.1186062 .2417718 
ragedumy28 .0857108 .0921659 0.93 0.352 -.0949622 .2663839 
ragedumy29 .0768493 .0933256 0.82 0.410 -.1060971 .2597958 
ragedumy30 .0989194 .0912833 1.08 0.279 -.0800236 .2778624 
ragedumy31 .0528844 .0934119 0.57 0.571 -.1302313 .2360001 
ragedumy32 .1171572 .0928557 1.26 0.207 -.0648682 .2991826 
ragedumy33 .1634515 .0930197 1.76 0.079 -.0188954 .3457983 
ragedumy34 .1868902 .0923499 2.02 0.043 .0058563 .3679241 
ragedumy35 .1828317 .0923928 1.98 0.048 .0017138 .3639496 
ragedumy36 .1211583 .0935429 1.30 0.195 -.0622141 .3045308 
ragedumy37 .1529513 .0934637 1.64 0.102 -.0302658 .3361684 
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ragedumy38 .2269739 .0938567 2.42 0.016 .0429865 .4109614 
ragedumy39 .1710012 .094451 1.81 0.070 -.0141515 .3561539 
ragedumy40 .2505345 .0934946 2.68 0.007 .0672567 .4338122 
ragedumy41 .1396779 .0960164 1.45 0.146 -.0485433 .3278991 
ragedumy42 .2084486 .095526 2.18 0.029 .0211886 .3957085 
ragedumy43 .1628391 .0954595 1.71 0.088 -.0242905 .3499687 
ragedumy44 .2082873 .09762 2.13 0.033 .0169226 .3996521 
ragedumy45 .1380003 .0982052 1.41 0.160 -.0545117 .3305124 
ragedumy46 .195843 .0967843 2.02 0.043 .0061166 .3855695 
ragedumy47 .1629595 .0994217 1.64 0.101 -.0319373 .3578562 
ragedumy48 .2061563 .09724 2.12 0.034 .0155365 .3967761 
ragedumy49 .1213113 .0989365 1.23 0.220 -.0726343 .3152569 
ragedumy50 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy51 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy52 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy53 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy54 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy55 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy56 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy57 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy58 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy59 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy60 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy61 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy62 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy63 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy64 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy65 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy66 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy67 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy68 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy69 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy70 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy71 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy72 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy73 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy74 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy75 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy76 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy77 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy78 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy79 0 (omitted)    
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ragedumy80 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy81 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy82 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy83 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy84 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy85 0 (omitted)    
_cons .5076805 .0913579 5.56 0.000 .3285913 .6867697 
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Excluding over 65, OLS without education variables  
Table A 13: Recent Immigrants Sample 
Linear regression  Number of obs = 2432 
  F( 82, 2349) = 2.90 
  Prob > F = 0.0000 
  R-squared = 0.0537 
  Root MSE = .46693 
    
  Robust  
redmig Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
female .0465828 .0207503 2.24 0.025 .005892 .0872737 
outoflabforce -.0261296 .0295843 -0.88 0.377 -.0841437 .0318846 
selfemployed -.0057438 .0498255 -0.12 0.908 -.1034504 .0919627 
unemployed .0160136 .0297326 0.54 0.590 -.0422912 .0743183 
w200809 -.0113138 .024015 -0.47 0.638 -.0584066 .0357791 
w200910 -.0543936 .0245251 -2.22 0.027 -.1024867 -.0063004 
subcont .0398423 .0426203 0.93 0.350 -.043735 .1234195 
otherasian -.039614 .0493537 -0.80 0.422 -.1363953 .0571674 
black -.1129422 .038408 -2.94 0.003 -.1882593 -.0376251 
mixedrace -.0093001 .0594931 -0.16 0.876 -.1259646 .1073644 
chinese -.0707048 .0566774 -1.25 0.212 -.1818477 .040438 
otherethnic .0233311 .0431097 0.54 0.588 -.0612059 .1078681 
budh -.0024292 .0564443 -0.04 0.966 -.113115 .1082567 
hindu -.0552459 .0378709 -1.46 0.145 -.1295097 .019018 
jew .0267137 .2740851 0.10 0.922 -.5107601 .5641875 
muslim -.0118615 .0295383 -0.40 0.688 -.0697854 .0460623 
sikh .1036109 .0669508 1.55 0.122 -.0276778 .2348996 
othreli .0856415 .0731099 1.17 0.242 -.0577251 .2290081 
noreli -.032715 .0485998 -0.67 0.501 -.128018 .062588 
reliyes -.0228515 .0249474 -0.92 0.360 -.0717727 .0260697 
incomebelow5k -.1000236 .0323364 -3.09 0.002 -.1634345 -.0366127 
income5kto10k -.0892639 .0343932 -2.60 0.010 -.1567081 -.0218197 
income15kto20k -.0481293 .040608 -1.19 0.236 -.1277606 .031502 
income20kto30k -.0876041 .0373394 -2.35 0.019 -.1608257 -.0143825 
income30kto50k -.1491854 .0441692 -3.38 0.001 -.2358001 -.0625707 
income50kp -.1888573 .0553748 -3.41 0.001 -.2974458 -.0802687 
northeast .0229283 .0673246 0.34 0.733 -.1090935 .1549501 
northwest .0609337 .0366118 1.66 0.096 -.0108611 .1327284 
yorknhumber .0532822 .0372141 1.43 0.152 -.0196936 .126258 
eastmidland .0686379 .037876 1.81 0.070 -.005636 .1429119 
westmidland .0315224 .0380932 0.83 0.408 -.0431774 .1062222 
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eastengland .0550139 .0456146 1.21 0.228 -.0344352 .144463 
southeast .0230915 .0344956 0.67 0.503 -.0445534 .0907365 
southwest .0238776 .0649523 0.37 0.713 -.1034921 .1512473 
wales .0574243 .1055998 0.54 0.587 -.1496542 .2645029 
ragedumy1 -.0861213 .3277414 -0.26 0.793 -.7288138 .5565711 
ragedumy2 -.1932819 .3214039 -0.60 0.548 -.8235467 .4369829 
ragedumy3 -.0633688 .3210748 -0.20 0.844 -.6929881 .5662506 
ragedumy4 -.3188869 .3167321 -1.01 0.314 -.9399904 .3022165 
ragedumy5 -.2242227 .3167724 -0.71 0.479 -.8454052 .3969598 
ragedumy6 -.2349177 .3152569 -0.75 0.456 -.8531283 .3832929 
ragedumy7 -.2458795 .3161586 -0.78 0.437 -.8658583 .3740994 
ragedumy8 -.2345713 .3155694 -0.74 0.457 -.8533949 .3842522 
ragedumy9 -.1257344 .3171453 -0.40 0.692 -.7476483 .4961794 
ragedumy10 -.237353 .3146955 -0.75 0.451 -.8544628 .3797569 
ragedumy11 -.2128267 .3153832 -0.67 0.500 -.8312851 .4056318 
ragedumy12 -.2600389 .3146468 -0.83 0.409 -.8770532 .3569753 
ragedumy13 -.1788234 .3143197 -0.57 0.569 -.7951963 .4375496 
ragedumy14 -.1991886 .3150308 -0.63 0.527 -.816956 .4185788 
ragedumy15 -.253919 .3145104 -0.81 0.420 -.8706658 .3628277 
ragedumy16 -.1214582 .315269 -0.39 0.700 -.7396927 .4967762 
ragedumy17 -.1757497 .3154449 -0.56 0.577 -.7943291 .4428296 
ragedumy18 -.1179997 .316496 -0.37 0.709 -.7386402 .5026408 
ragedumy19 -.1618337 .316426 -0.51 0.609 -.7823369 .4586695 
ragedumy20 -.2322564 .3168608 -0.73 0.464 -.8536122 .3890995 
ragedumy21 -.1399077 .3175202 -0.44 0.660 -.7625567 .4827413 
ragedumy22 -.1845682 .317527 -0.58 0.561 -.8072306 .4380942 
ragedumy23 -.1808185 .3170546 -0.57 0.569 -.8025545 .4409175 
ragedumy24 -.2396271 .3179198 -0.75 0.451 -.8630597 .3838054 
ragedumy25 -.0803768 .3242246 -0.25 0.804 -.7161728 .5554193 
ragedumy26 -.1812367 .3256741 -0.56 0.578 -.8198753 .457402 
ragedumy27 -.1803278 .3223006 -0.56 0.576 -.812351 .4516954 
ragedumy28 -.1036082 .3306312 -0.31 0.754 -.7519674 .5447511 
ragedumy29 -.1619547 .3240713 -0.50 0.617 -.7974502 .4735407 
ragedumy30 .0168344 .3257012 0.05 0.959 -.6218572 .655526 
ragedumy31 -.0757599 .3249334 -0.23 0.816 -.7129458 .5614261 
ragedumy32 .0748889 .3338233 0.22 0.823 -.5797301 .7295079 
ragedumy33 -.1957421 .3389053 -0.58 0.564 -.8603267 .4688425 
ragedumy34 -.0673883 .3302156 -0.20 0.838 -.7149325 .580156 
ragedumy35 -.2204129 .3327652 -0.66 0.508 -.8729568 .432131 
ragedumy36 -.1246149 .3444199 -0.36 0.718 -.8000135 .5507838 
ragedumy37 -.2915983 .3333008 -0.87 0.382 -.9451927 .3619961 
ragedumy38 -.2435988 .3422224 -0.71 0.477 -.9146882 .4274906 
155 
 
ragedumy39 -.0523159 .3592595 -0.15 0.884 -.7568146 .6521828 
ragedumy40 -.0727314 .3563617 -0.20 0.838 -.7715475 .6260847 
ragedumy41 -.0629269 .3711844 -0.17 0.865 -.79081 .6649563 
ragedumy42 -.2549274 .3579257 -0.71 0.476 -.9568106 .4469558 
ragedumy43 -.1787456 .3877353 -0.46 0.645 -.9390847 .5815934 
ragedumy44 -.5303828 .3151687 -1.68 0.093 -1.148421 .087655 
ragedumy45 -.2726801 .3493042 -0.78 0.435 -.9576567 .4122964 
ragedumy46 -.0167722 .4079399 -0.04 0.967 -.8167319 .7831875 
ragedumy47 -.4525349 .3200648 -1.41 0.158 -1.080174 .1751041 
ragedumy48 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy49 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy50 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy51 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy52 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy53 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy54 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy55 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy56 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy57 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy58 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy59 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy60 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy61 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy62 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy63 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy64 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy65 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy66 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy67 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy68 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy69 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy70 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy71 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy72 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy73 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy74 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy75 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy76 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy77 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy78 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy79 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy80 0 (omitted)    
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ragedumy81 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy82 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy83 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy84 0 (omitted)    
ragedumy85 0 (omitted)    
_cons .6195623 .3164046 1.96 0.050 -.0008989 1.240024 
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8.2 Appendix B: Estimates for all models after dropping all the 
respondents reporting “remain the same” to the outcome question 
Table B 1: Descriptive statistics (2007 – 2010) 
 
Variables Natives Earlier 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
       
Reduce 
Migration 0.967 0.178 0.798 0.401 0.597 0.491 
Increase 
Migration 0.033 0.178 0.202 0.401 0.403 0.491 
Out of Labour 
Force 0.324 0.468 0.324 0.468 0.209 0.407 
Self Employed 0.068 0.252 0.079 0.270 0.037 0.189 
Unemployed 0.153 0.360 0.165 0.371 0.191 0.393 
Employed 0.455 0.498 0.432 0.495 0.563 0.496 
Male 0.446 0.497 0.482 0.500 0.539 0.499 
Female 0.554 0.497 0.518 0.500 0.461 0.499 
Age 50.969 18.589 47.878 15.352 31.596 9.298 
Income below 5K 0.191 0.393 0.259 0.438 0.343 0.475 
Income 5K to 
10K 0.219 0.413 0.207 0.405 0.172 0.378 
Income 10K to 
15K 0.161 0.368 0.156 0.363 0.180 0.385 
Income 15K to 
20K 0.118 0.323 0.111 0.314 0.098 0.297 
Income 20K to 
30K 0.156 0.363 0.144 0.351 0.118 0.323 
Income 30K to 
50K 0.115 0.319 0.091 0.288 0.064 0.245 
Income above 
50K 0.040 0.195 0.032 0.176 0.024 0.153 
Observations 17112 5576 1370 
Variables available only for 2009 – 2010 
 
Lost Job 0.062 0.241 0.056 0.231 0.102 0.303 
Drop in Income 0.267 0.443 0.260 0.439 0.211 0.409 
Cutbacks in 
Luxuries 0.396 0.489 0.326 0.469 0.226 0.419 
Cutbacks in 
Necessities 0.339 0.473 0.352 0.478 0.269 0.444 
Non listed 0.411 0.492 0.428 0.495 0.500 0.501 
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Observations 5911 1931 402 
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Table B 2: Comparison of unconditional and conditional models 
Reduce 
Immigration 
Unconditional Models Conditional Models 
OLS Probit 
AME 
Probit 
Coefficients 
Ordered 
Probit 
OLS Probit 
AME 
Probit 
Coefficients 
Ordered 
Probit 
   Coefficients    Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Recent 
Immigrants 
-.37*** 
(.013) 
-.22*** 
(.005) 
-1.59*** 
(.039) 
-1.37*** 
(.031) 
-.23*** 
(.016) 
-.12*** 
(.008) 
-.90*** 
(.063) 
-.83*** 
(.046) 
Earlier 
Immigrants
  
-.17*** 
(.005) 
-.14*** 
(.004) 
-1.01*** 
(.027) 
-.76*** 
(.018) 
-.05*** 
(.011) 
-.06*** 
(.008) 
-.44*** 
(.059) 
-.35*** 
(.039) 
Constant .967*** 
(.001) 
 1.84*** 
(.019) 
 .93*** 
(.012) 
 .97 
(.595) 
 
Sample Size 24058 24058 24058 24058 24058 23987 23987 24058 
R2  0.13  .17 .07 .17  .22 .10 
 
Conditional models control for employment status, wave year, age dummies, ethnicity, religion, practising religion or not, income, and region. Omitted category 
for migrant status dummy is “natives”. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
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Table B 3: Coefficients of main controls for each respondent category (2007 – 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conditional models control for employment status, wave year, age dummies, 
ethnicity, religion, practising religion or not, income, and region. Omitted 
category for migrant status dummy is “natives”. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
Reduce 
Immigration 
OLS 
Pooled Natives Earlier 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
Recent Immigrants -0.233***    
(0.016)    
Earlier Immigrants -0.053***    
(0.011)    
Female 0.015*** 0.001 0.043*** 0.092*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.029) 
Out of Labour 
Force 
-0.018*** -0.012** -0.022 -0.029 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.017) (0.043) 
Self Employed 0.004 -0.004 0.028 0.038 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.021) (0.070) 
Unemployed -0.009 -0.008* -0.009 0.003 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.017) (0.041) 
Income below 5K 
 
-0.014** -0.002 -0.023 -0.105** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.018) (0.044) 
Income 5K to 10K -0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.118** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.017) (0.046) 
Income 15K to 20K 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.005 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.021) (0.053) 
Income 20K to 30K -0.007 -0.012** 0.002 -0.030 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.019) (0.050) 
Income 30K to 50K -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.024 -0.140** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.023) (0.064) 
Income above 50K -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.052 0.038 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.036) (0.088) 
Constant 0.932*** 1.023*** 0.122*** 1.080*** 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.033) (0.107) 
Sample Size 24058 17112 5576 1370 
R2 0.166 0.042 0.082 0.093 
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Table B 4: Wave 2009 – 2010 models for each respondent category controlled 
for financial worry dummies 
 
 OLS 
Pooled Natives Earlier 
Immigrants 
Recent 
Immigrants 
Recent Immigrants -0.219***    
(0.028)    
Earlier Immigrants -0.024    
(0.017)    
Lost Job 0.025** 0.014* 0.064* 0.035 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.036) (0.084) 
Drop in Income 0.007 0.009* -0.007 0.085 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.021) (0.067) 
Cutbacks in Luxuries 0.018*** 0.001 0.061*** 0.090 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.020) (0.068) 
Cutbacks in 
Necessities 
0.010 0.008 -0.001 0.023 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.020) (0.065) 
Out of Labour Force -0.019* -0.008 -0.017 -0.124* 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.027) (0.072) 
Self Employed -0.012 -0.026** 0.023 -0.050 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.033) (0.128) 
Unemployed -0.013 -0.010 -0.032 0.091 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.029) (0.074) 
Female 0.013** 0.003 0.029 0.074 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.019) (0.055) 
Income below 5K 
 
-0.012 -0.007 -0.004 -0.131* 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.029) (0.077) 
Income 5K to 10K 0.002 0.006 0.012 -0.123 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.028) (0.083) 
Income 15K to 20K 0.009 0.002 0.043 -0.015 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.034) (0.114) 
Income 20K to 30K -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.049 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.032) (0.106) 
Income 30K to 50K -0.010 -0.003 -0.050 -0.088 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.038) (0.126) 
Income above 50K -0.001 -0.000 -0.014 -0.102 
(0.017) (0.014) (0.058) (0.192) 
Constant 0.936*** 0.977*** 1.038*** 0.853*** 
(0.020) (0.027) (0.051) (0.244) 
Sample Size 8244 5911 1931 402 
R2 0.172 0.069 0.123 0.242 
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8.3 Appendix C: Graphs for Females 
 
Figure C 1: Discontinuous jump in treatment at threshold (Exit from the labour market) 
 
 
 
Figure C 2: Continuity in outcome variable (Reduce Immigration 1) at threshold (Exit from 
the labour market) 
 
 
 
 
 
1a) Discontinuous jump in treatment at threshold 1b) Discontinuous jump in treatment at threshold 
(sample trimmed at age 54 and 74) 
1c) Discontinuous jump in treatment at threshold 
(sample trimmed at age 61 and 69) 
2a) Continuity in outcome variable 
(reduce immigration 1) at threshold 
2b) No clear discontinuity in outcome variable (reduce 
immigration 1) (sample restricted at age 54 and 74) 
2c) No clear discontinuity in outcome variable (reduce 
immigration 1) (sample restricted at age 61 and 69) 
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Figure C 3: Continuity/discontinuity in outcome variable (Reduce Immigration 2) at 
threshold 
 
 
 
Figure C 4: Continuity in outcome variable (Reduce Immigration 3) at threshold 
 
 
 
 
3a) Continuity in outcome variable 
(Reduce Immigration 2) at threshold 
3b) Continuity in outcome variable (Reduce Immigration 2) 
at threshold (sample restricted at 54 and 74) 
3c) Continuity in outcome (Reduce Immigration 2) at 
threshold (sample restricted at 61 and 69) 
4a) Continuity in outcome variable 
(Reduce Immigration 3) at threshold 
4b) Continuity in outcome variable (Reduce Immigration 3) 
at threshold (sample restricted at age 54 and 74) 
4c) No discontinuity in outcome (Reduce Immigration 3) rather 
over fitting of the line (sample restricted at age 61 and 69) 
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Table C 1: OLS/IV estimates for all the models (Exit from the labour market 
models controlled for region dummies, religion dummies, ethnicity dummies, 
and practicing religion or not dummy) 
 
Panel A: Reduce Immigration 1 (1 for “reduce a little” & “reduce a lot” and 0 otherwise) 
Reduce Immigration 1 OLS (1) OLS (2)  OLS (3) IV (1) IV (2)  IV (3) 
Retired 0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.38*** 
(0.11) 
-0.21* 
(0.12) 
Normalized Age 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Normalized Age*above 65 -0.00* 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
Constant 1.95*** 
(0.06) 
1.31*** 
(0.12) 
0.61 
(0.39) 
1.40*** 
(0.34) 
1.52*** 
(0.17) 
0.62*** 
(0.21) 
N 4465 1438 755 4465 1438 755 
Panel B: Reduce Immigration 2 ( “remain the same” dropped from Panel A sample) 
Reduce Immigration 2 OLS (4) OLS (5)  OLS (6) IV (4) IV (5)  IV (6) 
Retired -0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
Normalized Age 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Normalized Age*above 65 -0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Constant 1.05*** 
(0.04) 
1.07*** 
(0.30) 
1.11*** 
(0.11) 
0.72** 
(0.34) 
1.14*** 
(0.09) 
1.07*** 
(0.10) 
N 3670 1256 666 3670 1256 666 
Panel C: Reduce Immigration 3 (1 for “reduce a lot” and 0 otherwise) 
Reduce Immigration 3 OLS (7) OLS (8)  OLS (9) IV (7) IV (8)  IV (9) 
Retired -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.50*** 
(0.15) 
-0.58*** 
(0.21) 
Normalized Age 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.01*** 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
Normalized Age*above 65 -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Constant 1.05*** 
(0.08) 
1.57*** 
(0.15) 
0.83** 
(0.40) 
0.94*** 
(0.33) 
1.32*** 
(0.44) 
0.61 
(0.43) 
N 4465 1438 755 4465 1438 755 
Sample Full Trimmed Trimmed Full Trimmed Trimmed 
Age boundaries (inclusive) 16 – 95 54 – 74 61 – 69  16 – 95 54 – 74 61 – 69  
 
Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. For IV, standard errors are 
adjusted by clustering at age. 
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Models 1,4 and 7 are estimated using the full sample of native males, models 
2,5, and 8 are estimated by trimming the sample at age 54 and 74, whereas, 
model 3,6 and 9 are estimated after trimming the sample at age 61 and 69. 
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8.4 Appendix D: Results using immigrant shares 
 
Table D 1: First stage of all specifications (immigrant share) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Shift-share “predicted share” 0.90*** 
(0.00) 
0.81*** 
(0.01) 
0.33*** 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat (excl. instrument) 35409.20 10572.38 472.44 3.50 
R2 0.90 0.93 0.46 0.65 
# observations 19376 19376 19376 19376 
# schools 9688 9688 9688 9688 
Year effects Yes No Yes No 
Local authority*year effects No Yes No Yes 
School fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the LSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Table D 2: Immigration, pupil structure and resources (immigrant share) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Pupils eligible for Key Stage 2 Assessment 
OLS 
Immigrant share 0.26*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.14*** 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
IV 
Immigrant share 0.27*** 
(0.02) 
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.82*** 
(0.08) 
3.03* 
(1.79) 
Pupils whose first language is not English 
OLS 
Immigrant share 4.50*** 
(0.08) 
5.18*** 
(0.14) 
3.54*** 
(0.10) 
2.74*** 
(0.10) 
IV 
Immigrant share 4.54*** 
(0.09) 
5.63*** 
(0.17) 
4.91*** 
(0.32) 
6.44 
(4.66) 
Native Pupils 
OLS 
Immigrant share -1.18*** 
(0.09) 
-3.46*** 
(0.13) 
-1.50*** 
(0.13) 
-1.98*** 
(0.16) 
IV 
Immigrant share -1.25*** 
(0.09) 
-3.63*** 
(0.15) 
2.01*** 
(0.38) 
14.92 
(9.27) 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 
OLS 
Immigrant share -0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
IV 
Immigrant share -0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.14*** 
(0.03) 
1.24* 
(0.70) 
Number of teachers 
OLS 
Immigrant share 0.17*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.14*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
IV 
Immigrant share 0.18*** 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.44*** 
(0.03) 
0.70 
(0.49) 
# observations 19376 19376 19376 19376 
# schools 9688 9688 9688 9688 
Year effects Yes No Yes No 
Local 
authority*year 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
School fixed 
effects 
No No Yes Yes 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the LSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Table D 3: Immigration and educational outcomes (immigrant share) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or above in English 
OLS 
Immigrant share -0.08*** 
(0.01) 
-0.22*** 
(0.02) 
0.37*** 
(0.03) 
0.27*** 
(0.04) 
IV 
Immigrant share -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.58*** 
(0.10) 
2.08 
(1.57) 
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or above in Maths 
OLS 
Immigrant share -0.08*** 
(0.01) 
-0.21*** 
(0.02) 
0.40*** 
(0.04) 
0.36*** 
(0.05) 
IV 
Immigrant share -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.43*** 
(0.11) 
0.97 
(1.46) 
Average Point Score 
OLS 
Immigrant share -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.03*** 
(0.00) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
IV 
Immigrant share -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.31 
(0.21) 
Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a level in English due to absence or 
disapplication 
OLS 
Immigrant share -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
IV 
Immigrant share -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.13 
(0.24) 
Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a level in Maths due to absence or 
disapplication 
OLS 
Immigrant share -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
IV 
Immigrant share -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.20) 
# observations 19376 19376 19376 19376 
# schools 9688 9688 9688 9688 
Year effects Yes No Yes No 
Local 
authority*year 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
School fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the LSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Table D 4: Immigration and school spending (immigrant share) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
 Total expenditure (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 3148.45*** -666.84 2982.37*** -177414.04* 
 (426.82) (727.68) (418.26) (100466.61) 
 Total income (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 3250.33*** -688.36 3074.31*** -1851.94* 
 (436.29) (744.69) (424.22) (1040.28) 
 Average salary of full-time teacher 
Immigrant share 7164.44*** -1738.03*** 7877.88*** -1287.04*** 
 (299.83) (423.39) (319.35) (474.99) 
 Teaching staff (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 972.60*** -625.68** 916.09*** -1039.44** 
 (169.38) (297.40) (153.91) (442.27) 
 Supply teachers (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 228.43*** 39.19 236.25*** 21.90 
 (22.73) (30.09) (24.55) (35.39) 
 Education support staff (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 839.87*** -25.45 747.50*** -372.38 
 (132.44) (232.57) (133.23) (287.42) 
 Premises (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 193.43*** -39.03 177.21*** -136.25 
 (36.24) (64.57) (34.76) (96.47) 
 Back office (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 328.81*** -42.90 326.03*** -129.16 
 (41.18) (69.03) (44.15) (88.48) 
 Catering (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 149.95*** 58.47*** 139.76*** 67.27 
 (9.72) (13.84) (9.43) (17.63) 
 Energy (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share -2.22 -19.56* -5.17 -35.32*** 
 (6.26) (9.98) (6.43) (11.25) 
 Learning resources (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 74.07*** 5.06 75.82*** -12.41 
 (8.22) (13.31) (8.01) (21.30) 
 ICT Learning resources (£/pupil) 
Immigrant share 0.04*** 0.00 0.04*** -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Local authority FEs No Yes No Yes 
Observations 13758 13758 13758 13758 
 
Coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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8.5 Appendix E: Results using MSOA level data with immigrant 
numbers 
 
Table E 1: First stage of all specifications (immigrant numbers) 
 1 2 2 4 
Shift-share 
predicted number 
of immigrants 
0.93*** 0.92*** 0.76*** 0.72*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.93 0.95 0.67 0.77 
Kleibergen-Paap 
F stat (excl. 
instrument) 
19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
Year effects Yes No Yes No 
Local 
authority*year 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
School fixed 
effects 
No No Yes Yes 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Table E 2: Immigration, pupil structure and resources 
Pupils whose first language is not English 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
5.10*** 5.27*** 3.02*** 2.37*** 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.12) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.57 0.64 0.44 0.52 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
5.21*** 5.84*** 3.11*** 2.28*** 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.17) (0.30) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.57 0.64 0.44 0.52 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.02*** -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.32 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.02*** -0.01** 0.07*** 0.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.31 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Number of teachers 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
0.20*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.13 0.32 0.15 0.26 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
0.20*** 0.12*** 0.24*** 0.13*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.13 0.32 0.13 0.26 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Native Pupils 
 
  1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-1.21*** -3.25*** -0.56*** -0.79*** 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.18) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.03 0.22 0.21 0.27 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-1.33*** -3.57*** 0.83*** 1.35*** 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.18) (0.34) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.03 0.22 0.19 0.25 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Table E 3: Immigration and educational outcomes  
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or above in English 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.10*** -0.23*** 0.32*** 0.21*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.24 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.06*** -0.18*** 0.37*** 0.31*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.24 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
 
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or above in Maths 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.10*** -0.22*** 0.35*** 0.30*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.31 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.06*** -0.17*** 0.37*** 0.43*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.10) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.31 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Number of Pupils eligible for Key Stage 2 Assessment 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
0.32*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.03 0.24 0.11 0.21 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
0.33*** 0.24*** 0.50*** 0.58*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.20 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on 
the MSOA level in parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, 
**5%, ***1% 
 
Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a level in English 
due to absence or disapplication 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.01*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.16 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.01*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.16 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a level in Maths due to absence or 
disapplication 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.01*** -0.00* -0.01*** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.16 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.16 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Average Point Score 
  
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.02*** -0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.10 
IV 
Number of 
immigrants 
(in 100s) 
-0.01*** -0.02*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.10 
widstat 19119.39 5714.10 971.91 277.58 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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8.6 Appendix F: Results using MSOA level data with immigrant shares 
Table F 1: First stage of all specifications (immigrant share) 
 1 2 3 4 
Shift-share 
“predicted 
share” 
0.92*** 0.88*** 0.44*** 0.15*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.93 0.96 0.56 0.74 
Kleibergen-
Paap F stat 
(excl. 
instrument) 
28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
Year effects Yes No Yes No 
Local 
authority*year 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
School fixed 
effects 
No No Yes Yes 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Table F 2: Immigration, pupil structure and resources 
Pupils whose first language is not English 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
4.54*** 5.60*** 4.09*** 3.51*** 
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.11) (0.13) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.58 0.66 0.47 0.54 
IV 
Immigrant 
share 
4.55*** 6.03*** 4.99*** 6.07*** 
 (0.10) (0.18) (0.27) (1.42) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.58 0.66 0.46 0.50 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Pupil Teacher Ratio 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.02*** -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.32 
IV 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.02*** -0.02*** 0.12*** 0.45*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.13) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.10 0.22 0.21 0.24 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Number of teachers 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
0.18*** 0.10*** 0.17*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.14 0.31 0.14 0.26 
IV 
Immigrant 
share 
0.18*** 0.11*** 0.40*** 0.29** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.14) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.13 0.32 0.05 0.21 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Native Pupils 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
-1.11*** -3.69*** -1.52*** -2.30*** 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.20) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.03 0.23 0.21 0.28 
IV 
Immigrant 
share 
-1.21*** -3.95*** 1.27*** 3.17 
 (0.10) (0.17) (0.33) (1.94) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.03 0.23 0.18 0.22 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Table F 3: Immigration and educational outcomes  
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or above in English 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.09*** -0.25*** 0.43*** 0.36*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.24 
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IV 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.05*** -0.17*** 0.53*** 0.97** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.47) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.23 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Percentage of Pupils achieving level 4 or above in Maths 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.08*** -0.23*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.11 0.20 0.27 0.32 
IV 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.05*** -0.17*** 0.46*** 1.07* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.55) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.30 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Number of Pupils eligible for Key Stage 2 Assessment 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
0.27*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.06* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.02 0.24 0.11 0.21 
IV 
Immigrant 
share 
0.27*** 0.20*** 0.77*** 1.46*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.42) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.02 0.24 0.06 0.09 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a level in English due to absence or 
disapplication 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.01*** -0.00 -0.04*** -0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.16 
IV 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.01*** -0.01** 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.16 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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Percentage of Pupils failing to achieve a level in Maths due to absence or 
disapplication 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.01*** -0.00* -0.03*** -0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.16 
IV 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.01*** -0.01*** 0.02 -0.07 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.16 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Average Point Score 
 
 1 2 3 4 
OLS 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.01*** -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
N 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 19376.00 
r2 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.10 
IV 
Immigrant 
share 
-0.01*** -0.02*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) 
N 19205.00 19205.00 19034.00 19034.00 
r2 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.03 
widstat 28794.88 7360.60 485.20 25.62 
 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the MSOA level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
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